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ABSTRACT 
User-friendly systems of human factors (HF) analysis are not presently 
available to the managers of small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs).   It is 
therefore difficult for such professionals to assess the safety culture within 
their own workplaces without the assistance of externally sourced experts. 
Large companies have implemented methods of HF analysis with a significant 
degree of success using HF experts.   The aim of this research project was to 
confirm that SMEs could also benefit from these methods using in-house 
personnel with a specially-created HF assessment tool. 
Human error is often cited as the cause of accidents and incidents.   A system 
of HF analysis was created as part of this research project to allow the 
technique to be implemented by non-experts within SMEs to identify human-
related risks and thereby to assist in improving safety culture and safety 
performance by implementing measures to minimise those risks through HF 
methods. 
This research project found that potential collaboration partners that were 
initially keen to take part soon withdrew from the research project after 
realising what was involved in terms of required resources. 
For those companies that participated, the workforce was surveyed to 
determine the workplace safety culture.   Some positive results were obtained 
but the overriding findings of this research project were that, of the majority of 
SMEs that were keen to collaborate, they did not actually want to change their 
safety culture; rather, they were content to continue to implement safety by 
enforcement of rules & regulations (antecedents) with little scope for 
implementation of behaviour-based safety systems of control.   Although most 
companies approached knew of the potential benefits it was clear that they 
had no desire to allocate the resources necessary to achieve those benefits. 
  
   iii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables .................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures ................................................................................................. xi 
Acronym List .................................................................................................. xii 
1.0 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Research Project Scope .......................................................................... 12 
1.2 Research Project Objectives ................................................................... 14 
2.0 BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 18 
2.1 Societal Expectations .............................................................................. 18 
2.2 Human Failings - The Root Cause of Accidents ...................................... 20 
2.3 Equipment Failings .................................................................................. 21 
2.4 Major Accident Statistics .......................................................................... 21 
2.5 Case Studies ........................................................................................... 26 
2.6 Case Study 1 – Forth Road Bridge Suspension Cable Corrosion ............ 29 
2.7 Case Study 2 – Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster ................................. 36 
2.8 Case Study 3 – Ladbroke Grove Rail Disaster ......................................... 45 
2.9 Case Study 4 – Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure .............................................. 57 
2.10 Case Study 5 – Buncefield Explosion ...................................................... 65 
2.11 Human Factors as a Solution................................................................... 71 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................... 79 
3.1 What is Human Factors? ......................................................................... 79 
3.2 What methods of assessing human factors are available? ...................... 83 
3.3 Why do people make mistakes and violate safety rules? ......................... 92 
3.4 Methods Available to Prevent Mistakes and Violations? .......................... 97 
3.5 How Do Ethical Values Affect Safety Culture? ....................................... 100 
3.6 Literature Review Conclusion ................................................................ 104 
4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................ 106 
4.1 General ................................................................................................. 106 
4.2 Safety Culture Survey ............................................................................ 107 
4.3 Research Study Partners ....................................................................... 109 
4.4 Large Businesses .................................................................................. 111 
4.5 Small Businesses .................................................................................. 112 
4.6 Non-Transportation Companies ............................................................. 112 
4.7 Transportation Companies .................................................................... 123 
   iv 
4.8 Collaborator Participation Issues ........................................................... 124 
5.0 SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY ASSESSMENT TOOL ...................... 127 
5.1 Assessment Tool Response Values ...................................................... 127 
5.2 Assessment Tool Quality Factors .......................................................... 129 
5.3 Survey Analysis ..................................................................................... 139 
5.4 Safety Culture Survey Sections Reliability Analysis ............................... 142 
5.5 Safety Culture Survey Quality Factors Reliability Analysis ..................... 155 
6.0 COLLABORATOR RESPONSE ASSESSMENT .............................. 174 
6.1 Company “A” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output................................... 174 
6.2 Company “C1” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output ................................ 189 
6.3 Company “C2” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output ................................ 201 
6.4 Company “C3” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output ................................ 211 
6.5 General Analysis ................................................................................... 218 
7.0 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH ............................. 226 
7.1 Research Project Objectives ................................................................. 226 
7.2 Safety Culture Survey ............................................................................ 228 
7.3 General Comment on Research ............................................................ 230 
7.4 HF Implementation Process (Think, Plan, Consult, Do, Review) ............ 231 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................... 233 
8.1 Background ........................................................................................... 233 
8.2 Literature Review ................................................................................... 234 
8.3 Safety Culture Survey Design ................................................................ 235 
8.4 Assessment Tool ................................................................................... 235 
8.5 Data Analysis ........................................................................................ 236 
8.6 General Conclusions ............................................................................. 237 
9.0 FURTHER WORK ............................................................................ 239 
9.1 Recruitment of More Participating Companies ....................................... 240 
9.2 Assessment Tool Quality Factors .......................................................... 240 
9.3 Alternative Recruitment Methods ........................................................... 240 
9.4 Assessment Tool Development ............................................................. 241 
9.5 More Respondent Involvement .............................................................. 242 
9.6 Safety Culture Survey Development ...................................................... 243 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 245 
   v 
A. APPENDIX: COLLABORATOR PRESENTATION ........................... 255 
B. APPENDIX – SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ..... 262 
C. APPENDIX – SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ..... 292 
D. APPENDIX – ASSESSMENT TOOL EXAMPLE OUTPUT ............... 298 
E APPENDIX – AUTHOR EXPERIENCE ............................................ 311 
F APPENDIX – EXAMPLE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (COMPANY A) . 312 
G APPENDIX – EXAMPLE FACTOR ANALYSIS (COMPANY A) ....... 318 
 
  
   vi 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1: Williams’ Violation-Producing Conditions ..................................... 89 
Table 5.1: Survey Response Values ........................................................... 128 
Table 5.2: Example Statement Response Scoring ...................................... 128 
Table 5.3: Survey Quality ............................................................................ 130 
Table 5.4: Survey Thoroughness ................................................................ 131 
Table 5.5: Negative Responses Quality Factor Allocation ........................... 132 
Table 5.6: Blame Culture Quality Factor Value Allocation ........................... 132 
Table 5.7: Indifferent Responses ................................................................ 136 
Table 5.8: Disagree / Agree Ratio ............................................................... 138 
Table 5.9: Consecutive Indifferent Responses ............................................ 139 
Table 5.10: Safety Culture Value ................................................................ 139 
Table 5.11: Ranking of Survey Secondary Value Total ............................... 140 
Table 5.12: Mean Quality Factors ............................................................... 140 
Table 5.13: Safety Culture Section Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient ............... 143 
Table 5.14: Safety Culture Factor Analysis ................................................. 143 
Table 5.15: Organisational Measures Section Reliability Analysis .............. 144 
Table 5.16: Organisational Measures Factor Analysis ................................ 145 
Table 5.17: Incident Management Section Reliability Analysis ................... 146 
Table 5.18: Incident Management Factor Analysis ..................................... 147 
Table 5.19: Competence Management Section Reliability Analysis ............ 148 
Table 5.20: Competence Management Factor Analysis .............................. 148 
Table 5.21: Influencing Factors Section Reliability Analysis ........................ 149 
Table 5.22: Influencing Factors Section Factor Analysis ............................. 149 
Table 5.23: My Role Section Reliability Analysis ......................................... 150 
Table 5.24: My Role Section Factor Analysis .............................................. 151 
Table 5.25: My Manager Section Reliability Analysis .................................. 152 
Table 5.26: My Manager Section Factor Analysis ....................................... 152 
Table 5.27: Communications Section Reliability Analysis ........................... 153 
Table 5.28: Communications Section Factor Analysis ................................ 153 
Table 5.29: The Organisation Section Reliability Analysis .......................... 154 
Table 5.30: The Organisation Section Factor Analysis ................................ 154 
Table 5.31: Survey Response Quality Reliability Analysis .......................... 155 
Table 5.32: Survey Response Quality Factor Analysis................................ 156 
   vii 
Table 5.33: Blame Culture Reliability Analysis ............................................ 156 
Table 5.34: Blame Culture Factor Analysis ................................................. 156 
Table 5.35: Colleague Trust Reliability Analysis ......................................... 157 
Table 5.36: Colleague Trust Factor Analysis ............................................... 157 
Table 5.37: Intervention Reliability Analysis ................................................ 158 
Table 5.38: Intervention Factor Analysis ..................................................... 158 
Table 5.39: Communications Reliability Analysis ........................................ 158 
Table 5.40: Communications Factor Analysis ............................................. 159 
Table 5.41: Incident Management Reliability Analysis ................................ 160 
Table 5.42: Incident Management Factor Analysis ..................................... 160 
Table 5.43: Competence Reliability Analysis .............................................. 160 
Table 5.44: Competence Factor Analysis .................................................... 161 
Table 5.45: Roles & Responsibilities Reliability Analysis ............................ 161 
Table 5.46: Roles & Responsibilities Factor Analysis.................................. 162 
Table 5.47: Safety Culture Reliability Analysis ............................................ 162 
Table 5.48: Safety Culture Factor Analysis ................................................. 163 
Table 5.49: Organisational Measures Reliability Analysis ........................... 164 
Table 5.50: Organisational Measures Factor Analysis ................................ 164 
Table 5.51: Empowerment Reliability Analysis ............................................ 165 
Table 5.52: Empowerment Factor Analysis ................................................. 165 
Table 5.53: Procedural Awareness Reliability Analysis ............................... 166 
Table 5.54: Procedural Awareness Factor Analysis .................................... 166 
Table 5.55: Management Pressure / Stress Reliability Analysis ................. 167 
Table 5.56: Management Pressure / Stress Factor Analysis ....................... 167 
Table 5.57: Employee Value Reliability Analysis ......................................... 168 
Table 5.58: Employee Value Pressure / Stress Factor Analysis ................. 168 
Table 5.59: Safety Promotion Reliability Analysis ....................................... 169 
Table 5.60: Safety Promotion Factor Analysis ............................................ 169 
Table 5.61: Resources Reliability Analysis .................................................. 170 
Table 5.62: Resources Factor Analysis ....................................................... 170 
Table 5.63: Motivation Reliability Analysis .................................................. 171 
Table 5.64: Motivation Factor Analysis........................................................ 171 
Table 5.65: Training Reliability Analysis ...................................................... 172 
Table 5.66: Training Factor Analysis ........................................................... 172 
   viii 
Table 6.1: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output ...................................... 174 
Table 6.2: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel
 .................................................................................................................... 179 
Table 6.3: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management 
Personnel .................................................................................................... 181 
Table 6.4: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed All 
Personnel .................................................................................................... 183 
Table 6.5: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
Non-Management Personnel Only .............................................................. 185 
Table 6.6: Company “A” Accident Statistics ................................................ 188 
Table 6.7: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output .................................... 189 
Table 6.8: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel
 .................................................................................................................... 192 
Table 6.9: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management 
Personnel .................................................................................................... 193 
Table 6.10: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
All Personnel ............................................................................................... 195 
Table 6.11: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
Non-Management Personnel Only .............................................................. 197 
Table 6.12: Company “C” Accident Statistics .............................................. 199 
Table 6.13 Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output ................................... 202 
Table 6.14: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel
 .................................................................................................................... 204 
Table 6.15: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management 
Personnel .................................................................................................... 206 
Table 6.16: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
All Personnel ............................................................................................... 207 
Table 6.17: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
Non-Management Personnel Only .............................................................. 209 
Table 6.18: Company “C3” Assessment Tool Output .................................. 212 
Table 6.19: Company “C3” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel
 .................................................................................................................... 214 
Table 6.20: Company “C3” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management 
Personnel .................................................................................................... 216 
   ix 
Table 6.21: Company “A” Management / Non-Management Comparison ... 218 
Table 6.22: Company “C1” Management / Non-Management Comparison 219 
Table 6.23: Company “C2” Management / Non-Management Comparison 220 
Table 6.24: Company “C3” Management / Non-Management Comparison 220 
Table 6.25: Additional Disagree Statements Analysis ................................. 223 
Table D.1: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Quality Factors ................ 298 
Table D.2: Company A Baseline: Modal / Mean Values .............................. 298 
Table D.3: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Values ............................. 298 
Table D.4: Company A Baseline: Management Safety Culture Quality Factors
 .................................................................................................................... 299 
Table D.5: Company A Baseline: Management Modal / Mean Values ........ 299 
Table D.6: Company A Baseline: Management Safety Culture Values ....... 299 
Table D.7: Company A Baseline: Non-Management Safety Culture Quality 
Factors ........................................................................................................ 300 
Table D.8: Company A Baseline: Non-Management Modal / Mean Values 300 
Table D.9: Company A Baseline: Non-Management Safety Culture Values 300 
Table D.10: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Quality Factors: Poor 
Quality Responses Removed ...................................................................... 301 
Table D.11: Company A Baseline: Modal / Mean Values: Poor Quality 
Responses Removed .................................................................................. 301 
Table D.12: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Values: Poor Quality 
Responses Removed .................................................................................. 301 
Table D.13: Company A Baseline: Non-Management: Safety Culture Quality 
Factors: Poor Quality Responses Removed ............................................... 302 
Table D.14: Company A Baseline: Non-Management: Modal / Mean Values: 
Poor Quality Responses Removed ............................................................. 302 
Table D.15: Company A Baseline: Non-Management: Safety Culture Values: 
Poor Quality Responses Removed ............................................................. 302 
Table D.16: Company A Final: Safety Culture Quality Factors .................... 303 
Table D.17: Company A Final: Modal / Mean Values .................................. 303 
Table D.18: Company A Final: Safety Culture Values ................................. 303 
Table D.19: Company A Final: Management: Safety Culture Quality Factors
 .................................................................................................................... 304 
Table D.20: Company A Final: Management: Modal / Mean Values ........... 304 
   x 
Table D.21: Company A Final: Management: Safety Culture Values .......... 304 
Table D.22: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Quality 
Factors ........................................................................................................ 305 
Table D.23: Company A Final: Non-Management: Modal / Mean Values ... 305 
Table D.24: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Values .. 305 
Table D.25: Company A Final: Safety Culture Quality Factors: Poor Quality 
Responses Removed .................................................................................. 306 
Table D.26: Company A Final: Modal / Mean Values: Poor Quality Responses 
Removed ..................................................................................................... 306 
Table D.27: Company A Final: Safety Culture Values: Poor Quality 
Responses Removed .................................................................................. 306 
Table D.28: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Quality 
Factors: Poor Quality Responses Removed ............................................... 307 
Table D.29: Company A Final: Non-Management: Modal / Mean Values: Poor 
Quality Responses Removed ...................................................................... 307 
Table D.30: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Values: 
Poor Quality Responses Removed ............................................................. 307 
 
  
   xi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: ABC Model .................................................................................... 3 
Figure 2.1: UK Vehicle Usage ....................................................................... 19 
Figure 2.2: Railway Industry Fatalities (by people and location breakdown) . 22 
Figure 2.3: Railway Industry Annual Fatalities .............................................. 23 
Figure 2.4: No of Fatal Railway Accidents / Crashes .................................... 24 
Figure 2.5: Fatalities in UK Industry .............................................................. 25 
Figure 2.6: Major Injuries in UK Industry ....................................................... 26 
Figure 2.7: NASA Flight Readiness Structure ............................................... 40 
Figure 2.8: Typical Blast Wave Pressure / Time Curves ............................... 67 
Figure 2.9: Iterative HF Application Process ................................................. 75 
Figure 3.1: ABC Implementation ................................................................... 92 
Figure 3.2: Generic Error-Modelling System ................................................. 93 
Figure 3.3: Performance Level Failure Modes .............................................. 94 
Figure 6.1: Company A Colleague Competence Assessment ..................... 224 
Figure 6.2: Company C1 Colleague Competence Assessment .................. 224 
Figure 6.3: Company C2 Colleague Competence Assessment .................. 224 
Figure 6.4: Company C3 Colleague Competence Assessment .................. 224 
Figure D.1: Company A – Safety Culture Statements ................................. 308 
Figure D.2: Company A – Organisational Measures Statements ................ 308 
Figure D.3: Company A – Incident Management Statements ..................... 308 
Figure D.4: Company A – Competence Management Statements .............. 309 
Figure D.5: Company A – Influencing Factors Statements .......................... 309 
Figure D.6: Company A – My Role Statements ........................................... 309 
Figure D.7: Company A – My Manager Statements .................................... 310 
Figure D.8: Company A – Communications Statements ............................. 310 
Figure D.9: Company A – The Organisation Statements ............................ 310 
 
 
  
   xii 
Acronym List 
AAIB Air Accident Investigation Branch 
ABA Applied Behaviour Analysis 
ABC Antecedents, Behaviours, Consequences 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ATEX Atmosphere Explosible 
ATP Automatic Train Protection 
BBS Behaviour Based Safety 
BSTG Buncefield Standards Task Group 
BTP British Transport Police 
CA Competent Authority (HSE & EA & SEPA combined) 
COMAH Control of Major Accident Hazards 
CNES Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (French Space Agency) 
DSEAR Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres 
 Regulations 
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System 
ESA European Space Agency 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FRB Forth road Bridge 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HEA Human Error Analysis 
HEART Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
HMRI Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate 
HSC Health and Safety Commission 
HFE Human Factors Engineering 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
HSL Health and Safety Laboratory 
IHLS Independent High Level Switch 
KSC Kennedy Space Centre 
MMI Man Machine Interface 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATS National Air Traffic Service 
NVQ National Vocational Qualification 
OBC On Board Computer 
OFCE Open Flammable Cloud Explosion 
ORR Office of Rail Regulation 
   xiii 
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand 
PSLG Process Safety Leadership Group 
RAIB Railway Accident Investigation Branch 
RBI Risk Based Inspection 
RCFA Root cause failure analysis 
RCM Reliability Centred Maintenance 
RSSB Rail Standards and Safety Board 
SA/SD Strongly Agree / Strongly Disagree 
SCT Safety Culture Tool 
SME Small to Medium Sized Enterprise 
SPAD Signal Passed at Danger 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
SRI Inertial Reference System 
TAL Transoceanic Abort Landing 
THERP Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
TOC Train Operating Company 
TPWS Train Protection and Warning System 
TESEO Technica Empirica Stima Errori Operati 
 
 
  
   Page 1 of 322 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
UK transportation and heavy industries have endured much negative publicity 
in the past regarding poor service and reliability.   Serious (including fatal) 
accidents and increasing costs to the consumer have all added to the 
unenviable position in which these industry sectors find themselves. 
Safety has improved through better methods of risk assessment and control 
in the workplace, greater regulation and enforcement and better training for 
workers but the number of accidents is still unacceptably high. 
In 1900 the proportion of manufacturing in the UK GDP was 28% and by the 
year 2000 this had reduced to 14% (Lindsay, 2000).   At the present time, 
manufacturing output appears to be showing a small positive growth (but at a 
reduced rate from previous recent quarters) while the overall UK economic 
growth is still positive (following the recession of 2008 / 2009) it has also 
slowed recently.   Recent data shows that the current manufacturing output is 
approximately 12.8% of GDP and growing (O’Grady, 2010).   The service 
sector continues to grow as seen from the official government data (from 21% 
in 1900 to 32% in 2000) (Lindsay, 2003). 
From the rich history of the UK industrial revolution it is disappointing to 
consider that, in the future, the UK could become totally dependent on the 
output of other countries for all manufactured products.   This would be bad 
for the UK economy as a result of the lost jobs in the manufacturing sector 
(with the potential to lose the manufacturing know how and capability at the 
same time); however, it is highly likely that a degree of manufacturing will 
always remain, with the subsequent requirement to manufacture goods safely 
from design through to delivery to the consumer.   This is especially true for 
products associated with civil defence and national security where the UK is 
at the forefront of many emerging technologies. 
Clearly, transport system infrastructure and associated control and monitoring 
systems cannot be farmed out to other countries as they form part of the built 
environment around us but the operation and maintenance of all such 
systems will remain a core function of any operator in the sector.   In contrast 
to this, a UK company (Alexander Dennis) has recently announced winning a 
new £25M contract to supply buses to New Zealand.   The buses will be 
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manufactured within the UK in kit form and will be assembled by a partner in 
New Zealand.   It is clear that in some sectors at least, UK industry is fighting 
back to win contracts over the rest of the world and to improve cost 
efficiencies using the latest technology and methods to do so.   Such 
companies cannot be at the forefront of such sectors without working safely 
and efficiently. 
The continuous introduction of new or updated EU and national industrial 
legislation means that heavy industry is becoming more and more regulated 
as time goes on.   Such trends mean that it is becoming even more important 
(and more difficult) for companies to seek new and more novel methods of 
improving safety, productivity and environmental performance.   The 
application of human factors methods of risk reduction through improvements 
in safety culture / safety behaviour is one such method. 
The UK HSE states that “Human factors refer to environmental, 
organisational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics 
which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and 
safety.” (HSG48, 1999)   They also state that “Human factors is a broad field 
and organisations may have viewed it in the past as being too complex or 
difficult to do anything about.”   This is in broad agreement with the attitude of 
companies as found during the period of this research project.   Human 
factors is described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Agnew and Snyder (2008) describe the ABC model of behaviour-based safety 
methods of reducing risk.   This is a model comprised of three elements: 
antecedents, behaviours and consequences (ABC).   An antecedent is 
described as any person, place, thing or event that comes before a situation 
that requires a behavioural action.   A behaviour is what is seen or done in 
carrying out work, tasks and actions.   The consequences are the events that 
occur after or simultaneously with the behaviour.   The consequences of the 
behaviour can affect the probability of the same behaviour being carried out in 
future depending on whether the consequences were favourable or 
unfavourable (irrespective of whether they were correct, incorrect or even 
inherently unsafe).   This is one of the problems with human perception: a 
poor or unsafe behaviour is often rewarded with good consequences such as 
completing the task quicker or with less people or using less raw materials.   
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Management personnel can also be at fault for reinforcing this unsafe 
behaviour with positive encouragement for the good consequences that were 
achieved (even though they may have been achieved through potentially 
unsafe behaviour, including violations).   Such encouragement serves to 
make those behaviours more likely in the future.   Potentially unsafe 
behaviours will not result in undesirable consequences every time but will 
present the potential for undesirable consequences every time and may result 
in those consequences being realised under only slightly different 
circumstances. 
The ABC model is shown in Figure 1.1 below.   The feedback loop between 
consequences and antecedents is shown.   Whatever consequences were 
achieved in previous tasks become indirect antecedents for future tasks. 
 
Figure 1.1: ABC Model 
©2008 Aubrey Daniels International, Inc. Taken, in part, from Agnew & Snyder, Removing 
Obstacles to Safety. Atlanta: Performance Management Publications, p. 26, 2008. 
Roughton and Mercurio (2002) state that there is presently no documented 
texts offering a method of integrating behaviour based safety systems (BBS) 
of risk reduction into existing health and safety management systems and that 
many such methods “stand out like a sore thumb” when implemented 
alongside existing health and safety management systems.   They also 
confirm that BBS is not able to solve all safety issues but that it is only one of 
the tools that a business can use in the aim of risk reduction.   It is only 
capable of solving issues caused by potentially unsafe human behaviours and 
the other methods of risk reduction (antecedents) such as hazard recognition, 
inventory reduction, material substitution, procedures, training, etc. should all 
be implemented in combination with BBS methods. 
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It can be seen from the above that human factors / BBS methods of risk 
reduction do not directly affect the antecedent part of the ABC model but 
affect the behaviour part of the model and, indirectly, the consequences part 
of the model.   The antecedents are the hazards that are present in the 
workplace and also the physical and organisational controls that are in place 
to control them such as training, risk assessment, procedures, rules, personal 
protective equipment, etc.   The antecedent controls are not behaviour-based 
but are rule-based.  They do still require personnel to follow the rules / 
procedures which means that they are still indirectly related to human 
behaviour.   Any failure to follow those rules would be classified as a violation.   
There is a significant difference between errors and violations: errors can be 
prevented by providing better training, supervision and motivation whilst 
violations can only be prevented by changing the behaviours of the violators.   
Errors occur as a result of poor decisions (based on inadequate information, 
experience, competence or knowledge) while violations occur as a result of 
the person knowingly deciding to break the rules.   Changing the behaviour of 
people can assist in preventing errors and violations from re-occurring.   This 
statement forms the basis of the application of human factors in the 
workplace.   The method is entirely concerned with the assessment and 
correction of the human decision-making process.   The implementation of 
any antecedent measures within the workplace environment that assist in this 
can also be identified and implemented through human factors assessment. 
A variety of legislative improvement initiatives have been introduced by the 
EU regarding industrial safety and public transportation systems such as 
Seveso (96/82/EEC, 1996) for workplaces with major accident hazards, ATEX 
(1999/92/EEC, 1999) for workplaces with flammable atmospheres, the EU 
machinery directive (2006/42/EC, 2006) and a common regulatory rail 
framework directive (2008/110/EC, 2008).   Most of the legislation is 
reactionary, i.e. it has been introduced as a result of single catastrophic 
events or a series of smaller, less significant events.   The key factor is that it 
is always introduced for the increased protection and safety of people, the 
environment and the infrastructure that surrounds us.   The Seveso EU 
Directive was introduced after the massive explosion and dioxin chemical 
release that occurred in Seveso, Italy in 1976.   The prevention of such 
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disasters was not previously covered by any legislation and this directive was 
introduced to ensure that “high risk” chemical plants throughout the EU 
considered the major accident hazard risks and implemented measures to 
minimise all such risks not only to those within the operational plants but also 
to those in the surrounding area that may be affected by such events.   Until 
that time all such incidents were prevented by self-regulation.   In the UK the 
Seveso directive is implemented under the COMAH Regulations (SI1999/743, 
1999). 
Companies generally try to prevent such accidents from occurring under all 
foreseeable types of activity (for financial reasons if nothing else) but without 
regulation or some other method of ensuring that the control and safety 
measures are adequate, the prevention of undesirable outcomes from 
occurring is completely dependent on people acting correctly at all times.   
Individual and corporate competence is therefore at the forefront of the 
prevention of all such accidents. 
A similar series of events resulted in the introduction of the ATEX User 
directive (1999/92EEC, 1999) (to promote safety in those work places 
containing potentially flammable or explosive atmospheres).   This directive 
was implemented under the Dangerous Substances and Explosive 
Atmospheres Regulations (DSEAR) in the UK (SI2002/2776, 2002).   DSEAR 
also implements the Chemical Agents Directive (CAD) (98/24/EC, 1998). 
The railway industry is also undergoing change as a result of new EU 
legislation.   As a means of harmonising the equipment and systems in use 
throughout Europe two EU directives for interoperability have been issued, 
one for high speed railway systems (96/48/EC, 1998) and the other for 
conventional systems (2001/16/EC).   These directives seek to ensure that 
the technology and systems employed throughout the EU converge as time 
goes on, thereby enabling and promoting EU wide co-operation, sharing of 
knowledge and learning and cost minimisation. 
The one thing that all such legislative measures have in common is that they 
are all intended to identify hazards and by doing so they provide a means of 
implementing risk prevention and mitigation measures.   Many of the 
individual requirements of such legislation are focussed on the principles of 
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promoting positive human behaviours, i.e. they clearly describe the type of 
activities that must be carried out in order to identify and reduce risk to a 
tolerable level.   An example of this is DSEAR (SI2002/2776, 2002) which 
clearly describes the principles of explosion safety and informs those 
responsible for ensuring adequate safety is in place through analysis of the 
workplace, the materials handled and the activities carried out.   It could be 
argued that highly capable and experienced personnel would always act 
correctly even without such legislation or guidance in place but not all 
personnel have the same capability or experience and without such 
legislation and guidance in place it is likely that there would be a much higher 
accident rate than at present, accompanied with the subsequent 
consequences to people, the environment and business.   The main objective 
of all such legislation is therefore to identify the minimum requirements and to 
provide clear and unambiguous guidance on what must be achieved in order 
to meet those requirements.   In the UK a core function of the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) is assisting people and companies to achieve the 
required objectives of legislation by direct consultation and by the issuing of 
approved codes of practice for legislation under their control.   These are 
approved documents generally founded on industry best practice and guide 
operators in what they should be doing to achieve the minimum requirements 
of the legislation.   Alternatively, if the operators do not heed the guidance 
provided, the HSE also have the power of enforcement through issuing 
improvement and prohibition notices to those companies or individuals that 
have not achieved the required standard and in extreme cases, by 
prosecuting offenders through the criminal justice system, either proactively 
or after an accident has occurred. 
In the railway industry improvements have ranged from changes to 
management structure and lines of responsibility (especially following the 
collapse of Railtrack in October 2001) to improvements on the train systems 
and associated railway infrastructure.   The benefits of some of these 
initiatives may not be seen or felt in their entirety for many years to come but 
they are no less desired by the public, train operators, track operators and the 
government through the regulatory bodies.   Many of the benefits are not 
visible to the end user and they do little to boost consumer confidence in the 
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ability of the companies concerned to provide a good service that meets their 
expectations, i.e. services running on time, with a seat always available, clean 
carriages, high quality refreshments, etc. 
Whilst accident statistics are important, the consumer does not expect them 
to be a major factor in the quality of service provided as it is assumed by all 
stakeholders involved that public transportation accidents should not occur 
and that passenger safety is therefore the prime concern of everyone from 
traveller to train operating company (TOC) (RSSB, 2005).   Many of the 
projects associated with providing and maintaining passenger safety come 
with a very high price tag.   An example is Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 
which will cost billions to implement throughout the UK rail network.   As a 
result of the complexity of the ATP system and the geographical position of 
the network infrastructure, such systems cannot be installed quickly or easily, 
especially on a network that must remain in operation throughout any such 
upgrade programme.   In the interim period the effects felt by passengers of 
upgrade works on signalling systems and infrastructure are the inevitable 
delays and extended journey times.   TOCs and the infrastructure operator 
are under immense pressure to improve service and safety levels whilst 
maintaining an acceptable level of service to the consumer.   These time / 
operability pressures provide ideal conditions for high stress situations where 
the likelihood of human error is increased.   Such errors can have a 
potentially dangerous effect on the railway network, either directly in the 
operation of the trains or indirectly through the inspection and maintenance of 
the railway infrastructure.   Public perception is that poor track and 
infrastructure maintenance is one of the main causes for railway accidents / 
crashes (RSSB, 2005).   Failure to follow strict operations, inspection and 
maintenance procedures can come at the expense of the lives of workers and 
passengers.   Even the smallest and seemingly insignificant of errors can lead 
to an accident with a scale of effects that is completely indiscriminate to those 
it can affect and is often severely disproportionate to the root cause. 
It is an unfortunate fact that railway accidents involving similar causes 
continue to occur showing that “lessons learned” have not in fact been 
learned at all or have been ignored or forgotten by those who need to know or 
should know better.   The public perception of this fact is also uncannily 
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accurate (RSSB, 2005), potentially as a result of the high profile media 
coverage given to such accidents.   Examples of this are the Potters Bar and 
Grayrigg accidents – both caused by faulty points systems which had 
(allegedly) recently been inspected or maintained by the infrastructure 
operator.   It is clear from preliminary reports that similarities exist between 
the two accidents and that the sense of public outrage at such accidents is 
even greater when corporate and personal negligence appears to be a factor 
time and time again when lessons should have been learned.   Public 
perception shows that drivers and trains are generally trusted and considered 
to be safe but the management of the railway infrastructure is not trusted to 
the same degree (RSSB, 2005).   Unfortunately a common factor in such 
accidents is the attitude and competence of humans and their ability to 
continuously perform their allotted tasks to the required degree of rigour 
under all conditions and with the independence necessary with which to 
ensure adequate safety is achieved at all times. 
The global air transportation industry of the western world (northern 
hemisphere) has an excellent record in preventing accidents caused by 
human error and the UK railway industry is following in its footsteps in terms 
of accident investigation and shared learning through the Rail Accident 
Investigation Branch (RAIB) which is founded on similar principles to the Air 
Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB).   Whilst there are international 
standards for operational activities such as air traffic control and aircraft 
maintenance procedures many countries and aviation companies fall short of 
these standards and are subsequently “blacklisted” from operating in the 
developed world until they can prove that they have met the required 
standards.   An EU-wide system is operated which bans airlines from the 
entire EU area (EU Commission, 2011). 
Public perception and sense of outrage is completely different between 
industrial and transportation accidents.   An occasional (but all too frequent) 
industrial fatal accident rate (perceived low consequence) seems to be more 
tolerable to the UK public than a single incident leading to multiple fatalities 
(perceived high consequence) (Heath and Safety Commission, 2007).   Even 
within the UK there appears to be differences between Scotland and the rest 
of the country in terms of the media coverage given to industrial fatal 
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accidents where the perception in Scotland is that single fatalities are less 
tolerable to the public than elsewhere in the UK (Heath and Safety 
Commission, 2007).   In the UK far more people are killed each year in 
industrial accidents than while using public transport but such accidents are 
not as well publicised and the sense of shock seems to be far greater when a 
higher number of people are involved in a single accident such as with train 
crashes.   Another likely factor of this attitude is that of personal familiarity.   
Whilst most people can relate personally to a train crash as they will have 
used trains at some time in their lives, they will not normally have been 
involved in any specific area of industry in which an accident may have 
occurred and will feel therefore that such an accident couldn’t possibly affect 
them or put them at risk as they consider themselves to be physically and 
geographically detached from the accident, its causes and its consequences. 
Part of the reason for this attitude may be associated with the work ethics 
founded in the UK industrial revolution between the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries when the attitude towards safety was very much that “accidents 
happen” and that people could do nothing other than to accept this fact.   This 
attitude has now largely given way to a more pro-active approach to safety 
awareness and risk reduction.   Personal competence was still a factor in 
those days and apprentices learned how to work safely by copying the 
tradesman who taught them without the requirement for formal procedures. 
The poverty and deprivation of that era meant that people relied heavily on 
their factory earnings and were not therefore empowered to enforce 
acceptable working conditions for fear of losing their jobs and income.   Long 
term, debilitating illnesses (some fatal) associated with handling dangerous 
and harmful materials within industry were also commonplace and were 
accepted as a fact of life which could not be changed.   A huge quantity of 
industrial legislation is now in place in the EU and the UK to promote better 
practices and to prosecute those who disobey the regulations.   In the UK 
workplace injury and illness statistics show that there is still significant scope 
for improvement.   In the year 2009/2010 152 people were killed while at work 
in the UK (Sweeney, 2010).   For the same year, under the Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR), more 
than 121,000 reportable incidents occurred (Sweeney, 2010).   Each one of 
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these incidents represents an event that could cause life-changing injury or 
illness to workers (possibly even a fatality). 
Many developing countries within the world do not have such rigorous 
legislation or workplace ethics and many preventable accidents and illnesses, 
as previously occurred in the UK, continue to occur in those places. 
There are many examples of manufacturing processes being shut down in the 
UK and production moved elsewhere within the world for reasons of cost and 
efficiency.   Whilst such developments provide an overall enhancement to the 
countries involved in terms of revenue generation and employment there will 
be unfortunate individuals that will suffer directly as a result of such policies 
as their right to a safe place of work is not equivalent to that of a worker in the 
EU.   The author has consulted (albeit briefly) in the decommissioning of a 
manufacturing line based in Fife (Scotland) which was being moved in its 
entirety to a factory in India.   There were a few key reasons for such a 
transfer of the line; namely: 
• The manufacturing line did not comply with EU / UK machinery 
guarding and interlocking regulations and achieving compliance was 
deemed to be cost-prohibitive. 
• The machinery guarding and interlocking regulations in India are far 
less prescriptive than in the UK meaning that only minimal investment 
in protective and safety devices was necessary. 
• The UK labour costs associated with the operation of the line could no 
longer be supported for the value of the product being produced. 
• As India is a rapidly developing country, it represented a huge market 
to the product being manufactured and such a move would clearly 
reduce the transportation costs of the finished product. 
Although it was never stated directly, it was clear that one of the underlying 
factors was that there would be far fewer regulatory requirements with 
operating the line (in its current form) in India than in the UK.   This situation 
suggested that the company involved placed less value on the life and well-
being of an Indian citizen than that of a UK citizen which is clearly an ethical 
issue and one that may become more prevalent as time goes on.   It is 
feasible that all such developments may eventually converge with EU 
   Page 11 of 322 
legislation in terms of providing worker protection and well-being but the 
fundamental questions remain as to how long this will take and how many 
people will suffer unnecessarily before that time comes? 
Whilst such economic development of countries is welcomed from all quarters 
it is debatable whether it should be carried out simply to make a profit 
potentially at the expense of the health and well-being of the workers 
involved.   It is the author’s experience, in working for a multi-national oil 
company and as an independent consultant, that most people have similar 
ethical values when it comes to protecting people and the environment from 
harm but that people are sometimes placed in difficult situations by their 
employers or by the situation and are often forced to make what could be 
considered to be unethical decisions as a result of the contributing factors 
involved. 
There are people and corporate bodies that still do not live up to current laws 
and expectations in order to achieve the required degree of safety for 
themselves and others and as a result, EU and UK legislation is constantly 
being implemented and updated to close loopholes and to enforce better 
operating methods.   The number of RIDDOR incidents (121,000) as noted for 
the year 2009 / 2010 clearly shows that it is essential to improve on our 
existing safety performance to minimise the number of injuries to personnel. 
Whilst legislation enables prosecution of those who do not meet the required 
standards the most significant improvement in safety can be made by 
changing people’s attitudes towards personal accountability, engineering 
integrity and personal competence rather than enforcing potentially 
uncomfortable and unfamiliar methods of working through antecedent 
measures.   Some companies will continue to disobey the law simply because 
compliance will affect revenue too much (in their opinion).   The operators of 
those companies are likely to find themselves in court at some point in time 
trying to defend their actions but they will only be there as a result of having 
put workers at risk without understanding the potential consequences of the 
tasks being carried out or worse; after bullying workers into performing tasks 
knowing that they are potentially dangerous. 
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Human factors is becoming more popular in industry as the incentives for its 
incorporation in project, operation and maintenance functions become more 
evident and as the level of understanding within the engineering community 
increases (Harvey, 2004).   Human factors assessment and application of 
behavioural safety initiatives is one of the methods that can be used to 
improve on existing safety systems and reduce overall risk. 
1.1 Research Project Scope 
The scope of this research project was to investigate the application of HF in 
UK industry; specifically within small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs).   
The research covered aspects such as safety management, corporate and 
personal responsibility and competency, accident causation, HF case studies 
and proposed improvements to the way in which safety in UK industry is 
controlled and monitored. 
Assessment of human factors within the workplace is often considered by 
industry managers as an additional (perhaps needless) operating cost and a 
complex method of risk reduction only achievable by using experts in the 
field.   However, only by examining the attitudes of workers and identifying 
potentially unsafe behaviours will it be possible to change potentially unsafe 
behaviours.   It is this behaviour modification that ultimately results in risk 
reduction through better safety culture / behavioural safety. 
Historically, implementation of human factors methods in industry invariably 
involved the use of expert consultancies at significant cost to the client.   The 
benefits are clearly much desired but the costs and human resource 
necessary to implement the methods of assessment and improvement may 
sometimes be seen as outweighing the benefits.   It was an aspiration of this 
research project to bring human factors assessment capability to small to 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by methods which can be applied by non-
experts.   Clearly, such implementation may be considered by experts in the 
field to be a partial or incomplete implementation, compared to what an expert 
may be able to achieve with the same data and resources; however, this 
research project aimed to determine if such methods could be implemented 
by persons with little background or understanding of the methods to achieve 
measurable (and safe) results.   It is possible that misunderstanding results 
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and implementing safety or control measures incorrectly could lead to an 
increased level of risk to workers. 
Implementing human factors methods of risk reduction in the workplace is no 
different from any other activity, i.e. it can take a lifetime to become an expert 
at doing something but in a very short time a person can achieve useful 
results using only a basic appreciation and background knowledge of the 
subject.   There are many examples of this such as a person driving a car but 
who doesn’t understand how the engine or gearbox function together to form 
a means of motive power.   A person learning to ski will fall over often at the 
beginning but will quickly be able to descend down a hill, perhaps not at 
breakneck speed, but with sufficient speed and control with which to enjoy the 
experience.   Human factors and health and safety engineering is not seen as 
being any different to this in that the perfect and thorough application by 
experts will identify all hazards and issues that present a significant risk to 
any particular workplace situation.   In the vast majority of situations that 
present risk to workers, there are relatively simple actions that can be 
implemented to prevent an accident from occurring.   This research project 
was carried out in order to investigate whether the methods of identifying 
these potential actions through human factors and behavioural safety 
assessment could be applied by non-experts and still achieve measurable 
(risk reducing) results. 
For this research study, the basis of implementing human factors assessment 
in the workplace was a survey of workers’ attitudes to the workplace.   The 
outcome of the assessment would be a set of data that would guide the 
employer to elements of the workplace processes that could be changed in 
order to boost morale, improve behavioural safety (and usually efficiency) and 
improve safety culture within the workplace.   The assessment and 
subsequent corrective measures should be directed at the most significant 
areas in which accidents can be prevented and would therefore provide a 
system of safety culture improvement for minimal cost and one that is based 
on prioritising the most significant issues and addressing these in order of 
importance as defined by employee perception and management priorities.   
Many systems of HF analysis, as provided by specialist external 
consultancies, utilise their own data gathering and analysis tools and involve 
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carrying out extensive surveys and interviews of personnel to fill in their data 
fields.   The data is then transformed into an action plan for implementation.   
The system of HF analysis created as part of this research project sought to 
obtain the same (or similar) data but, instead of creating another layer of 
safety management, would assist in making subtle changes to existing 
procedures and systems to ensure that HF was applied as part of existing 
processes and with existing resources. 
1.2 Research Project Objectives 
This first part of this research programme involved the review of the causation 
of high profile industrial and public transportation accidents and to 
hypothesize from the official findings whether the application of HF 
assessments could have prevented any of the accidents from occurring and 
how such application may be applied in order to maximise safety and 
minimise the likelihood of similar accidents occurring in the future. 
It was confirmed in this project that small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
often have little or no capability to implement such measures.   All of the 
companies approached expressed a desire to participate in the research but 
none of them had any resources to do so.   This included SMEs with a 
handful of employees and multi-national companies with thousands of 
employees. 
This research project aimed to build upon the work and methods previously 
carried out in order to propose a system of HF analysis implementation which 
could be applied by SMEs and larger companies in a quick and efficient 
manner with minimum resources such that they can also reap the benefits of 
lower operating costs and lower risk. 
This research programme sought out collaboration partners for the research 
study in terms of identifying existing practices and testing the implementation 
of the HF system in an industrial, transportation or manufacturing setting.   
The research therefore not only endeavoured to provide the means and 
methods by which HF implementation could be carried out by an SME but 
also intended to discover whether the professionally skilled engineer / 
manager could deploy such a system successfully, with little external 
assistance, to such an extent that real benefits could be achieved.   The 
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research would therefore not only add to existing knowledge but would also 
attempt to create less formal methods of utilising existing knowledge by 
opening up the application of HF to a far greater community of people. 
The collaboration partners were chosen based on the original criteria listed 
below. 
• Had employees in all grades of technical personnel, apprentice to 
chartered engineer; 
• Handled dangerous or potentially explosive materials / substances 
providing for a significant level of real risk to workers; 
• Didn’t have any existing formal application of human factors methods 
of risk reduction; 
• Had the requirement to design, install, operate, inspect and maintain 
safety-critical systems for provision of worker safety or that of the 
consumer (in terms of product safety) or the environment; 
• Had in-house projects, maintenance and operations personnel; 
• Preferably had less than 100 employees (technical, operational, 
supervisory and managerial). 
At first glance, this may seem like a very restrictive list of criteria that would 
rule out most companies and SMEs in existence.   However, through existing 
author/client relationships, 63 potential collaborators were identified as 
suitable.   Several additional factors were used to determine which companies 
would be approached to consider collaboration in the research project.   
These were location, current relationship status and the author’s perceived 
risk to the businesses by taking part in the research project. 
The relationship status between the author and the collaborators was 
important.   Some businesses only hire the services of the author because 
they have been forced to do so either by a threat of enforcement action from 
the enforcing authority (HSE) or actually having been served improvement or 
prohibition notices already.   It is the author’s experience that companies 
falling into this category usually have some underlying (but obvious) reason 
for their apparently poor safety record.   This can usually be attributed to 
several key factors: inadequate competence of the personnel employed in 
positions of responsibility; an autocratic management style that forces people 
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into compliance with the company rule (whether it is best, safest or otherwise) 
under threat of losing their jobs or status and also the refusal of management 
to provide the necessary level of resources present (to maximise profit 
margin). 
Inadequate competence of personnel in positions of responsibility is a clear 
failure of management to understand the hazards and risk associated with 
their own businesses.   Alternatively, by putting such people in place the 
management may be acutely aware of the weaknesses of those people and 
may use this as a means of ensuring their hard-line policies are implemented 
without question.   In most cases those subordinates will have been chosen 
for their compliance with management style rather than for their ability to 
assess and control risks.   This could present a highly dangerous and volatile 
situation: for the supervisor and for the shop floor operatives.   With corporate 
manslaughter laws in force there is no hiding place for such managers but the 
unfortunate outcome in this situation is that it is the shop floor workers who 
invariably get hurt.   Companies fitting this description were identified in the 
list of potential collaborators and were also approached to take part in the 
research.   The response from those companies was predictable.   No 
companies classified as such participated. 
The collaboration partners were required to complete an initial survey in order 
to provide a baseline measurement of employee attitudes to safety, 
competence, operability and decision making processes within their company.   
In addition to this a critique of existing safety processes and procedures was 
carried out to identify other unrelated issues that may be present.   All data 
was then analysed and presented to the companies to enable them to identify 
where maximum benefit could be gained from the application of corrective 
measures to improve safety based on the outcome of the HF assessment.   
The companies were then assisted in the application of HF methods and the 
subsequent safety culture and behavioural safety performance monitored 
over an extended period.   On completion of the monitoring trial period the 
companies were then re-surveyed to determine what improvements 
(perceived and actual) had been achieved.   The original intention of the 
research was then to determine what modifications could be carried out to the 
HF assessment system or what strategy could be changed in order to 
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improve the scoring and performance of the survey elements.   Due to the 
difficulties associated with the collaborators it was not possible to create a 
robust, fully tested HF assessment and analysis system.   The reasons for 
this are discussed throughout this thesis. 
It was a key requirement of this research programme that the system of HF 
analysis had to be such that it could be embedded in existing company safety 
and operational processes.   Such a method of application was essential to 
avoid cynical attitudes such as the familiar “change for change’s sake” and to 
ensure that the modifications to company processes were minimised, 
substantially covert, and above all, easily implemented by making a number 
of small changes to existing systems rather than implementing “yet another” 
risk assessment process over all the others without provision of any additional 
resource.   In the manufacturing industry, it is an unfortunate fact that this is a 
common attitude towards such methods and this attitude must be overcome if 
successful application of HF is to be achieved.   “Substantially covert” means 
that the corrective measures or behaviour modification methods employed 
are built into the normal activities of all personnel in everything that they do at 
work, i.e. where a robust safety culture is developed in which people want to 
do things in a safe manner without the need for continuous enforcement.   
This would be a self-regulating workforce that is capable of setting its own 
standards and improving upon them because it is the right thing to do.   Such 
a situation would rely on ethical standards supporting this attitude. 
An excellent quote for this type of process comes from a manager in the 
sporting environment: Sir Clive Woodward; who said that “My philosophy is 
about doing 100 things 1% better.”   In other words, to get the best out of any 
process, it is not feasible or possible to make any process 100% better.   
Instead, it is necessary to examine every aspect of every activity carried out 
and to determine how each aspect can be improved and optimised in order to 
make many minor changes to the way in which activities are carried out.   In 
isolation each improvement would be insignificant but in combination the 
overall outcome becomes significant and assists in achieving the desired 
goals. 
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2.0 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Societal Expectations 
In today’s society, people have come to expect ever-increasing levels of 
service and safety.   The days of people treating injuries at work or in public 
transportation systems as inevitable and expected are long gone.   However, 
it is a generally accepted fact that in potentially dangerous environments such 
as heavy industry and public transportation systems, with the significant 
sources of stored energy involved, it is inevitable that accidents will happen. 
The industrial revolution was magnificent for the UK as a world leader in 
showing how things could be done on a grand scale for yield and profitability 
but the number of work-related injuries and diseases of that time is nothing to 
be proud of. 
Similar attitudes to safety can also be found in industry today where some 
companies attempt to maximise profits by not complying with regulations if 
they believe they can get away with it, irrespective of the risk of being caught 
or of the harm that their actions may cause to individuals or society as a 
whole.   Such cases are routinely prosecuted by the UK HSE.   This attitude is 
no different to what happened in the UK industrial revolution or what can be 
seen happening today in real work situations in countries all over the world in 
their own modern day industrial revolutions.   In places like India and China, 
people are commonly working for very low wages, in poorly regulated and 
poorly controlled factories where safety is clearly not the highest priority.   The 
poverty and desperation that the workers find themselves in allows the factory 
owners to disregard their safety and wellbeing, knowing that, if someone is 
killed or injured, there are many more ready and willing to take their place.   
The workers only have two choices: to put themselves in danger or starve 
and be destitute.   The industrial laws concerning such issues in developing 
countries do not appear to be as robust as those in the western countries. 
In industry where, despite the years of gradual and continuous improvements 
in safety and control have been implemented (or enforced), an unacceptable 
number of injuries still continue to occur.   In order to continue operating to 
the greatest level of safety possible, the best companies are looking to 
improve their safety performance through new methods, such as human 
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factors, while at the other end of the scale those companies with the poorest 
safety records continue to perform badly, barely achieving the minimum 
requirements through lack of resources and an unwillingness to change 
existing practices.   Revenue generation appears to be more important to the 
owners of those companies than the safety and welfare of their employees. 
It has become clear that business owners need to be convinced of the 
benefits of the application of human factors before they will voluntarily 
authorise resources for such risk reduction schemes.   Companies may be 
guided towards HF methods but it is up to each to determine how they will 
improve their own situation.   It is fair to say that the best results are always 
achieved when people have a desire to change rather than having change 
enforced upon them.   An example of this is described below. 
Discouraging people from using personal vehicles in favour of more 
environmentally friendly modes of transport such as walking, cycling or using 
public transport will be an uphill struggle until it can be shown that an 
adequate level of service and safety is provided. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the number of passenger miles travelled is increasing 
year on year as the population is growing and people become more mobile. 
 
Figure 2.1: UK Vehicle Usage 
One of the problems with such a desire to shift people’s attitudes towards 
travel and commuting lies with the ability of the public transport operating 
companies to provide a safe and adequate service such that people have 
confidence of arriving at their destination on time and in one piece. 
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Statistically, road travel is more dangerous than rail travel (NTSB, 2004) but 
people feel more in control of their own destiny in a private vehicle and they 
perceive that they lose all such control on public transport.   Data from the UK 
suggests that rail travel is 20 times safer than car travel but this value is 
highly dependent on how the statistics are compared and measured (RSSB, 
2007).   The key point is that rail travel is safer than car travel; to what degree 
is arbitrary.   Coach travel lies somewhere between the two. 
As the societal risk increases with an increase in the number of people using 
the service, it will become even more important for existing safety standards 
and system reliability to be enhanced to maintain present risk levels. 
The application of human factors is one of the tools which can be used to 
assist in fulfilling this expectation and its application within industry is the main 
focus of this research project. 
2.2 Human Failings - The Root Cause of Accidents 
Consideration of the type of faults or errors to be detected and prevented is 
crucial if procedural controls and risk reduction systems are to be effective. 
The classification of human error has been attempted by many people.   
Rasmussen & Jensen (1974) cited by Reason (1990) devised a framework for 
the categorisation of human errors based on the performance level of the 
activities being carried out.   The three performance levels are skill-based, 
rule-based and knowledge based and these are discussed in detail in section 
3.3. 
Dekker (2006) defines the cause of human error as being in “the head” or “the 
world” and describes the old and new views of attributing human error to the 
cause of an accident.   The old method simply attributed the cause of an 
accident to human error without further assessment which brought closure of 
the accident investigation.   The new view may still define human error as a 
cause but instead of an investigation ceasing on the discovery of a human 
error it will then examine the workplace situation in much more detail to 
determine what other factors may have been present that caused the error to 
occur.   This research project and the assessment tool created was 
fundamentally concerned with the identification of such factors being present 
within the workplace prior to them contributing to an accident. 
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Stranks (2007) also uses the three performance levels in his categorisation of 
human error in the same way as Reason (1990). 
There are older texts that use different classification criteria such as Green 
(1982) in which the main classification of human error is defined by the 
activity (and hence the person or group in which the root cause of the error is 
founded), i.e. operation, maintenance, design or test after which the cause 
and nature of the contributing factors need to be investigated further.   This 
method of classification is not considered to be ideal in this research study as 
it is primarily interested on the type of activity rather than the type of error. 
The method of classifying human error in three performance levels has been 
at the forefront of the field for a considerable period of time.   For the 
purposes of this research project the three performance level model as 
defined by Reason (1990) has therefore been used. 
2.3 Equipment Failings 
Revealed faults in equipment are relatively straightforward to deal with as 
they are easily detected and can be corrected as required before a real 
hazard is allowed to exist.   They will inevitably cause loss of service but with 
little additional direct risk.   The analysis and modifications processes 
implemented under HF can be used to prevent future recurrences. 
Covert faults (functional or systematic) are the most likely to cause accidents, 
being revealed only when the consequences of the failure have caused an 
undesirable or unplanned event.   Functional safety standards such as IEC 
61508 and tools such as human factors / safety culture assessments can be 
used in the identification and prevention of systematic errors and covert 
faults. 
2.4 Major Accident Statistics 
Accident statistics of various sectors have been examined and these are 
shown below. 
2.4.1 UK Railway Industry 
The Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) produced by the Rail Safety 
and Standards Board (RSSB) details the safety performance of the UK 
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Fatalities By Person Type
Public
Workers
Passengers
railway network.   It identifies the causes of all accidents and injuries on the 
railway network.   The data also includes assaults, suicides, trespass, etc. 
The latest report (2010) shows that, overall, the risk level to all people that 
interface with the railway network in any form is reducing.   There are many 
reasons for this, most significantly the work being carried out by the operators 
in terms of reducing accident rates (train crashes and occupational risks) and 
providing better security arrangements for passengers. 
The charts below show the breakdown of the causes of fatal accidents by 
person type and location (reproduced from the ASPR 2010 report – RSSB, 
2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Railway Industry Fatalities (by people and location breakdown) 
It can be seen that the public appear to be most at risk based on the accident 
statistics, however the 97.4% which comprises all public fatalities also 
includes suicides which accounted for 236 out of 306 fatalities while trespass 
accounted for another 49 thereby leaving a residual 13 fatalities: 12 of these 
were at level crossings and one was as a result of a fall onto the track.   It can 
be seen therefore that the risk to the general public is much lower than the 
charts initially suggest. 
These figures show that HF assessment of the workforce is unlikely to 
provide any reduction in fatal accidents to the public as most of the accidents 
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detailed in the statistics are beyond the direct control of railway workers as 
they are violations of existing rules and regulations.   It would appear that only 
more antecedents would serve to reduce such accidents by way of physical 
prevention measures such as better security preventing people gaining 
access to the line and perhaps better safety / hazard awareness campaigns 
to reiterate the dangers.   Figure 2.3 shows the trend for reduced fatalities 
since 1945. 
 
Figure 2.3: Railway Industry Annual Fatalities 
The trend shows that worker fatalities have reduced by a huge margin in the 
last few decades.   This is clearly a welcome trend for all concerned and one 
which can be used to show that the many new antecedents employed to 
improve worker safety are and have been effective in reducing the rate of 
fatalities.   As the trend flattens out it will cost more per head to reduce the 
fatality rate still further.   The aspiration for all people and corporate bodies 
involved in the railway industry must be to prevent any fatalities from 
occurring at all.   A single fatal accident in any year is an unacceptably high 
accident rate and the prevention of any fatal accidents must be an aspiration 
for all concerned. 
It is interesting to note that until the mid-1970s the suicide and trespass rates 
had a downward trend but that they both underwent a relatively steep 
increase simultaneously from around 1974.   This was a time when inflation 
was high and unemployment was increasing.   Strikes and industrial action 
were rife which meant that the country even suffered power cuts as a result of 
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the poor state of the country’s industry.   The trend for suicides on the railway 
industry has remained relatively unchanged for decades and it is an 
unfortunate fact that there is probably little that can be done from within the 
industry to reduce the prevalence of such events.   The trespass rate has 
decreased significantly which is a result of increased surveillance technology 
on the railway network, better vigilance and maintenance of the security 
systems employed around the network such as barriers and fences and also 
as a result of high profile media campaigns to educate the young population 
(the majority of cases) about the dangers present on the railway.   It can be 
seen that the reduction in fatal accidents caused by trespassing has been 
achieved by changing people’s behaviour, i.e. by the application of human 
factors assessment combined with appropriate prevention measures. 
Figure 2.4 below shows the trend for the number of fatal train accidents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: No of Fatal Railway Accidents / Crashes 
It can be seen that there is a downward trend of the number of fatal accidents 
occurring each year but there is no scope for complacency as recent 
accidents such as the one that occurred at Grayrigg has shown. 
2.4.2 UK Industry 
The HSE promotes and enforces health and safety legislation in the UK and 
as part of their statutory functions to government they also monitor the health 
and safety performance of UK companies and produce reports of the 
corresponding statistics.   The report for year 2009/2010 (HSE Statistics, 
2009/10) reveals that over 1.3 million people within the UK were suffering 
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from work-related illnesses, 152 people were killed while at work and over 
121,000 people received serious injuries significantly affecting their lives. 
The “Total Employed” data shown in Figure 2.5 below was derived from Craig 
(2003), ONS (2001), ONS (2002), ONS (2006), ONS (2010) and ONS (2011).   
It can be seen that the ratio of employed to self-employed remained 
significantly similar for the period shown. 
 
Figure 2.5: Fatalities in UK Industry 
This chart provides a clear picture of UK industry in that despite a significant 
amount of resources being spent on reducing such accidents, the number of 
fatalities per year has remained relatively unchanged since the mid-1990s.   
Given that heavy industry and manufacturing is generally in decline within the 
UK (ONS, 2010) this number of accidents may also mean that the fatality rate 
is actually increasing within those sectors.   The workforce has increased by 
around six million since 1981 while the number of fatalities has reduced which 
means that overall the fatal injury rate is improving.   The number of people 
who are self-employed has remained relatively static as has the number of 
fatalities in that group.   It is clear that a different approach is required if the 
rate of fatal accidents is to be reduced further.   Human factors assessment is 
one such method of achieving this. 
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Figure 2.6: Major Injuries in UK Industry 
Figure 2.6 above shows those injuries in UK industry that are potentially life-
changing by way of permanent disability or disfigurement.   As most accidents 
occur as a result of a series of factors coming together at the same time a 
minor change in behaviour at any point in the process or activity can result in 
the prevention of that accident.   In contrast, a minor change in behaviour or 
associated conditions of the task may also result in a number of these 
accidents turning out to be fatal if the change in behaviour is for the worse. 
2.5 Case Studies 
It is an unfortunate fact that there are many high-profile accidents available 
for analysis and research.   This research project examined several accidents 
to highlight any common human factors aspects between them in order to 
seek out methods of identifying any of the combination of factors which could 
have prevented the accident. 
When applied effectively human factors assessments should be capable of 
identifying potential HF issues from the highest level of management down to 
operational levels of personnel. 
With the assistance of collaborative companies, the aim of this research 
project was to propose solutions / answers to some key questions such as 
those listed below. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
96/97 98/99 00/01 02/03 04/05 06/07 08/09
R
at
e 
o
f M
ajo
r 
In
jur
y
(p
er
 
10
0 
00
0)
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f M
ajo
r 
In
jur
ie
s
Year
Number and Rate of Reported Major Injuries to 
Employees
Number
Rate
   Page 27 of 322 
• To what extent do human factors (or lack of their consideration) play a 
part in accident causation? 
• Where accidents have occurred, how difficult (or easy) would it have 
been to prevent the accident had an appropriate human factors 
assessment system been in place? 
• At what level or levels (technician, supervisor, engineer, and manager) 
would changes in behaviour have been required in order to prevent the 
accident? 
• Is there any correlation between perceived and proven competence of 
responsible persons? 
• To what extent is competency testing and assurance carried out and 
how is competence measured? 
• Is there any evidence to suggest that any one group of personnel are 
responsible for the majority of accidents, e.g. operatives, managers? 
• Do all levels of personnel have the same perception of what or who is 
the common cause of accidents or errors? 
• If any one group is predominantly associated with the causation of 
accidents, has an investigation taken place into why this is so?   Was 
the investigation conclusive and what actions have been put in place 
since?   As all people are not the same there is likely to be some 
correlation between their role and the training or procedures 
associated with their role, i.e. there must be common factors for this 
group of personnel that make them (or their role) more susceptible to 
causing accidents. 
• Are existing safety management systems capable of identifying such 
potential issues?   It is a fact that no two people are the same and, as 
a result, the application of human factors assessment in the workplace 
can only change some human behavioural traits.   Undesirable 
behaviours or work methods that cannot be changed directly must be 
manipulated through systematic application of procedural and physical 
methods, i.e. antecedents.   Some people are more easily influenced 
than others and the application of human factors methods must enable 
a minimum standard to be achieved. 
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• It is the author’s experience that no-one knowingly intends to design a 
poor system or operate industrial processes badly, but what happens 
when such a system is in operation?   Is there a management process 
for implementing change and does it take account of the human factors 
issues?   Is there a review process to bring about improvement?   Is it 
used and enforced simply as means of achieving management targets 
or is there a genuine desire to do the right thing? 
• Is there any one particular type of equipment that contributes to a 
significant amount of accidents?   Is the equipment fail-safe?   Are 
there override facilities that can be applied to disable such safety 
systems?   Are they used correctly and properly authorised through 
written procedures?   What other factors of safety are built in to the 
equipment in order to ensure that systematic faults (physical and 
procedural) can be designed out at an early stage? 
• Is there any evidence of motivational or training issues that can be 
associated with previous accidents or incidents?   How are such issues 
brought to the surface?   Are there processes in place with which 
personnel can have their say or is it down to the management style of 
individuals to bring about change for the better? 
• What type of systems can be put in place such that even the least 
motivated or qualified person can still perform their duties safely? 
• What design processes are used to ensure that even with worst 
performance criteria, the automatic safety systems will take over at the 
appropriate time and carry out the corrective safety actions? 
• Were incorrect assumptions a factor in the causation of any accidents?   
Were the assumptions so long ago that they were out of date, i.e. 
could a design / operational review process have uncovered the issue 
prior to an accident occurring? 
• Have there been any indisputable cases of incompetence or neglect 
that led to an accident?   How can these be prevented in future?   How 
were they dealt with at the time? 
• Are accident / incident statistics trended such that they could have 
indicated that the likelihood of an accident occurring was increasing? 
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• Are good safety behaviours praised or reinforced or is it only negative 
situations that promote discussions about safety? 
• Is there enough internal or external safety auditing carried out?   What 
determines “enough”?   How are audit results handled? 
• Are safety issues dealt with promptly or are they placed on work lists or 
to do lists for the future?   How are they prioritised and by whom?   Is 
the prioritisation system effective?   Are there any cases where high 
priority issues have been incorrectly assigned a low priority? 
• What systems and methods are in place to highlight safety issues?   
How do the management (or the workforce) judge if these systems are 
adequate? 
• Is the information system adequate?   How do management know that 
the personnel are fully up to date with all the required knowledge and 
training? 
• How is human factors applied in all these soft issues? 
Many of these questions formed the basis of this research project by working 
with the collaborative companies in determining their current situation in terms 
of the application of human factors (whether intentional or not). 
2.6 Case Study 1 – Forth Road Bridge Suspension Cable Corrosion 
The Forth Road Bridge (FRB) was opened in 1964 when the heaviest single 
load allowed on UK roads was 25 tonnes.   The UK heavy goods vehicle 
weight limit is now 40 tonnes with the possibility that it may be raised even 
further in line with continental Europe (44 tonnes). 
The main suspension cables of the FRB are required to support the 13,800 
tonnes of load placed on them by the bridge structure.   The loading and 
safety factors built into the FRB’s design mean that it is still safe to operate 
today but only after recognition some time ago that the main supporting 
towers required strengthening to cope with the increasing demands placed on 
them by increasing vehicular weight limits.   The volume of traffic has also 
increased well beyond that for which the bridge was designed.   The 
theoretical capacity is placed at 30,000 vehicle crossings per day.   In 1976 
there were approximately 12,500 crossings per day whilst in 2004 this figure 
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was closer to 32,000.   Projected figures include for steady growth between 
2% and 3% (Forth Estuary Transportation Authority, 2011). 
When the FRB was built it cost £11.5 million to construct (Forth Estuary 
Transportation Authority, 2011). 
As a result of on-going inspection and maintenance work significant corrosion 
issues have been identified in the main bridge support suspension cables.   
This has been caused by moisture ingress but other contributing factors 
(under investigation), potentially dating back to when the bridge was 
constructed, may also include poor workmanship, inadequate construction 
procedures or techniques and inadequate supervision and control of 
construction methods. 
The costs of halting further degradation or repairing the structure are 
immense in comparison to the costs associated with preventing such 
degradation in the first place.   A 15-year programme of upgrade and 
maintenance projects is currently underway totalling £98 million.   This 
involves extensive consultation on the most effective method of correcting the 
current issues, i.e. replacement or augmentation of the main support cables 
and how such a project can be carried out with minimal disruption to the 
bridge traffic and the country as a whole.   The costs associated with such 
assessment studies are significant and could well have been avoided had 
better notice been taken of all relevant factors during construction.   Another 
indirect solution to the problem is the creation of a completely new crossing 
(now approved) but the requirement for such a drastic measure should have 
been entirely preventable had appropriate measures been in place during and 
since construction. 
There are many examples of similar bridges throughout the world that have 
far less corrosion than that being measured on the FRB and with far fewer 
broken wires within the main suspension cable pile.   All bridges undergo 
some deterioration and this is one of the problems associated with the 
operation of such a structure; as soon as construction is completed the task 
of preventing it falling down begins.   Suspension bridges are invariably above 
salt water and are therefore likely to be subject to accelerated rates of 
corrosion as a result of the harsh conditions of the salty atmosphere. 
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The Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco recently had a survey carried out to 
determine the scale of corrosion on its main suspension cables.   The report 
stated that the cables required stripping back and recoating along their entire 
length as the existing paint system “had surpassed its useful life”. 
Following the discovery of the cable corrosion on the FRB the Highways 
Agency commissioned a similar investigation on the Severn Bridge (built in 
1966 and of a similar construction to the FRB).   The corrosion detected on 
this bridge was found to be more severe than the FRB and similar analysis 
and corrective measures are now being carried out.   Vehicle restrictions were 
put in place immediately; contrary to the FRB where restrictions are not yet 
necessary but remain under continuous review. 
As such public structures are vital to the country, it is essential that a high 
degree of safety and operability are maintained and that all factors of the 
original design are kept under review to maintain the conditions and purpose 
for which they were originally designed and constructed.   This is no different 
to public transportation systems or industrial plants where safety, operability 
and efficiency must remain under constant review to maintain safety and 
effectiveness. 
2.6.1 Case Study 1 Analysis 
Direct implementation of human factors assessments is unlikely to have been 
used to any great extent during the design and construction of the bridge.   It 
is likely that the best available engineering methods would have been in place 
as the UK was good at this type of project.   When the bridge was built, the 
country had come through the Industrial Revolution, two world wars, and 
appeared to be leading the world in terms of manufacturing quality and 
methods.   There would have been no significant reasons during the bridge 
construction to question the construction methods in use or quality of 
personnel and materials used.   It was not known at the time but a significant 
proportion of the country’s manufacturing heritage was to end in ruin in the 
few short years that followed: British Leyland, Triumph, deep coal mining, 
British Steel and more recently The Rover Group to name a few; all of which 
were industries associated synonymously with the industrial heritage of the 
UK but all of which had underlying faults that the UK government was no 
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longer willing to support.   The same underlying faults with those industries 
may have contributed to the problems now being encountered on the FRB, 
i.e. lack of motivation (possibly associated with a union movement with too 
much influence), lack of foresight, judgement and inadequate experience, 
training and supervision. 
Given the passage of time it is impossible to determine the level of 
supervision and procedural compliance during construction.   Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some of the bridge span cable wires were run during 
the worst weather of the year to keep up with construction schedules and that 
it was during these periods that the seeds of the degradation now evident 
were planted, i.e. through rule-based mistakes (if adequate competence was 
present), knowledge-based mistakes (if adequate competence was not 
present) or violations (if the procedures were not followed).   There is also 
anecdotal evidence that the wires that make up the pile of the main cables 
were not properly laid when reeled out between the anchor points at each end 
and that wire crossovers had occurred.   The evidence suggests that these 
had been ignored completely or incorrectly disregarded as an insignificant 
issue i.e. errors potentially attributable to knowledge-based mistakes or 
violations.   Crossovers would provide small air gaps and pockets between 
the wires that could retain moisture and promote corrosion.   Clearly, the 
prevention of such situations is far more desirable than the present 
predicament of trying to limit the degradation many years later.   The current 
programme of inspection and maintenance on the bridge cables is centred on 
detection of new wire breakages (by acoustic methods) and also in fitting de-
humidification equipment in an attempt to remove moisture and thereby limit 
or prevent further corrosion / degradation.   At time of writing approximately 
100 single wire breakages have been detected from a total present in the 
cable pile of 11,618.   The FRB management board therefore believe that the 
overall extent of the problem has been uncovered but on-going acoustic 
monitoring will confirm the situation. 
It is highly unlikely that personal competency assessment of the bridge 
construction operatives at the time would have been anything other than an 
informal interview between supervisor / manager and prospective employees.   
The type of work carried out by such personnel relies more on material 
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selection, design and supervision than in the operative skill set.   It is 
therefore postulated that the professionally graded personnel involved in the 
construction team are the most likely group to have been able to prevent the 
current situation from occurring.   This would represent errors caused by lack 
of judgement and inadequate competence or experience, i.e. knowledge-
based mistakes. 
Should these theories prove to be correct the present situation may be 
partially attributed to pressure being applied as part of tight construction 
schedules or perhaps as a means of achieving higher bonus payments, i.e. 
skill-based errors, rule-based mistakes or even violations induced by 
motivational issues.   The original cause is somewhat arbitrary as the most 
important factor now is to prevent further degradation of the structure to 
ensure that safety is maintained.   Now that the issue has been identified 
much greater attention to detail is in place and experts are assessing the 
situation daily. 
At the design stage, critical assumptions of the cable wire ambient conditions 
would have been made in terms of specifying the correct grade and type of 
steel to be used.   These assumptions would have been based on other 
similar structures around the world in terms of likely corrosion rates and 
bridge loadings.   As a result of the increased rate of corrosion it is clear that 
these assumptions were either incorrect or based on incorrect or absent data, 
i.e. knowledge-based mistakes. 
2.6.2 Case Study 1 Conclusion 
It is impossible to say at this time if personnel responsible for design 
displayed any incompetence or neglect but clearly several factors have come 
together over time resulting in the huge and costly task of preservation.   The 
current situation with the FRB is well publicised and is likely to assist in the 
maintenance and care of other such structures in the future (as detailed for 
Severn Bridge).   Better technology in terms of design methods, construction 
methods, material composition / selection and personal competence and 
responsibility are now in place and such a situation is less likely to occur in 
the future.   Acoustic monitoring and de-humidification systems are now being 
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included in new bridges around the world in order to prevent such issues from 
occurring. 
The Health and Safety at Work Act now enables prosecution of company 
directors and new / modified legislation (Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act) is in place to make corporate bodies responsible 
(through the justice system) for their actions where neglect of duty has been 
proven to be a contributing factor to an accident.   All such measures clearly 
make the adoption of personal competence assessment and assurance a 
worthwhile exercise for those companies involved in safety-critical projects.   
Thus the prevention of errors attributable to inadequate competence (skill and 
knowledge-based) has been addressed at high level and companies involved 
in such construction projects must ensure that they have adequate 
competency assessment systems in place. 
As each day passes the roads are becoming more congested and 
transportation systems are becoming more important.   The travelling public 
are now more vocal and less tolerant of the disruption associated with such 
issues.   It is likely that government agencies and corporate bodies 
responsible for such issues will be held to account in future as better methods 
of control, supervision and traceability are now in place. 
Human factors assessment can play a major part in such projects by ensuring 
that potential issues are detected and addressed to ensure public safety is 
maintained, that personnel are competent for their allotted tasks and that 
adequate systems of monitoring are in place to ensure that not only are 
people performing their duties correctly but that they are able to build upon 
the foundations of the safety management systems in place to bring about the 
best possible solutions available by the prevention of errors and bad practices 
creeping in or being disregarded without due analysis. 
Had the potential effects of moisture in the cables been adequately 
considered in terms of future corrosion rates it is likely that some kind of 
assessment would have been carried out at the design phase to determine 
what actions were necessary at the construction phase.   Such hypothetical 
questions are not easily answered decades later. 
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The selection of project design and construction personnel is an important 
part of any project as the individual experience and competence of each 
person in the team contributes to the overall project team capability.   Bale 
and Edwards (2000) found that more than 50% of companies did not verify 
qualifications or experience of their contract employees.   This clearly 
represents an intolerable risk to any organisation responsible for employee 
and public safety and could be judged as criminal neglect.   Human factors 
assessment can be used to assist in ensuring that personnel employed on 
such high profile projects have the required skills and competences.   This is 
not achieved directly but through the implementation of antecedent 
procedures and processes designed to ensure that the selection and 
monitoring processes take account of all such issues. 
Over time it would appear that some safety-critical assumptions have been 
made regarding the integrity of the bridge structure.   The present situation 
shows that an inadequate inspection and maintenance strategy was in place.   
Human factors assessments may have prevented this situation by identifying 
issues earlier but it is doubtful if it could have prevented the issues given that 
the root cause appears to have occurred during construction when such 
methods were not commonly available. 
This case study was selected specifically to show that human error (including 
covert latent errors) within industry, transportation and civil engineering 
applications can be detected through many different methods including 
regular inspection and maintenance (as in this case).  The lack of such 
systems can be identified with the aid of tools such as the safety culture 
survey. 
Risk reduction can also be achieved by building a better safety culture 
through implementing a human factors assessment system to detect any 
existing human factor issues not yet identified or appropriately addressed.   In 
this case the potential corrosion issue (and any other latent problems with the 
structure) may have been identified at an earlier stage had a structured 
assessment of all people, work processes and systems been implemented.   
The HF assessment system may have identified weaknesses requiring further 
investigation through the competence management, my role and my manager 
sections of the proposed safety culture questionnaire. 
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The UK HSE (HSG48, 1999) states that “careful consideration of human 
factors”, i.e. the implementation of a better safety culture through human 
factors assessment, as proposed within this research project, “can reduce the 
number of accidents and cases of occupational ill health.”   Therefore, 
through better training and detection of potential HF issues the likelihood of 
human error (skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based errors caused by 
inadequate judgement, competence and inexperience) can be reduced. 
Whittingham (2004), states that violations (rule-based motivational errors) can 
be prevented through a system of training, robust procedures, workplace 
auditing and ensuring that all violations are thoroughly investigated and 
addressed in accordance with the company procedures, i.e. implementing 
and building a better safety culture.   Whittingham (2004) also notes that not 
investigating every violation can appear to the workforce that such behaviour 
is condoned.   This would have the effect of promoting unsafe (violating) 
behaviour thereby developing a poor safety culture. 
2.7 Case Study 2 – Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster 
The Challenger space Shuttle disaster on 28th January 1986 was a tragic 
culmination of issues, events and problems that were known about by many 
people and those problems had been communicated to personnel in overall 
charge of the launch process but yet the decision necessary to prevent the 
accident from occurring wasn’t taken for several reasons: none of which (in 
hindsight) are considered important enough at the expense of a single human 
being: far less an entire crew of seven.   The fact that Challenger also had 
two members of the public on board made the situation even worse.   They 
were not career astronauts but had been specially trained for the mission as 
payload specialists. 
The Rogers Commission Report (Rogers, 1986) found that no single person 
involved in the decision making process to launch felt that they had been put 
under pressure to approve the launch against their best judgement. 
By the time the Challenger explosion occurred there had been 24 successful 
space flights with a remarkable safety record (on the surface) and very little to 
report in terms of problems encountered during any of the missions.   Any 
problems that had occurred had been dealt with in such a manner that they 
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were not considered to be serious or did not present a high risk.   The 
confidence placed in the Space Shuttle system by NASA, and the world as a 
whole, was very high, but to a select few that were involved in the safety and 
engineering management of the Shuttle system there were problems and they 
were known about.   It would be extremely unfair to say that the problems 
were ignored as they had been discussed at great length but, with the 
advantage of hindsight, they were not given an adequate risk ranking and the 
tragic results were there to see for all shortly after the Challenger launch was 
authorised to proceed.   It is clear that the issues were not discussed at the 
appropriate levels within the organisations involved. 
Rogers (1986) found that the potential problems with the solid rocket booster 
(SRB) seals at low ambient temperatures were not known about or 
understood by all the people responsible for the decision-making process to 
authorise launches. 
Circumstances surrounding the STS51L launch were incredibly unlucky.   The 
mission had been delayed twice due to operational delays with mission STS 
61C.   Weather conditions at the Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) site in 
Dakar, Senegal enforced a third delay.   The Cassablanca TAL was then 
chosen for the next available launch window but this meant changing to a 
morning launch rather than a night launch.   This resulted in a further delay as 
Kennedy Space Centre (KSC) launch processing could not be made ready for 
the morning launch in time.   Predicted bad weather at KSC then enforced 
another delay of 24 hours.   Operational problems with an entry hatch door 
assembly enforced another 24 hour delay.   On the 28th January a further 
delay of 2 hours was caused by a component failure in the Shuttle fire 
detection system.   During all of this time discussions were being held within 
NASA regarding the abnormally low ambient temperatures being encountered 
on the launch pad.   No missions had previously been launched in such low 
temperatures and genuine concerns had been expressed from employees of 
the solid rocket booster (SRB) manufacturer (Morton Thiokol) and NASA that 
the Shuttle had not been designed to launch in such conditions and that 
without further analysis it was not recommended to proceed with the launch.    
The ambient temperature was lower than the SRBs had been designed for 
but this situation was clouded further by different interpretations of the original 
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SRB specification.   In hindsight the delays encountered for the STS51L 
launch gave a much greater timescale and more opportunities than normal to 
postpone the launch but to no avail.   Rogers (1986) found that the seal 
problems with the SRBs had been known about for years but the issue had 
not been adequately resolved.   Launches in low ambient temperatures were 
simply avoided.   Recent launches had been “signed off” at lower levels of 
authority such that the senior levels of launch personnel were not formally 
aware of the detail and risk with the SRB seals and that, provided they had 
signed authority from the systems people at lower levels, they could proceed 
with a launch. 
The Rogers Commission Report identified failure of the aft field seal of the 
right SRB as the prime cause of the accident caused by: 
“faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors.   These factors 
were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of 
materials, the effects of reusability, processing, and the reaction of the joint to 
dynamic loading.” 
The conditions on the launch pad prior to launch did not help.   Approximately 
seven inches of rain had fallen in the time that the Shuttle assembly was on 
the launch pad.   A previous mission (STS9) had shown that water ingress to 
the SRB seals could occur as this was detected when stripping down and 
making ready for the next mission.   The cold conditions of the launch day 
provided for the possibility that water in the SRB aft joint could have frozen, 
thereby restricting the ability of the O-ring seal to adequately perform its 
intended function (prevention of high pressure combustion gases leaking from 
anywhere other than the rocket nozzles).   The launch pad temperature on 
launch day was 9°C (15°F) lower than any previous mission (Rogers, 1986).   
The resilience of the seal had been proven (in subsequent extensive testing) 
to be such that it could give rise to the leakage rates displayed during the 
launch of STS51L in the conditions encountered.   The temperature of the 
joint at the area where the first leakage of propellant gases occurred was 
estimated to be minus 2°C (28°F) while at the side facing the sunlight the 
temperature was estimated to be 10°C (50°F) (Rogers, 1986).   The pressure 
increases induced on the SRB section seals on rocket motor start up caused 
the tang and clevis of the joint to “open up”.   The O-ring seals are in place to 
prevent leakage during such conditions.   The right SRB aft section seal 
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under the conditions of launch was potentially incapable of responding to the 
load conditions quickly enough as a result of the temperature-induced 
reduced resilience and a leak occurred resulting ultimately in the destruction 
of the Shuttle.   Another factor of the right SRB was that during assembly 
there was a significant “out of roundness” observed between the two sections 
of the SRB at the aft joint.   Procedures were in place for such situations and 
it was thought that these were adequate. 
2.7.1 Case Study 2 Analysis 
Human factors assessment is a huge issue for NASA and space exploration 
as a whole and substantial resource (over $183 million in 2008) is spent on 
human related issues associated with the space exploration programme to 
ensure that the technical, personnel and operational systems are up to the 
task (NASA, 2008).   Although beyond the scope of this research project, 
there are many other factors detailed in the Rogers Commission report that 
suggest internal and external politics also played a major role in the decision 
to launch but, irrespective of this, the report findings stated that no person felt 
that they were under any internal or external pressures to make the decision 
to launch. 
There are conspiracy theories (Maxon, 2011) surrounding the accident that 
suggest that the mission was testing some other advanced propulsion / rocket 
system or was carrying some other secret device for military purposes.   As 
all such theories are purely speculative with little or no hard evidence they are 
not considered further within this report. 
It is clear that human factors played a significant part in the causation of the 
accident.   Many of the people involved in the decision to launch were not fully 
aware of the issues and risks associated with the O-ring seals on the SRBs.   
Rogers (1986) found that the decision-making chain of events that led to an 
authorisation for launch was founded on: 
“incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between 
engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management 
structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle 
managers.”   (Rogers, 1986, pp.20.) 
A diagram of the flight readiness planning is shown in Figure 2.7.   The Level 
1 flight schedule is initiated at approximately two weeks prior to launch with 
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the commencement of Level 4 flight readiness activities.   Each successive 
flight readiness level then follows the programme outlined in the initial Level 1 
schedule. 
 
Figure 2.7: NASA Flight Readiness Structure 
Reproduced from the Rogers Commission Report – 1986. 
Rogers (1986) found that the SRB seal problems had been known about 
since 1982.   A “Criticality 1” flight constraint had been put on the seal 
problem which meant that loss of life or vehicle was a credible risk.   The 
personnel involved in discussing these issues were involved at Level 4 and 
Level 3 of the flight readiness programme.   Since mission STS51B (where it 
was found that a seal had failed) 6 waivers had been issued for the seal 
problems from mission STS51F onwards.   The theory seems to have been 
that as each successful mission passed the likelihood of catastrophic failure 
diminished and the people responsible for issuing or signing for the waivers 
had become complacent. 
A leak check carried out on the SRB seals was the key factor for signing off 
flight readiness (at Level 3) but this check did not adequately take account of 
the ambient conditions and dynamic loadings associated with a launch in very 
cold temperatures.   A tele-conference was held between senior Level 3 
personnel from all relevant parties prior to launch and the testimonies of the 
personnel involved were key to the Rogers Commission report.   The 
engineers responsible for the integrity of the SRB seals at Morton-Thiokol 
were not happy with a low temperature launch as the data they had from 
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previous missions suggested a higher probability of seal failure under those 
conditions.   Their data was incomplete but they had enough to recommend a 
delay to launch at least until the temperature at the launch pad had risen to at 
least the lowest temperature of any previous successful launch (11.6°C / 
53°F).   It was stated that they felt that the tone of the recent meetings and 
tele-conference held to discuss the issue was such that they felt they were 
under pressure to prove that there was a problem rather than the more 
normal situation when they would be under pressure to prove that all systems 
were functioning correctly and therefore ready for flight.   They were being 
asked to prove that they weren’t ready for flight instead of being asked to 
prove that they were ready for flight.   This must have been a very difficult 
decision for the SRB manufacturer management to be in as they didn’t have 
clear and unambiguous evidence that the SRB would fail and hence could not 
prove conclusively that they weren’t ready.   The SRB engineers felt 
exasperated that they had done all they could to postpone the launch but the 
management decision to launch based on the fact that they could not prove 
that the SRB seal would fail prevailed.   Commercial and/or political pressures 
had dominated the decision-making process. 
None of this information was passed to Level 2 or Level 1 flight readiness.   
The outcome of all the discussions was simply that any problems had either 
been rectified or had been signed off.   To the Level 1 and Level 2 flight 
readiness personnel it looked like they were ready to launch. 
The key findings of the Rogers Commission Report in terms of the systems 
and management failings were as follows. 
• There was a serious flaw in the decision-making process that could 
have been prevented had a structured safety assessment system been 
in place with which all such problems could be flagged to all levels of 
personnel.   (Rogers, 1986, pp.105.) 
• Launch waivers and constraints were not required to be informed to all 
flight readiness levels.   This created the possibility that flight system 
faults (potentially fatal) could still be in place when launch occurred.   
(Rogers, 1986, pp.105.) 
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• The Space Shuttle design, planning, construction and flight operations 
programme workload was shared between several NASA 
establishments.   The Marshall Space Flight Center (sic), responsible 
for main engines (SRBs) was found to be trying to resolve all its own 
issues internally without passing notification of these forward.   The 
Space Shuttle is a combination of many sub-systems and it was 
considered essential by the commission that all such items of 
importance should be shared for a full and adequate assessment to be 
made by all involved parties.   Poor communications was not 
conducive to operating the system effectively and with maximum 
safety.   (Rogers, 1986, pp.105.) 
• Morton-Thiokol was found to have reversed its decision to launch after 
receiving considerable pressure from Marshall Space Flight Center 
(sic) to do so.   The Commission found that this decision had been 
made against the advice of its engineers and was more associated 
with an unwillingness to upset a client than to ensure the safety and 
integrity of the crew and Shuttle vehicle system.   (Rogers, 1986, 
pp.105.) 
Hawkins (1987) extract contained in Flin, O’Connor & Crichton (2008) also 
cites fatigue as a potential contributing factor in the Challenger explosion 
through sleep loss, excessive duty periods and disturbed circadian rhythms of 
those involved in the discussions surrounding the ambient temperature and 
its effect on the SRB seals.  Some of the personnel involved in making the 
decision to launch had been discussing the issues in great detail for a number 
of days and it is postulated that their judgement may have been adversely 
affected by fatigue.   Rogers (1986) noted that the managers involved had 
“several days of irregular working hours and insufficient sleep” while engaged 
in the discussions.   Rogers (1986) also noted that fatigue, caused by 
excessive duty periods and shift rotas, was a contributing factor in a 
potentially serious incident that occurred prior to launching mission 61-C in 
early January 1986. 
The official findings show that, even in multi-billion dollar projects with few 
limits on the resources available, commercial pressures can still affect the 
way that safety-critical decisions are made.   The decision making processes 
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in place were clearly flawed but the overriding factor in the decision to launch 
was that a highly influential partner (Marshall) had exerted commercial 
pressure (indirectly or otherwise) on another partner (Morton-Thiokol), who 
clearly did not want to be the cause of any further delays to the programme.   
The resultant accident was therefore inevitable, if not with STS51L then with a 
later flight, until the root cause of the problem was identified and rectified as 
detailed within the Commission report findings. 
2.7.2 Case Study 2 Conclusion 
It is clear that human factors played a significant part in the accident.   The 
initial SRB seal design was flawed and this was realised from analysis of 
used SRBs by the SRB manufacturer engineers.   The engineers acted 
responsibly by highlighting the potential issues as soon as they became 
apparent but the issues were not heard at the appropriate levels of the Shuttle 
launch programme as a result of commercial pressures.   Had a different 
group of people been in charge with slightly different ethics or backgrounds it 
is feasible that the decision to launch by Morton-Thiokol might not have been 
reversed and the Challenger and its crew would still be here today.   The 
decision making process was found to be reliant not only on highly developed 
systems of control and analysis but also on personal competencies, ethics, 
experience and responsibilities to such a degree that people were able to 
short circuit the system to their own ends thereby providing a path (or drift) to 
failure which could not be stopped once it had commenced.   A well-
developed decision-making safety management system making better use of 
human factors assessments and auditing may have served to seek out and 
remove all such possibilities. 
The workload during the launch preparation stage including the launch delays 
has been highlighted as a potential cause of fatigue which may have resulted 
in a degraded ability of the management personnel involved to make good 
decisions, i.e. the root cause of the explosion may be attributable to 
judgement errors (knowledge-based performance level).   Additionally, some 
cause may be attributed to motivational issues on the part of the Marshall 
personnel who appeared to have lost focus on safety and were instead more 
concerned with keeping up with the programme (rule-based mistakes and 
potentially violating behaviour).   Dekker (2005) describes the potential for 
   Page 44 of 322 
“drift” into a potentially unsafe situation through a “slow, incremental 
movement of systems operations toward the edge of their safety envelope.”   
Such a situation may have been present in this example where some “blow 
by” past the O-ring seals was observed on several previous launches and that 
issuing a waiver for this had almost become routine, irrespective of the 
prevailing ambient conditions. 
Since the Challenger accident the Space Shuttle programme has suffered a 
further disaster with the loss of the Columbia orbiter in 2003 when it broke up 
on re-entry to the earth’s atmosphere.   This was caused by a piece of foam 
insulation from the main fuel tank breaking away some 81 seconds after lift-
off and damaging the thermal protection of the orbiter’s left wing.   This 
damage was critical and was found to be the root cause of the loss of the 
orbiter due to excessive thermal load on the structure through the damaged 
wing on re-entry to the earth’s atmosphere.   A similar investigation to the 
Challenger accident was held with a similar outcome.   The summarised 
findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board include the statement: 
“The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle 
Program’s history and culture, including the original compromises that were 
required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource 
constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of 
the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed 
national vision for human space flight.   Cultural traits and organizational 
practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on 
past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing 
to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with 
requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication 
of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; 
lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution 
of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that 
operated outside the organization’s rules.”   (NASA, 2003, pp.9.) 
It is clear that there were striking similarities to the issues deep rooted in the 
Challenger accident and that those lessons had clearly not been learned by 
all concerned to the degree necessary with which to prevent future system 
failures. 
Such failures in an organisation with almost limitless resources serve to show 
how difficult it can be for the wider engineering community with far less 
resources available but fortunately usually with far less risk. 
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2.8 Case Study 3 – Ladbroke Grove Rail Disaster 
On the morning of 5th October 1999 two trains collided practically head on at 
Ladbroke Grove, approximately 2 miles west of Paddington Station (Cullen, 
2002, Part 1 Report).   31 people lost their lives in the accident, including the 
two train drivers.   400 others were injured either directly as a result of the 
collision or by the effects of fire and smoke that occurred after the collision. 
Lord Cullen was requested by the Health and Safety Commission to 
investigate the root causes of accident.   The inquiry was carried out in two 
parts: Part 1 which was primarily concerned with the causes and 
circumstances of the crash and Part 2 which was concerned with an 
investigation into the management of safety on the railways. 
The two trains that collided were a 3-car Turbo type-165 train operated by 
Thames Trains (TT) and a High Speed Train (HST) operated by First Great 
Western (FGW).   The FGW train was an eight car train with a diesel power 
car at either end, i.e. substantially heavier.   It was travelling at approximately 
90mph and therefore held much more momentum than the TT train. 
The TT train had left Paddington station at approximately 08:06 and the 
collision occurred two miles west of Paddington approximately three minutes 
later with a combined speed of approximately 130mph (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 
Report). 
2.8.1 Case Study 3 – Analysis 
The inquiry found that the crash occurred directly as a result of the outbound 
TT train passing through a red signal (SN109) which ultimately led it into the 
path of the inbound FGW train. 
Train interlocking and control system records from the associated Slough 
control centre showed that the signalling systems were proven to be 
functioning correctly prior to the crash.   The TT train had been traversing its 
route and (through subsequent expert analysis) was shown to have 
previously passed a double yellow aspect followed by a single yellow aspect 
and then finally the red aspect of SN109.   The SN109 signal was at red to 
hold the TT train in position until the FGW train had passed, at which time the 
points and signalling systems would have been set for safe progress of the 
TT train.   A double yellow aspect means that a train is occupying the line 2 
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signals ahead and that the next signal is currently displaying a single yellow.   
A single yellow aspect means that the next signal is currently at red, i.e. a 
train is occupying the next section of line ahead of the red signal 
(Rowbotham, 2001). 
The brakes of both trains were applied immediately prior to the crash but such 
was the closing speed of the trains that by the time both drivers would have 
realised what was about to occur the braking time would have had an 
insignificant effect on energy of the crash.   The crash occurred immediately 
beyond the points through which the TT train had switched lines just beyond 
SN109. 
Cullen (2002, Part 1 Report) found that there were several key factors that 
affected the likelihood of those involved to survive such an event.   These are 
summarised below. 
• Design of the carriages in terms of resistance to impacts / crashes and 
their ability to absorb energy by remaining intact rather than breaking 
up. 
• Driver training procedures and competency assessment. 
• SPAD management in terms of preventing and thoroughly investigating 
all occurrences. 
• Signal sighting capabilities of drivers and the subsequent positioning 
and monitoring of the signals under all conditions from all types of 
trains. 
• Fitment of train cab communications systems. 
• Fitment (and operation of) automatic train protection systems. 
• Modification of safety-critical signalling systems and the lack of 
subsequent monitoring or adequate training updates. 
• The lack of a cohesive safety management and investigation system to 
respond to on-going signalling system and operational safety issues. 
 
Carriage Design 
Although there is scope for improvement, the FGW train was effective in 
maintaining a good degree of safety in terms of maintaining a survival space 
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as its carriages were substantially intact after the crash.   Its design was such 
that a significant amount of plastic deformation took place near the ends of 
the carriages although this design feature was not an original intent of the 
designer (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 Report).   In contrast, the TT carriages did not 
fare so well where instead of absorbing the crash energy by plastic 
deformation; they broke up to a large extent thereby exposing the occupants 
to far greater danger from the surrounding infrastructure as a result of being 
ejected from the train or being struck by flying debris.   The TT train was a 
more modern construction but was built using substantially lighter materials 
and methods of construction.   The reason that the TT carriages broke up 
rather than deforming was that the structural welds of the carriage were 
weaker than the surrounding material and these gave way on impact (Cullen, 
2002, Part 2 Report). 
New trains now include crumple zones similar to those found in road vehicles.   
Extensive testing has shown that they clearly assist in absorbing energy of 
impacts thereby reducing the likelihood or extent of injury to anyone inside.   
Newer designs also include anti-overriding devices which reduce the risk of 
one carriage going up and over the other at impact.   Whilst a welcome 
development, it was shown that in this crash, crumple zones would not have 
changed the outcome significantly as the kinetic energy in the crash 
amounted to approximately 400MJ whilst the crumple zones presently fitted to 
new trains are designed to absorb around only 1MJ (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 
Report). 
Driver Training 
Thames Trains had previously been audited regarding their procedures and 
processes for driver training and these were found to be inadequate.   Some 
recent progress had been made prior to the crash but the findings and 
recommendations of the audits were not implemented in an expeditious 
manner.   No direct fault or error was attributed to the TT driver as there were 
several other contributing factors most notably training and signal sighting 
issues in combination with an unacceptable number of SPADs that had been 
occurring at the signal involved.   It was clear that safety management within 
Thames Trains was not all it should have been.   The safety culture within the 
company (and the industry as a whole) was found to be lacking. 
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Part 2 of the inquiry concentrated on safety management and heard (from 
one of the expert witnesses) that in general approximately 90% of all 
industrial accidents are caused by changes in human behaviour rather than 
functional or systematic failures (Cullen, Part 2 report, 2002). 
The Cullen Inquiry also found that while there was no evidence to suggest 
that safety was compromised (or improved) as a result of privatisation, 
communications between the fragmented companies made it more difficult to 
form a cohesive industry-wide approach to managing safety and creating a 
common safety culture for all involved. 
The Inquiry was presented with evidence suggesting that railway system 
performance had been given a higher priority than safety as its business 
targets were predominantly measured by delays and timetable compliance 
(driven no doubt to a certain extent by the need to minimise the hype and 
associated backlash supported by or caused by the media).   The 
management and board level of the operators perceived this situation 
differently from the front line employees in that they did not feel that this was 
the case while workers at the front line were persistently aware of the safety 
issues but were not of the opinion that sufficient resources were allocated to 
correct them.   Cullen (2002) found that management even attempted to lay 
some blame on the Government in terms of enforcing and encouraging the 
setting of performance targets at the expense of safety.   It is most likely that 
such a view was a gross misunderstanding of expected values and targets. 
It is likely that if passengers were given a choice the vast majority of them 
would quite rationally choose to arrive at their destination a little late in favour 
of risking not arriving at all.   Recent research carried out by RSSB confirms 
this position (RSSB, 2005). 
It is clear that management personnel in overall charge of any kind of safety-
critical system must remain strong in terms of maintaining focus on the real 
targets and not be influenced by external pressure to concentrate on false 
targets likely to detract from the real issues.   In hindsight it is clear that taking 
some criticism for missing performance targets is significantly more preferable 
to being at the centre of an accident such as that which occurred at Ladbroke 
Grove.   Safety culture must be developed as the overall most important 
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business requirement and only when that is functioning correctly can other 
less important issues be tackled successfully. 
SPAD Management 
When the Ladbroke Grove accident occurred SPADs were occurring at the 
rate of approximately 56 per month across the network (HSE, 1999).   Not all 
such recorded incidents were significant in terms of the capability of causing a 
major accident; the majority only resulting in the train stopping in the overlap 
region just behind the signal.   However, approximately 5% of the SPADs that 
occurred did have the potential to cause damage or injury. 
The areas around Paddington had previously been subjected to a special 
investigation as a result of the high number of SPADs that had occurred in the 
area (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 Report).   Signal sighting issues were a concern 
and these were being “dealt with” by Railtrack (the infrastructure operator).   
Signal SN109 had a history of eight previous SPADs over the preceding five 
years.   HMRI had investigated the high frequency of SPADs in the area and 
had taken a slightly relaxed attitude to enforcement action as a result of the 
promises it had received from Railtrack that they were being addressed.   As 
it turned out the promises were not fulfilled (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 Report).   
HMRI accepted the criticism from the Inquiry that had it issued improvement 
notices irrespective of what they were being told by the operator, there was a 
high probability that the corrective measures would have been implemented 
in a more timely fashion and perhaps would have prevented the accident from 
occurring at all.   A specific investigation was held into a previous SPAD at 
SN109 which occurred on 4th February 1998.   The timescale for the 
investigation and subsequent corrective actions was criticised by the Inquiry 
as it could have been carried out much more quickly and efficiently and 
thereby would have had the potential to prevent the crash from occurring.   
HMRI cited lack of resource, lack of vigour in pursuit of issues and placing too 
much trust in the operators as their reasons for their apparent lack of 
influence and regulation (Cullen, 2002, Part 2 Report). 
The Inquiry evidence therefore shows that not only was the railway industry 
not enforcing and building an adequate safety culture, it was clear that the 
regulator (HMRI) was also suffering from similar issues and that a relaxed 
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culture had taken over where it was incorrectly assumed that everyone in the 
industry was doing their best and that as long as this was the case there was 
no need to rock the boat any further by introducing formal measures such as 
improvement notices. 
Since the crash many measures have been put in place to prevent SPADs 
and to handle SPAD investigations.   Senior railway personnel have been 
trained in root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and also in the methods of 
conducting SPAD investigations.   Human Factors specialists are also now 
involved in the investigations into the causation of SPADs (Cullen, 2002, Part 
1 Report). 
Another recommendation of the inquiry was that signal sighting processes 
and procedures required to be improved in order to improve the likelihood that 
issues are discovered prior to an accident occurring.   The Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR) has now formally taken over responsibility for Health and 
Safety in the railway industry from HSC and HSE and co-ordinates all such 
matters (including accident investigation through the RAIB).   As it is a body 
independent from the HSE / HSC its resources should be easier to manage 
than in the previous multi-role HSE set up and thereby provides scope for 
better and more consistent regulation.   The HF issues of the regulator have 
therefore been recognised and corrected. 
Signal Sighting 
Signal sighting is considered to be a greatly important issue as it is becoming 
clear from SPAD investigations that issues with drivers misunderstanding or 
not being able to see track side signals quickly enough or for long enough to 
enable them to carry out their jobs safely and effectively is a significant factor 
in the causation of SPADs. 
Following the Southall crash in 1997 the requirement for carrying out signal 
sighting was greatly increased (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 Report).   The 
procedures and methods of signal sighting or the baseline on which systems 
were judged against were not considered to be adequately documented.   
Most decisions on the need for improvement or modification of a signalling 
system were based on the vast experience of a relatively small community of 
people.   The Inquiry recommended that the signal sighting community was 
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subjected to a review in terms ensuring that an adequate number of 
personnel were in place and that those personnel were subjected to a 
systematic review of competence and capability (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 Report). 
As this is such a highly specialised safety-critical task the personnel involved 
had previously been self-regulating.   The Inquiry found that the responsibility 
for initiation of the formation of a signal sighting committee for investigative 
purposes was not always clear and therefore these were not always carried 
out under the terms of the group standards (GK/RT/0037, GO/RT/3252) in 
response to SPADs occurring (Cullen, 2002, Part 1 Report). 
It is clear that the individuals were well respected and they seemed to be 
capable of performing their tasks to the required degree of competence and 
integrity but that resources or internal politics were so restrictive that the 
safety management system was not conducive to initiating signal sighting 
activities when required. 
Cab Communications 
A new system of GSM-R communications is currently being designed and 
trialled across certain areas of the network.   The system requires £1.2 billion 
of investment and is expected to be fully operational by 2013.   The system is 
massive and requires a huge amount of co-ordination in what is a very difficult 
and dangerous operating environment.   It is recognised that there are more 
important and immediate issues such as building an industry-wide safety 
culture, TPWS+, ATP, etc. 
The trials are being monitored for all issues of concern including human 
factors issues. 
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 
The ATP project for UK railway infrastructure will be implemented as part of 
the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS).   Waboso (2002) 
asserts that the primary reason for such a system (as proposed for the UK) is 
to prevent signals passed at danger (SPAD); the cause of several fatal rail 
crashes in the UK.   Risk assessments and cost benefit analysis suggest that 
ATP installed as part of the European Rail Traffic Management System 
(ERTMS) would not provide a significant increase in safety for the costs 
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involved over the presently installed system: Train Protection and Warning 
System (TPWS); currently estimated to prevent approximately 80% of ATP-
preventable crashes (Waboso, 2002).   The immediate need for ATP has 
therefore been much reduced and the massive spend required for 
ERTMS/ATP has been shown to be unjustified at this time. 
ERTMS not only provides an ATP system but also enables compliance with 
the EC interoperability directives.   The system will provide several key 
requirements: EU-wide interoperability, increased capacity and increased 
safety. 
ERTMS is being implemented on several different levels.   Level 1 and Level 
2 specifications are in place and there are systems in operation already 
across Europe.   There are different grades of implementation in each level 
with each providing different levels of capacity and safety improvements.   
The higher grades of Level 2 are not yet fully designed or implemented. 
Waboso (2002) asserts that the most rapid method of migration to Level 1 
would require a huge amount of work; would need to retain existing signalling 
equipment and would substantially reduce existing capacity.   The migration 
would also likely cause significant disruption to services.   The ERTMS final 
report also shows that this disruption and reduction in capacity is likely to 
cause people to migrate to using road transport thereby exposing them to 
greater theoretical risk with a subsequent increase in the likely number of 
injuries and fatalities on the road network as a result. 
The HSC have previously accepted that the original timescale proposed by 
Cullen / Uff (2001) was not viable (Jones, 2003).   A more measured and 
achievable approach is therefore being developed that allows a gradual 
migration to ERTMS.   When the changeover occurs it envisaged that it will 
be to Level 2 which will dispose of the requirement for the majority of line-side 
signalling equipment.   This means that the risk to track workers will also have 
been substantially reduced in the interim period and for the future as there will 
be far less equipment to maintain and inspect that is located in the trackside 
danger zone.   Much of the ERTMS equipment will be based on radio 
communications (GSM-R) between the signalling system and the train cab to 
provide cab signalling (as fitted to systems such as the Eurotunnel / Eurostar) 
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where line-side signalling is not present or minimal.   This means that higher 
speeds are possible as the driver no longer needs to be able to sight external 
signals as all such signalling information will be displayed in the cab on the 
HMI (human machine interface). 
The ERTMS review project has taken account of the direct and indirect risks 
and has recommended the most effective way forward in terms of reducing 
overall risk to all concerned.   Contrary to the implementation timescales 
recommended in the Cullen / Uff Joint Report (2001) the ERTMS project has 
found that the best implementation method is not the quickest and that the 
quickest implementation of ERTMS does not provide for the greatest overall 
reduction in risk. 
Where equipment is being replaced in the future as part of the maintenance 
or planned end of life programmes it is expected that ERTMS-ready 
equipment and components will be installed in order to ease the transfer to 
the new systems at some later date.   Waboso (2002) asserts that the TPWS 
system has a design life of 15 years but as with modification and replacement 
of all such high-tech large scale systems it is likely that this will be extended 
as required prior to implementation of ERTMS. 
System Modifications / Management of Change 
Gantry 8 at Ladbroke Grove which contained SN109 had been modified in a 
recent upgrade of the signalling system.   A signal sighting committee had not 
been convened after this modification contrary to internal procedures and also 
to the advice of HMRI following a post modification inspection (Cullen, 2002, 
Part 1 Report).   As discussed under the signal sighting section above these 
committees lacked ownership and were rarely convened as and when they 
should have been.   Procedures and processes were in place to ensure such 
committees met when required but they were not followed.   There did not 
appear to be any auditing or monitoring system in place which was capable of 
detecting such failures.   This can be considered as a systematic procedural 
failure and one which could easily have been corrected had an effective HF 
monitoring and review system been in place. 
As there was no formal meeting of signal sighting committees there was also 
a lack of committee output such as training update requirements and safety 
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notices to drivers.   This is clearly a high risk strategy which should not have 
been allowed to continue unchecked.   This highlights a major failing of the 
safety management system, indicative of the safety culture of that period. 
Driver Training / Safety Management 
Cullen (2002, Part 1 Report) found that there was an inadequate safety 
management system on the part of the infrastructure and of the TOCs.   The 
Inquiry made recommendations concerning communications between drivers 
and their managers, specifically to discuss any safety-related issues as a 
priority. 
Cullen (2002, Part 1 Report) recommended that driver competence was 
tested every three years to ensure that performance was at the required high 
level and also that the effectiveness of competence testing systems were 
reviewed at a similar frequency.   It was also recommended that a central 
driver licensing system was created perhaps with a NVQ style of training and 
on-going certification. 
Cullen (2002, Part 1 Report) also recommended that a safety culture 
promoting effective communication without fear of recrimination was 
developed.   This implies that a certain amount of blame culture existed prior 
to the crash.   Such a culture is not conducive to getting the best (or safest) 
out of the whole team. 
Cullen (2002, Part 2 Report) found that there was a culture of tolerance to 
unsafe acts and such behaviour only breeds further contempt for the safety 
systems and procedures in place.   Agnew & Snyder (2008) state that when 
operatives see management showing such behaviours it is usually the case 
that they too will copy those behaviours.   It is imperative therefore that where 
safety-critical systems are involved, management must lead by example and 
show by their actions that breaking the rules will not be tolerated. 
SN109 had a history of SPADs which should have prompted a review of the 
causes but this did not take place.   This is a case of management failing to 
lead by example.   Cullen (2002, Part 2 Report) found that a great majority of 
SPADs that occurred within the railway network were too often attributed 
simply to driver error and as such the incidents were not subjected to a full 
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review to discover whether any underlying issues were present (as was 
proven to be the case at SN109). 
The Inquiry conclusions to the safety management culture were that higher 
safety standards required to be set through clear leadership, good two-way 
communications, better adoption of best practice in operations and learning 
processes, better training of all employees from drivers’ duties through to 
incident management and response of associated train personnel, a new 
focus on the concerns and aspirations of the customers and a new ethos of 
communications within the industry. 
Clearly the issues noted above relate entirely to promoting the good 
behaviours of humans while minimising the prevalence and effects of less 
desirable behaviours, i.e. designing out the HF-induced issues. 
2.8.2 Case Study 3 – Conclusions 
It is clear that since the occurrence of the major accidents that involved driver 
error, signal sighting issues and SPADs, a huge amount of work has been 
completed by the industry and the regulatory authorities in terms of correcting 
the procedural and behavioural failings that once existed.   The number of 
SPADs is reducing and training, monitoring and reporting methods have been 
vastly improved.   TPWS has now been installed over the entire network 
(Office of Rail Regulation, 2010) and is producing positive results as can be 
seen in more recent SPAD reports (RSSB, 2007). 
By analysis of the physical, procedural and technical systems involved, it has 
been shown by the UK railway industry that by designing and implementing 
appropriate systems of safety management, control and monitoring that the 
safety culture, even in a highly complex organisation, can be improved to 
such an extent that results previously thought to be unachievable can be 
realised to the benefit of all who use and work in the railway system. 
Cullen (2002, Part 1 Report) found that the direct cause of this accident was 
that the TT train driver drove through a red light but also that it would be 
unfair to attribute all blame to him as there were other situational aspects that 
contributed to this accident occurring.   Signal sighting issues (poor design), 
driver training (skill-based and knowledge-based errors), motivational errors 
(violations), inadequate SPAD detection safety systems and poor 
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communications channels (motivational and competence issues) all 
contributed the accident occurring.   Driver inexperience may also have been 
a contributing factor given the driver’s recent qualification to operate.   Cullen 
(2002, Part 1 Report) found that the signalling system designers did not 
provide the drivers with best available information at Gantry 8 / SN109.   Also, 
the issues with signal SN109 were not investigated and rectified 
expeditiously.   Existing issues were not communicated adequately to new 
staff such as the TT train driver who had only qualified two weeks prior to the 
accident occurring.   Although deemed to be fully competent, having passed 
all necessary theory and practical examinations, putting a new driver on a 
route with a history of signal sighting issues was noted by Cullen (2002 Part 1 
Report) to be a less than acceptable situation.   The training programme was 
subjected to an audit and was found to be lacking in terms of practical 
experience on the exit from Paddington with respect to passing SN109.   The 
training programme was subjected to an independent review by Prof. John 
Groeger (University of Surrey) which revealed that in certain parts of the 
programme (route learning) there were no clear pass / fail criteria with which 
the driver trainers could assess the trainees against.   Additionally there was 
no definition of how many times or how accurately the trainee had to 
complete an activity for the trainer/observer to deem them competent.   Such 
a situation may occur as a result of many factors but clearly they must include 
motivational issues, competence issues and judgement errors on the part of 
the management and driver training personnel, i.e. knowledge-based 
mistakes and rule-based mistakes.   The review noted this situation to be a 
weakness and specific recommendations were made to rectify this situation. 
There were other human factors present such as fatigue as a result of the 
working / commuting arrangements of the TT driver.   The driver rose at 03:00 
to get to Paddington in time for his first journey of the day (approximately 
05:30).   The driver had requested to operate out of Reading which was much 
closer to his home but this request was not granted.   Minimising commute 
times and maximising rest / sleep periods would have helped to reduce stress 
and the likelihood of fatigue occurring.   This is considered to be a 
management judgement error and a motivational issue (knowledge-based 
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mistakes) as the management appeared to be unsympathetic to the driver’s 
request and may not have realised the potential outcome of the decision. 
2.9 Case Study 4 – Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure 
The Ariane 5 rocket launcher system was designed and built by a pan-
European consortium of companies known as the European Space Agency 
(ESA).   It was designed as a heavy lift system of delivering payloads into 
orbit such as commercial communications satellites.   Although fundamentally 
a European system it is launched from Central America (Kourou in French 
Guiana).   This location is near to the equator which minimises the flying 
distance to achieve weightlessness, thereby minimising the quantity of fuel 
required to do so. 
The maiden launch of the system was heralded as a new chapter in the 
space industry as Europe became a more considerable commercial force with 
the Ariane 5 heavy lift system. 
Lions (1996) found that on the day of the launch (04/06/1996) there were no 
major issues of concern affecting the launch schedule.   Visibility was such 
that the launch time was postponed for a short period but weather on the 
whole was suitable.   After the countdown sequence the main Vulcain engine 
and solid rocket boosters (SRBs) all ignited normally and were fully 
operational in flight until at approximately T+36 seconds when the launcher 
suddenly veered off course and spectacularly broke up and exploded as a 
result of the dynamic forces encountered and the resultant safety self-destruct 
systems deployed.   The launcher exploded into thousands of pieces 
showering an area east of the launch pad of approximately 12km2 with the 
debris.   Some of this debris presented a danger to people and the 
environment as a result of the flammable and toxic materials released during 
the explosion. 
At T+36 seconds the back-up inertial reference system failed followed 
immediately by the active system.   These failures caused the engine nozzles 
to swivel to the extreme position of their operating envelope resulting in the 
sudden veering that was observed. 
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An independent Inquiry Board was set up under instruction by the Director 
General of ESA and the Chairman of the French Space Agency (CNES) to 
investigate the accident. 
As a result of the nature of the failure it was quickly determined by the Board 
that their initial investigations would be centred on the flight control systems.   
Extensive telemetry data was available and this was analysed by experts for 
the purposes of attaching a verifiable time line to the analysis. 
Several other anomalies occurred during the short flight but, after preliminary 
investigation, these were ruled out as contributing factors to the accident.   It 
was acknowledged that they required to be rectified for future launches but 
that they would not lead to such an accident as observed on the maiden flight. 
Despite the difficult terrain and ground conditions of the area (mangrove 
swamp and savannah), the inertial control systems components were 
recovered and sent off for analysis. 
The flight control system of Ariane 5 was based on the same system fitted to 
Ariane 4; an earlier and highly successful ESA launch system (Lions, 1996).   
The system includes an Inertial Reference System (SRI) with its own internal 
computer which calculates angles and velocities based on information from 
the laser gyros and accelerometers fitted to the launcher.   The data from the 
SRI is fed to the launcher on board computer (OBC) which executes the flight 
control program and controls the engine directional thrust nozzles by 
hydraulic actuator systems.   Redundant systems are employed to improve 
reliability.   One SRI is “active” while the other is in “hot stand-by” mode and 
the units are identical.   OBCs are also duplicated.   When the OBC detects a 
failure of the active SRI it automatically switches to the hot stand-by unit (if 
operational).   The SRIs fitted to Ariane 5 were the same as those fitted to 
Ariane 4 in all respects (including software). 
The accident was caused when the active SRI (SRI2) developed a software 
operand exception error followed by automatic shutdown of the unit processor 
thereby enforcing the OBC to switch to the other unit (SRI1).   Under normal 
circumstances this would enable the launcher to continue its flight but in this 
case the hot standby had also failed for exactly the same reason during the 
previous data cycle (72ms earlier).   This meant that the OBC could no longer 
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compute any real flight control data and the flight was doomed from that point.   
As both the SRIs had ceased to function the OBC was computing flight 
control actions based on an erroneous diagnostic string pattern value 
interpreted as genuine flight data (Lions, 1996). 
The software routine that contained the error was associated with the 
alignment of the strap-down inertial platform and only computes meaningful 
results prior to take-off.   It is used as a means of detecting the position of the 
launcher with reference to earth and space.   After lift-off the software routine 
is essentially redundant as the in-flight systems take over.   The software 
routine operates for approximately 50 seconds (9 seconds before and 41 
seconds after lift-off).   This sequence was derived from the Ariane 4 launcher 
and was not changed for Ariane 5.   The times are associated with the 
procedures involved in halting and restarting countdowns and to enable the 
ground systems to re-gain control of flight systems from the launcher after 
countdown cessation.   There was no requirement for the Ariane 5 alignment 
system software to continue after lift-off but the same times set for Ariane 4 
were still in place. 
The Ariane 5 alignment / lift off preparation sequence was different to the 
Ariane 4 sequence to such an extent that the software routine was not 
applicable in terms of the time required to re-align the systems after a 
countdown hold.   For reasons of commonality and unnecessary software 
modification this routine was not modified for the Ariane 5 launcher.   This 
may be perceived as a knowledge-based judgement error at several levels 
within the organisation. 
The Board found that the reason for the operand exception was that during a 
conversion of an operand value in the alignment routine from 64-bit floating 
point form to 16-bit integer form the floating point number had a greater value 
than could be represented by the integer value.   The operand was found to 
be the horizontal bias value (BH) as measured by the strap-down inertial 
platform (containing the laser gyros and accelerometers).   The software code 
for the SRI relating to this value was exactly the same as Ariane 4 including 
timings and values.   The flight path of Ariane 5 has a greater horizontal 
velocity than Ariane 4 thereby causing the operand exception error to occur.   
The code was therefore unsuitable for the Ariane 5 launcher.   Error trapping 
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for this operand value was not in place.   Six other similar measurements 
were used in the software with four of them having error trapping routines in 
place.   The assessment of the three values that did not have software error 
trapping showed (incorrectly) that there was insignificant risk associated with 
these values and that to achieve the processor workload target of 80% these 
values could remain unprotected.   This was a valid assumption for Ariane 4 
but not Ariane 5 (Lions, 1996).   The classification of risk associated with this 
value was incorrect.   The inquiry report does not attribute blame to any single 
person or group but the errors appear to be caused by inexperience, 
judgement and competence by several persons or groups. 
The issue with the BH parameter was that assumptions were made that the 
value was physically limited or that there was a large margin of safety; both of 
these assumptions were incorrect for Ariane 5 as found by the Board.   Such 
assumptions clearly show a lack of knowledge (competence) or judgement by 
a number of personnel involved. 
The testing regime of the launcher system did not include physical testing of 
the SRI systems under launch conditions and the Board concluded that had it 
done so, the flaw in the guidance system would have been discovered.   This 
failure may be attributed to a lack of competence as a result of the personnel 
involved not appreciating the requirement for more thorough testing of the 
flight control software and associated systems to be carried out.   This is not 
likely to be an issue with a root cause directly associated with the personnel 
involved but is more likely to have a root cause in the training, development 
and competence assurance programmes within ESA, i.e. judgement and 
competence errors associated with the personnel at a higher level within the 
organisation.   This is the type of issue that the safety culture questionnaire 
and assessment tool has been designed to detect. 
The Ariane 5 trajectory data was not programmed into the SRIs but instead 
the Ariane 4 data remained.   As a result of the assumptions made at an 
earlier stage of the development process this was not perceived to be an 
issue at the testing phase, i.e. inadequate competence or judgement errors. 
The SRI specification required the processor to be shut down when a 
software exception occurred.   The Board found that this was also a major 
   Page 61 of 322 
factor in contributing to the accident.   The type of software errors accounted 
for were solely in place for the purpose of detecting random hardware failures 
for which a hot stand-by system was considered as adequate mitigation.   
However, the type of failure that occurred was systematic and was not 
therefore adequately protected against by the stand-by systems in place, i.e. 
there was a failure to detect the latent error through inadequate competence, 
inexperience or judgement. 
The Board found that the system performed as designed, i.e. the exception 
error was detected and the stated action was carried out (processor shut 
down).   It was the specification that was incorrect in that the SRI should not 
have been shut down on an exception occurring.   The Ariane programme 
had an overall view that software should be considered as correct in all such 
error handling situations until it could be shown that it was at fault.   The 
Board had the opposite view in that all software should be considered to be 
faulty until all best practice methods of testing and analysis have proven it to 
be otherwise. 
The Board stated their view was that mission-critical software should be 
subjected to the same level of exhaustive testing and analysis procedures as 
any hardware component and that back-up / stand-by systems must take 
account of software failures when considering the system failure modes. 
Equipment testing and qualification procedures for Ariane 5 are similar to that 
of the Space Shuttle.   The process is noted below. 
1. Equipment Level:  Each item of equipment is confirmed as being in 
conformance with specification (including software). 
2. Stage Integration Level:  Integration testing is carried out to ensure that 
all equipment functions correctly as part of the subsystems to which it 
is connected. 
3. System Validation Testing Level:  Validation testing is where entire 
systems are tested, e.g. the flight control system where all subsystems 
are either present for the tests or are simulated. 
The Board found that the test programme did not include a test being 
performed to verify that the SRI would function correctly when subjected to 
the countdown sequence in combination with the expected Ariane 5 flight 
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trajectory data.   The Board concluded that had such a test been carried out 
the accident would not have happened as the underlying software fault would 
have been discovered.   The specification for the Ariane 5 SRI did not contain 
reference to the functional requirement to include actual Ariane 5 flight 
trajectory data.   The Ariane 4 data therefore remained. 
The SRIs were considered to be fully qualified at equipment level and all 
subsequent higher level testing of the associated sub-systems was carried 
out by simulation of the SRI signals and data. 
2.9.1 Case Study 4 Analysis 
The main findings of the board were that the loss of the vehicle was caused 
by total loss of the guidance and attitude systems and that this failure was 
caused by inadequate analysis and testing of the SRI and the complete flight 
control system, i.e. judgement, competence and potentially inexperience 
errors (knowledge-based, rule-based and skill-based errors). 
It is clear that human factors played a significant part in the cause of this 
accident where assumptions were made that were not correct and those 
assumptions had not been fully analysed to determine the potential effects on 
the whole system.   As with NASA, the Ariane project employs a huge number 
of highly intelligent and specialist personnel easily capable of detecting such 
a fault in the design given the appropriate procedures and processes with 
which to carry out their duties. 
The Board made 14 key recommendations based on their findings.   They are 
summarised below. 
• Disable the alignment system after lift-off and ensure only software 
functions necessary for flight are operated during flight. 
• Prepare an adequate testing facility. 
• Do not disable any sensor from sending best effort data. 
• Provide a specific qualification review of each item of equipment 
containing software and ensure that all critical software is classified as 
a Configuration Controlled Item (CCI). 
• Review software functions specifically for the effects of assumptions, 
the range values possible under all conditions and to ensure that a 
review is carried out by external experts. 
   Page 63 of 322 
• Improve software exception handling and back-up capabilities. 
• Improve quantity of telemetry data available. 
• Reconsider the definition of critical components (including software). 
• Include external experts review of specifications, software and 
justification documentation. 
• Include trajectory data in specifications and test requirements. 
• Review existing test coverage of all existing equipment. 
• Improve software change control procedures and justification 
documentation. 
• Set up a team of experts for ensuring the software qualification is 
carried out to the necessary degree of rigour. 
• Provide a more transparent system of co-operation between all Ariane 
5 partners. 
As can be seen, there were no issues of a highly technical nature identified in 
the recommendations.   All recommendations were either relatively simple 
statements of making straightforward changes as to how certain flight 
systems operated or they were recommendations for how the testing, 
analysis and system verification was carried out and by whom, i.e. they were 
recommendations based on removing human factors issues. 
2.9.2 Case Study 4 Conclusions 
Whilst the fixes necessary to implement the recommendations may have 
been highly complex, the identification of the required fixes was relatively 
straightforward. 
It is postulated that had an effective HF policy been in place then the type of 
actions highlighted in the recommendations made by the Board would have 
been identified as part of the normal administrative review process. 
The personnel responsible for the safety-critical systems had such a tight 
scope of responsibility that they were not focussed on the wider issues (or 
were prevented from doing so by their limited breadth of responsibility).   This 
need not be an issue of great importance provided that someone else or 
some other team is in overall control but in the case of Ariane 5 this was not 
the case, hence how the software error was built into the launcher. 
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The testing and qualification procedures were found not to be of adequate 
rigour so as to enable all such errors to be discovered and that in this case 
the fault that led to the destruction of the launcher passed undetected.   In 
such a large organisation it is unlikely that the same team would be 
responsible for writing the hardware / software specifications and also that of 
the test specifications.   For independence and integrity reasons it would 
clearly be unwise for such a situation.   The international functional safety 
standards such as BSE 61508 and BSEN 61511 require such rigorous 
practices for safety-critical systems where independence must be designed 
into the system from conception to decommissioning and this must be 
adequately documented. 
The testing programme did not consider the need for a full test of the systems 
under simulated launch conditions.   Ordinarily the software routine that 
caused the failure does not directly affect flight control after lift-off but was still 
capable of shutting down the processor that measured critical flight control 
parameters and passed data to the OBC.   This indirect ability to cause the 
accident seems to be an inexcusable oversight on behalf of all personnel 
involved.   The communications system within the organisation was not set up 
such that the width and scope of reviews carried out were visible to all 
partners to the same degree; a very similar situation to that in the NASA 
accidents.   This type of error falls into several categories: judgement, 
competence and inexperience, i.e. knowledge-based and skill-based errors.   
Also, the inexperience does not relate to the experience of those personnel 
working in their field of expertise but their experience of appreciating the 
bigger picture of all potential issues. 
As the recommendations show, many of the issues were easily resolved and 
the Ariane 5 launch system has since carried out 56 successful missions (up 
to mid-2011 but also with one further failure during this time).   It is a point 
worth noting that the system is not designed for carrying personnel into 
space.   Had it been so then it is most likely that additional review and testing 
stages would have been included in the procedural requirements and again 
the fault would almost certainly have been discovered prior to flight.   The 
Board’s report does not go into detail about the competence of personnel but 
it is clear that there were such issues given that the error was not detected.   
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It is widely accepted that all software contains errors and whilst the error in 
the software code was a credible occurrence, as with all other such software 
errors, it should have been detected through the test specification and actual 
systems testing programme.   It is clear therefore that the software fault was 
not the only contributing factor. 
The type of error that caused the Ariane 5 accident shows that there were 
failings not only at the engineering level but also in safety engineering and 
management levels in terms of not providing adequate systems of review, 
control and communication, i.e. judgement, competence and potentially 
inexperience errors (knowledge-based). 
In the petrochemical industry it is normal to include specialist safety 
engineering personnel at all stages of the design and testing programme in 
order to assist in identifying such issues.   While those personnel may not be 
useful in terms of providing solutions to issues raised they may have brought 
the issues to the fore such that the technical and managerial personnel could 
have addressed them as necessary. 
2.10 Case Study 5 – Buncefield Explosion 
The Buncefield fuel storage and distribution depot serves the south east of 
England.   The depot is used for the storage and transportation of all types of 
hydrocarbon fuels to the surrounding area via road tankers and also by direct 
pipe line connections (jet aviation fuel) to Gatwick and Heathrow airports.   
The depot receives its fuel in batches via three cross-country pipe lines: one 
from Lindsay Refinery in North Humberside, one from Stanlow Refinery in 
Cheshire and the third from Coryton Refinery in Essex (Buncefield Major 
Incident Investigation Board, 2008). 
A series of explosions occurred at the depot in December 2005.   This 
occurred after a gasoline tank had been inadvertently overfilled and the 
released liquid formed an extensive vapour cloud at ground level.   It is 
postulated by the investigation team that the vapour cloud was ignited by a 
piece of electrical equipment within the fuel depot.   The main explosion 
caused catastrophic damage to the facilities at the depot and also in the 
buildings in the immediate vicinity.   The blast wave destroyed several houses 
and business premises adjacent to the depot and severely damaged many 
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others.   It was extremely fortunate that no one was killed as a result of the 
explosion.   Over forty people were injured as a direct result of the explosion 
but these were not life-threatening injuries. 
The explosion caused widespread disruption to people (domestic and 
businesses) in the surrounding area by the implementation of road closures 
for several months afterwards to allow the emergency response and site 
clean-up teams to access the site safely and to keep people away from the 
danger present in the aftermath of the explosion.   People had to be 
evacuated from their homes and businesses for their safety: some for several 
months.   Several businesses went into liquidation as a result of the disruption 
and many buildings had to be knocked down as a result of the blast damage 
being irreparable.   Damage to buildings was recorded up to 2km away from 
the depot: an area much larger than previously thought possible for open 
flammable cloud explosions (OFCE).   Subsequent investigation revealed that 
a detonation-type explosion must have occurred to have caused the level of 
damage present and the energy released in the explosion was found to have 
been equivalent to an earth quake with a magnitude of 2.4 on the Richter 
scale (Buncefield Explosion Blast Wave Energy, 2010).   Under normal 
conditions OFCEs do not give rise to detonations.   These usually only occur 
when a degree of confinement or turbulence is present with which to 
propagate a flame front more efficiently through the unburned mixture of 
flammable material and air.   Whilst deflagrations still present a danger to life 
and infrastructure, the explosion energy involved with a deflagration is much 
lower than with a detonation because the explosion occurs over a longer time 
period and does not reach such high explosion blast wave pressures.   A 
detonation is an impulse-type explosion with very short positive phase blast 
wave pressure rise and fall times while a deflagration develops much slower 
because it is unconfined.   It is therefore a much less energetic explosion with 
lower maximum pressure and longer blast wave pressure rise and fall times 
as shown in Figure 2.8 below. 
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Figure 2.8: Typical Blast Wave Pressure / Time Curves 
In the aftermath of the explosion and the subsequent fire fighting efforts it 
became apparent that a significant environmental incident had also occurred 
(Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008).   The fire water, mixed 
with hydrocarbons and fire fighting foam compounds was not retained within 
the site as it should have been and found its way into the surrounding 
groundwater system.   This also contaminated an aquifer which many 
surrounding domestic and commercial businesses use for abstraction.   The 
local water utility company also used this as a source of potable water. 
A major investigation was carried out by a specially formed team from the 
HSE and the Environment Agency (known as the Competent Authority for 
COMAH purposes).   They examined all aspects of the site from normal 
operation up to the point of the explosion occurring.   The findings of the 
investigation led to several successful prosecutions of those held responsible. 
2.10.1 Case Study 5 Analysis 
The main causes of the explosion are listed below (MacDonald, 2011).   
These were used as the basis for the subsequent prosecution of those at 
fault. 
• Simultaneous failure of the automatic tank gauging (ATG) instrument 
and independent high level switch (IHLS). 
• The IHLS was of a design that was potentially unsafe. 
• An inadequate attitude to equipment maintenance was prevalent. 
• Tank filling procedures were inadequate and poorly enforced. 
• The flow rate to the tanks (from other sites) was controlled by the feed 
plants and the availability of information on flow status was poor. 
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• Throughput had increased as a result of the adjacent depot closing 
down. 
• The combinational effects of these factors resulted in a stronger focus 
being placed on production than safety, leading to a poor safety 
culture. 
ATG / IHLS Failure 
The tank level is monitored on a computer screen in the control room.   The 
computer system receives the tank level information from the ATG instrument 
located on the tank.   The ATG had developed a fault which meant that it 
could no longer track the level in the tank.   It had become stuck thereby also 
leading to a “stuck” displayed level.   The tank was being filled from the 
previous evening from one of the three supply pipe lines.   It would appear 
that the operator did not notice that the tank being filled was no longer 
showing that it was filling; a potential operator competence issue (in this case 
a skill-based error) but also potentially one of a poorly designed level display 
equipment and alarm system.   Issues with how the tank level information was 
displayed on the screen meant that this fault was not obvious.   Additionally, 
the alarms that could be set up in the tank gauging system for monitoring tank 
operations were not operational.   The software alarms that could be 
configured allowed for multiple high and low levels as well as tank movement 
alarms, i.e. to sound an alarm when a tank starts to show filling or emptying 
when it should be static and vice versa.   Access to the software system to 
change the alarm set points was not restricted and this meant that the alarms 
could effectively be disabled, i.e. an unapproved modification (or violation) to 
what is essentially a safety system.   The issues with the level display system 
were numerous.   There were clearly issues associated with operator training, 
level monitoring and alarm system ergonomics, motivation of level system 
installer/maintainer, motivation of operators, inexperience of operators 
(potentially as a result of poor training) and clearly an overall lack of control 
and supervision from the site management team, i.e. competence, 
judgement, and motivational failings (rule-based, knowledge-based and skill 
based errors). 
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IHLS Design Flaw 
The IHLS had a design flaw that had not been identified to the switch 
installation contractor or the site operator.   This fundamentally affected the 
safety of the installation.   The switch was fitted with a lever which is used to 
test the functional operation of the device.   The lever is fitted with a means of 
padlocking it in the inactive position.   If not padlocked it is possible for the 
lever to be in the wrong position which would have prevented the switch from 
initiating a tank overfill protection shutdown.   This is believed to have been a 
major contributing factor to the explosion occurring.   Since installation no 
padlocks had been fitted to any of the IHLSs at the site.   The IHLS 
manufacturer was criticised (and ultimately convicted and fined) for not 
providing sufficient information to the installation contractor in order to 
maintain safety with their switches installed in a safety-critical application.   
This is a motivational type of error on the part of the switch designer (rule-
based mistake or violation) but also one of inexperience and judgement on 
the part of the installer/maintainer (knowledge-based mistake compounded by 
the knowledge-based mistake of the supplier). 
Inadequate Maintenance 
The level gauge had failed several times prior to the explosion occurring but 
the root cause of the failures had not been identified.   Only cursory checks 
and quick fixes had been applied to rectify the situation each time but the root 
cause was not identified and the fault kept occurring.   This is clearly an error 
associated with inadequate competence, experience and judgement 
(knowledge-based and skill-based mistakes).   The maintenance of the ATG 
system was contracted out to the ATG manufacturer with little contractual 
control.   The site operator simply trusted the ATG manufacturer to provide an 
adequate service level but without actually ensuring that such a level of 
service was in place and maintained.   The maintenance contractor clearly 
had motivational issues present as a result of the structure of the 
maintenance contract potentially rewarding the contractor for each visit 
necessary with little or no auditing to ensure that faults were being properly 
rectified.   This is also indicative of serious judgemental and competence 
errors being present (rule-based and skill-based mistakes).   A lack of 
experience or understanding of the issues present also contributed to the 
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issue.   In safety-critical applications the investigation team stated that this 
was not good enough and the site operator was ultimately fined for not 
providing a safe place of work and for endangering people not at work (the 
public).   The site operators were fined a total of more than £4million in 
addition to costs also totalling over £4million. 
The failure of the ATG should not have resulted in the tank overfilling as best 
practice would have required the operators to manually check the tank level 
during the filling process.   This does not appear to have been adequately 
carried out.   This situation was made more complex as a result of how the 
pipe line systems were operated.   Failure to manually check tank level is 
likely to be a motivational error on the part of the operators as operating 
procedures would include such measures ordinarily, i.e. a likely violation of 
existing procedures.   If such procedures were not in place then there would 
also be competence, judgement and inexperience issues present on the part 
of the management team, i.e. knowledge-based mistakes. 
Tank Filling Procedures 
The filling of the tanks was often not under the direct control of the site 
operators.   The inquiry found that the depot was run with a frame of mind that 
placed too much emphasis on keeping pipe lines available and with a far 
lower emphasis being placed on safety.   As the flow could be turned on and 
off remotely and the depot could draw from the tank at the same time as it 
was being filled it was often difficult for the operators to accurately determine 
what the filling rate was. 
Throughput Increase 
One of the adjacent site operators had recently closed down its operations 
and the resultant gap in supply was taken up by the Buncefield site.   This 
change appears to have been implemented without formal analysis of the 
effects on the operability of the depot and without due consideration of the 
workload of the operators and supervisors responsible for its operation.   This 
was clearly a failing of management to fully understand the situation, i.e. a 
knowledge-based or rule-based mistake or violation (if management of 
change procedures were in place) but this also suggests that the competence 
of those involved was also questionable.   Inexperience may also have been 
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a factor in the review / decision process to increase throughput without 
properly examining the process safety implications. 
2.10.2 Case Study 5 Conclusions 
A human factors assessment (as described in this thesis) may well have 
identified the contributing factors leading to the occurrence of this explosion.   
However; even if it had identified the most significant issues prior to the 
explosion occurring, it is not a foregone conclusion that the site management 
would have addressed the findings given the attitudes and production 
requirements in place at the time.   The system (including humans) had been 
pushed beyond its capability and the explosion that occurred was the result. 
It is clear from the investigating team reports that the underlying causes of the 
incident were predominantly related to inadequate control and management 
of the site, i.e. inexperience, judgement, motivation and competence issues 
(knowledge-based and rule-based mistakes).   Attention to detail was lost in 
the need to keep the depot running at maximum capacity and too much 
freedom and trust was afforded to the contractors engaged to install and 
maintain the site equipment to a sufficient degree of rigour.   The site 
personnel were not qualified or sufficiently experienced to ensure such 
measures were being adequately applied and the management did not put 
sufficient measures in place. 
2.11 Human Factors as a Solution 
Modern engineering methods in design, construction and operation can do 
much to improve safety and reliability while inadequate control of these 
aspects may mean that the associated engineering outcomes remain 
susceptible to influencing factors such as poor motivation and training of 
those personnel in positions of safety-critical responsibility. 
Influencing the behaviour of those in responsible positions by the 
consideration of human factors in their routine activities and responsibilities 
can introduce benefits in cost, safety and performance (Harvey, 2004).   An 
example of this has recently been implemented by the National Air Traffic 
Service (NATS) where all personnel in safety-critical positions such as air 
traffic controllers and support services / maintenance personnel are now 
required to undergo rigorous requirement-driven competence testing and 
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analysis and the overall assessment is carried out on a risk-based analysis of 
the level of competence required (Bush, 2007). 
Harvey (2004) has shown that increased effort in human factors assessment 
at the design stage of any safety-critical system results in that system being 
more efficient and having fewer problems throughout its life cycle and it is 
likely that such a system will therefore be inherently safer and more reliable 
as a result, though such assumptions are clearly related more to the quality of 
the HF assessment work carried out and not the quantity. 
Kubie (2001) writes that there can be cases where “one safeguard too many” 
can actually induce greater risk as a result of people becoming complacent.   
An example presented is that of improved safety and technology in the motor 
car by the introduction of mandatory seatbelt use in the UK (1983).   Since 
introduction there are now fewer fatalities in the UK as a result of crashes but 
there are more crashes occurring (Kubie, 2001).   People seem to be paying 
less attention to their surroundings, perhaps as a result of being enveloped in 
their cell of safety and feeling detached from the real risk that exists not only 
outside the vehicle but also within the vehicle.   There are now a multitude of 
distractions available such as SatNav, CD players and mobile phones and 
these too will no doubt have a contributing factor to the accident rate.   There 
are also more vehicles on the road today than were present in 1983.   
Legislation has also been brought in to make using such equipment while 
driving an endorsable offence but not everyone complies with such laws.   
Clearly this is an unacceptable situation but one which cannot be corrected in 
a state where people are essentially free to move around in whatever 
transport they desire and however they choose to do it – until they have been 
caught and dealt with through the judicial system.   Even then, the system 
does not seek to improve behaviour but simply imposes fines or driving bans.   
For the worst offenders such as drink drivers, rehabilitation schemes are in 
place whereby offenders can elect (or be ordered) to attend rehabilitation 
programmes to assist in preventing such future behaviour.   These schemes 
seek to change the behaviour that causes the offenders to break the rules 
and take unacceptable risks in the first place thereby maximising the 
likelihood of future prevention of such errors and unacceptable behaviour.   
The assessment of human factors in the workplace and in public 
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transportation systems seeks to apply exactly the same methods by which the 
behaviour of people can be changed for the better. 
It is essential for the continuous improvement of public transportation safety 
that all available technology is considered at the design stage but in 
contradiction to this, in safety-critical control systems, such as those in use in 
transportation and industry, it is often more appropriate to include tried and 
tested technology in the final design.   An example of this is the automated 
control and safety shutdown systems fitted to commercial nuclear reactors.   
Whilst the shutdown systems in place contain the most up to date high-
integrity, high-reliability and high-tech equipment they also contain tried and 
tested technology such as 1950s design electro-mechanical relay-based 
systems.   Such systems are not only designed to be fail-safe (for predictable 
equipment failures) but they also make use of redundant systems using a 
different means of detection, initiation and executive action to minimise the 
probability of failure to operate on demand (PFD) through the removal of 
common mode failures in the protection systems. 
Human factors in addition to other safety management and risk reduction 
tools such as risk assessment, reliability centred maintenance (RCM), risk 
based inspection (RBI), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), can be used 
to minimise and mitigate the risk associated with any new methods or 
technology being employed.   Huge leaps forward in engineering technology 
and practice, such as the invention of the compound steam engine in1869 
(Compound steam engine invention, 2010) or the jet engine in 1937 (Jet 
engines history, 2010) are now rare events: the norm now being many small 
steps, discoveries and developments which collectively form an overall 
improvement over an extended time frame.   Human factors engineering can 
be used to bring about many of these small changes and can influence many 
aspects in the design and operation of any transportation or industrial control 
system. 
For older safety-critical systems being upgraded, such as those in the UK 
railway industry, human factors can and does play a significant part in the 
development and design process to optimise the final solution prior to 
implementation and also to minimise the disruption to passengers in the 
interim.   It is essential that all available data is assimilated and considered to 
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ensure that the most effective system is designed.   Missing data can be 
critically important to the design of any system and can result in a system with 
inherent covert design flaws.   This must be prevented for all such safety-
critical systems and requires obtaining real evidence and information from all 
sources and from all levels of personnel from technician through to manager 
from all personnel actively involved in managing such assets (maintenance 
operation, etc.) to ensure that all relevant data has been addressed. 
Transfer of human factors assessment knowledge and methods into industry 
from other sectors such as air and sea transportation where it has already 
been proven useful should be possible as it is a generic tool that can be 
applied to all aspects of engineering and operational activities. 
The method of HF assessment proposed as part of this research project is 
capable of being implemented in a similar way for all sectors and includes 
several key stages of implementation; namely: think, plan, consult, do, review; 
implying that human factors assessment should be applied to the entire 
lifecycle of any project, equipment or system and that it needs to be an 
iterative process.   It is therefore no different to any other engineering or 
project management process founded on good behaviours with a systematic 
approach.   Whilst an isolated application of human factors assessment to 
any one stage or aspect of a project may provide improvements over no 
application at all, it is unlikely to achieve all potential benefits of applying it to 
the entire system or lifecycle. 
Roughton and Mercurio (2002) describe a method of developing an effective 
safety culture in a planned and structured way including the specific stages of 
developing policies (thinking and planning), communicating policies 
(consulting), developing and establishing goals and objectives (doing), 
reviewing achievements (reviewing and improving existing arrangements). 
Tainsh (2004) describes the process of human factors integration within the 
defence sector.   The process includes several key stages: concept, 
development, production, utilisation, support and retirement.   As described 
above, this process can also be made to fit the think, plan, consult, do, review 
process proposed as part of this project. 
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Figure 2.9 below shows that the implementation process should not be 
considered as circular but more of a spiral with decreasing risk for each 
iteration. 
 
Figure 2.9: Iterative HF Application Process 
Lester (2007) defines the project lifecycle for general project management as 
containing 8 key stages: concept (think), feasibility (plan, consult), evaluation 
(plan, consult), authorisation (consult, do), implementation (do), completion 
(do, review), operation (do, review) and termination (do, review) 
As noted (in brackets) these key project lifecycle stages can also be made to 
fit the model proposed within this research project. 
2.11.1 Implementation Stage 1: Think 
By assessing potential human factors issues at the conceptual stage of a 
project, the foundations can be laid for a fully and correctly specified project.   
This research project has investigated how human factors can be applied in 
real situations within industry by exploring what information is required and 
how it can be used to optimise the operation of workplaces.   In terms of 
human factors, this research project investigated (by analysis of data from 
collaborative companies) what requirements should be specified and how the 
requirements can be defined and incorporated into existing systems of control 
and monitoring.   This preliminary stage of the implementation of human 
factors is very much associated with the provision of specifications such that 
the entire scope of requirements is covered and confirmed as such.   The 
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scope clearly needs to take account of external factors such as any legislative 
constraints or other constraints of any type and their likely effect over the 
lifecycle of the project / system. 
2.11.2 Implementation Stage 2: Plan 
The planning stage of the implementation of human factors assessment of a 
project or system should include a full appraisal of the overall project strategy.   
Isolated or spurious application of the technique will provide benefits but the 
most effective application will be when the entire project or system lifecycle is 
subjected to a full and rigorous application of the technique. 
This research project has investigated, through collaboration, the application 
of human factors assessments to determine what benefits are expected or 
achievable and how project timescales or resource burden may be affected 
by the application of HF assessments and how the operation of the process 
systems may be affected in terms of efficiency and safety. 
2.11.3 Implementation Stage 3: Consultation 
The consultation process should be applied at all levels and to all stages of a 
project in order to maximise the quality and quantity of the data and 
information that is available to the personnel responsible for the system 
design and operation.   This consultation described does not refer to hiring 
external experts (though it does not discount this) but refers instead to 
consultation between all relevant personnel involved.   It is essential to 
consider what group of personnel the data came from and to analyse what 
personnel provide the most useful data in terms of assisting in improving the 
safety integrity of any existing or proposed system. 
An accident is a coming together of several undesirable factors at the same 
time, with undesirable consequences.   The UK HSE defines an accident as: 
“any unplanned event that results in injury or ill-health to people, or damages 
property, plant or equipment”. (Health and Safety Executive, 2010) 
Near misses are defined as: 
“an unplanned event which does not cause injury or damage, but could have 
done so." (Health and Safety Executive, 2010) 
The accidents caused by the errors or omissions of humans can be split into 
two main types: those which are caused by truly genuine errors or 
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misunderstandings and those which are a direct result of neglect (violations).   
In the former, genuine errors are often the result of inadequate competence 
or experience of the personnel involved; such personnel having done their 
best but unfortunately not possessing the breadth of experience and 
competence required with which to make good and balanced engineering 
judgements.   The case can easily be argued that this is not a failing of the 
individual but a failing of the individual’s management or its safety 
management system to recognise the competency or experience gap 
present.   External influences causing distractions can also have an adverse 
effect on people’s performance.   This may be down to the type of person, i.e. 
how easily they are distracted in any situation requiring a high degree of 
concentration or it may be as a result of a poorly designed workplace in which 
constant distractions prevent the required degree of concentration ever being 
achieved.   The latter type of accident (neglect or violation) is caused by 
human incompetence, where personnel clearly neglect their professional 
duties and responsibilities and even more importantly that they are aware of 
the risks and the potential consequences to themselves and others. 
Human factors assessments can be used to assist in designing out these 
incompetence factors by incorporating protection against them at the design 
stage of a project lifecycle.   The difficulty is in recognising such factors during 
analysis to be able to design them out.   It is essential therefore that an 
adequate competence assessment system is in place and this project aimed 
to provide a system of assessment that can be used to gauge when a 
company has an adequate system as part of the implementation of HF 
assessments in an industrial setting. 
One of the most important considerations in engineering is determining what 
information is unknown rather than what is known and also what measures 
can be put in place to mitigate the unknowns by estimating the likely scale of 
the worst case event that may occur.   The assessment of human factors 
should endeavour to answer this fundamentally important question for all 
activities. 
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2.11.4 Implementation Stage 4: Do 
An effective safety and management strategy is essential for modern 
transportation systems and industrial processes or manufacturing systems 
but it must be used effectively at all levels of the organisation if it is to be 
successful and more importantly, if it is to be safe.   Inadequate enforcement 
of safety could be considered tantamount to promoting accidents.   This 
research project has investigated who must be involved in the analysis, how 
their competency and experience is assessed or measured, and by whom, 
and what is the degree of certainty associated with competency 
measurement?   A list of criteria which can be combined to give an 
assessment of a person’s competence was defined by Bale and Edwards 
(2000) based on extensive industry experience and benchmarking.   This 
project investigates published accident and incident reports/statistics to seek 
out correlations in the data between the systems and processes involved and 
the HF assessment input (or lack of input) that went into the design of the 
system. 
2.11.5 Implementation Stage 5: Review 
It is essential to continuously monitor and review the effectiveness of any 
safety related process or system to maintain or improve upon design and 
operability as operating experience increases.   The review process also has 
benefits in being fed into the design process of new systems.   Passenger 
movements and lifestyles are continuously changing and transportation 
systems must be able to adapt to such changes quickly, economically and 
safely.   Process plants are often reconfigured for the purposes of making 
slightly different products or enhancing the quality of existing products.   
There is a clear need for management of change procedures to be in place.   
Several high profile accidents can be attributed directly to failings in such 
procedures as highlighted by Bale and Edwards (2000). 
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3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of literature concerning human factors, 
safety culture and behavioural safety in the context of its application in 
industry. 
The purpose of this research project was to potentially answer several key 
questions (as described below) and from those answers to consider how to 
implement suitable methods of analysis to determine significant issues 
present within SMEs and hence implement the most appropriate corrective 
measures. 
• What is human factors? 
• What methods of assessing human factors are available? 
• Why do people make mistakes and violate safety rules? 
• What methods can be employed to prevent mistakes and violations? 
• How do ethical values (personal and corporate) affect safety culture? 
3.1 What is Human Factors? 
Many texts have been written that deal with human factors assessment 
systems and methods.   A considerable number of them refer specifically to 
those aspects of human factors associated with ergonomics and design of 
man-machine interfaces (MMIs).   This is not the area of interest of this 
research project.   This project is concerned with the assessment of why 
people do the things they do, whether those actions are correct or not and 
how those individual decisions can be manipulated by the health and safety 
management systems in place to ensure that the number of correct decisions 
far exceeds the number of incorrect decisions, i.e. a system that is heavily 
weighted to promote safe behaviours and discourage unsafe behaviours. 
Meister (1971) describes human factors as: 
“...those elements which influence the efficiency with which people can use 
equipment to accomplish the functions of that equipment.   The most important of 
these elements are the following: 
Meister (1971) then goes on to define those elements as equipment, 
environment, task and personnel. 
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The environment, task and personnel are the elements that can affect the 
performance of humans in the safe operation of any process within the 
workplace and this is considered in more detail throughout this text. 
The environment in which a person works, among many other factors, is 
important in terms of ensuring that workers are not put under too much stress 
as a result of the surrounding conditions.   People need to be able to carry out 
their tasks with a certain minimum level of concentration in order to achieve 
and maintain safety. 
Analysis of the task being carried out is also critically important to ensure that 
all possible conditions and situations have been assessed.   Such analysis 
serves to remove as much of the safety-related decisions from the operatives 
as possible and to implement work processes and procedures that provide 
the safest possible environment and work methods.   Only abnormal 
conditions or events would then require a decision from the operative to 
determine the appropriate action to be taken.   This method of working can 
present a potential risk to the business by designing processes and systems 
to be automated to such an extent that operatives may lose their skills of 
judgement and analysis and may become bored in their roles thereby 
increasing the likelihood of an error occurring. 
The personnel selected for any particular task must be capable of performing 
that task to a defined minimum level of rigour and safety.   This description 
essentially means that personnel must be competent to carry out their allotted 
duties.   If safety-related decisions are part of those duties then the personnel 
must have sufficient knowledge and must have received sufficient training 
and experience with which to be able to make those decisions. 
Dekker (2006) also provides his definition of what human factors is.   “Human 
factors is not just about humans, just like human error is not just about 
humans.   It is about how features of people’s tools and tasks and working 
environment systematically influence human performance.”   As can be seen 
from this definition, it is broadly similar to that described by Meister in that 
human factors must take account of the human issues as well as the working 
environment, the task in hand and the capabilities of those people performing 
the tasks. 
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Reason & Hobbs (2003) state that “human errors do not emerge randomly, 
but are shaped by situation and task factors that are part of the environment 
in which the person is functioning.”   In consideration of why errors occur they 
state “Error-producing conditions in the workplace are commonly referred to 
as local factors, meaning that they are present in the immediate surroundings 
at the time of the error.”   These local factors are the same as the human 
factors as described above, i.e. they describe any conditions present that can 
affect how the human performs in the tasks that are to be carried out.   This is 
the essence of what this research project is all about: the assessment of 
those factors that can affect the human decision-making process that 
determines whether good behaviours or potentially unsafe behaviours are 
carried out. 
Reason (1997) discusses the principles of proactive process measurement 
which involves making an assessment of three key factors: unsafe acts, local 
workplace factors and organisational factors.   Reason (1997) asserts that the 
measurement or assessment of unsafe acts is extremely difficult as the 
number of unsafe acts actually carried out in any workplace is almost 
impossible to ascertain.   Unsafe acts do not always result in immediate 
undesirable consequences other than indirectly promoting unsafe behaviours 
in the future and when this happens they may not be reported.   It is stated by 
Reason (1997) that “Errors are essentially information-processing problems” 
while violations “have their origins in motivational, attitudinal, group and 
cultural factors, and need to be tackled by countermeasures aimed more at 
the heart than the head.”   The assessment of these factors therefore leads to 
a potential range of corrective measures that can be applied in order to 
reduce the likelihood of unsafe behaviours occurring and thereby reduce risk 
within the workplace. 
Local workplace factors (as defined by Reason) such as environment, 
process and machinery hazards, etc. are relatively straightforward to assess, 
given an adequate quantity and quality of information regarding the tasks to 
be carried out. 
Organisational factors are described by Reason (1997) as the upper level 
parent failures that cause child failures further down the organisation, i.e. 
those issues that become apparent at the shop floor level but with their root 
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causes in the management system.   A good system of upper level 
management and control is therefore critically important if the risk associated 
with the work carried out on the shop floor is to be minimised. 
Komaki et al. (2000) describe the applied behaviour analysis (ABA) method of 
human factors assessment.   They state that: 
“The ABA approach has three features which distinguish it from other 
motivation theories: (a) its emphasis on the consequences of performance; 
(b) its pinpointing and direct sampling of relevant behaviours or outcomes; 
and (c) its insistence on the evaluation of effectiveness.” 
From the description detailed above it can be seen that behaviours and 
consequences are again at the forefront of the methods they describe. 
Komaki et al. (2000) state that the consequences of our behaviour “..are 
thought to have a powerful impact on what we do from day to day.”   This 
means that behaviour can be conditioned as a function of its consequences.   
The ABA method relies on the feedback provided to workers on the behaviour 
that is carried out.   Komaki et al. (2000) discuss antecedents such as 
“training, the setting of goals and the communication of company policy” 
which all precede performance (or behaviours) and also consequences “such 
as the providing of feedback, recognition, and incentives which usually follow 
performance and take place after the behaviour.”   It is noted by the authors 
that the antecedent measures are important but that consequences have a 
stronger effect on people in terms of changing future behaviours by providing 
motivational encouragement to do the right thing for the right reasons.   ABA 
is therefore dependent on the reaction to and learning from the delivery of 
consequences which provide positive reinforcement for correct and 
appropriate behaviours and negative (but still preferably safe) consequences 
for inappropriate (or unsafe) behaviours. 
Dhillon (2007) describes human factors as “the body of knowledge concerned 
with human abilities, shortcomings, and so on.” and splits human factors into 
four separate categories of objectives (fundamental operational, reliability and 
maintainability, user and operator and miscellaneous). 
Helander (2006) describes human factors as: 
“Considering environmental and organizational constraints, use knowledge of 
human abilities and limitations to design the system, organization, job, 
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machine, tool or consumer product so that it is safe, efficient and comfortable 
to use.” 
It can be seen that this description encompasses all aspects of human 
interaction in the workplace from objects to organisations and that it is entirely 
concerned with the design process, whether that design refers to procedures 
(antecedents) to control how work is (or should be) carried out or whether the 
design refers to objects or equipment that the workers use to achieve some 
goal.   This is a good description of what human factors means in the context 
of this research project. 
The UK HSE (HSG48, 1999) note that human error is often cited as the 
primary cause of many industrial and transportation accidents.   The real 
situation is never this simple though (unless sabotage is a factor and this 
would not be classified as an error but would be an act of safety violation, 
potentially with criminal intent).   In all such cases where human error is cited 
as the cause of an accident there are always other factors present which 
contribute to the accident occurring.   The common link in the chain of most 
accidents is the human and it is because of this that the human is often 
blamed for the accident.   It is often found that the human is not the major 
cause of the accident but that some other cause related to design, operation 
and maintenance is the major contributing factor.   Often, a single individual is 
blamed for an accident in such situations but it is usually true that the same 
accident would have occurred to some other equally competent individual at 
some other point in time when the same contributing factors came together.   
In those cases human error may be to blame for the accident but not 
invariably the human that is present at the time.   The root cause of many 
accidents is often a latent error inherent in the design that was not discovered 
until a certain series of circumstances contrived to cause the accident. 
3.2 What methods of assessing human factors are available? 
Many of the methods of assessing human factors in the workplace and 
designing the associated behaviour-based correction measures appear to be 
very similar in how they are implemented.   Some methods only refer to the 
likelihood of human error while others are specifically centred on promoting 
safety culture. 
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3.2.1 TESEO 
Technica Empirica Stima Errori Operati (TESEO) is a method that assigns 
values to five key factors of an activity as listed below. 
• Type of activity 
• Temporary stress factor (routine activities) 
• Operator qualities 
• Activity anxiety factor 
• Activity ergonomic factor 
This method is described by Wong (2002) as a simplistic method of assessing 
the likelihood of human error applicable to control room operators.    
Values are provided in a table for assigning to each factor based on the type 
of activity being carried out.   When all factors have been assigned a value 
the overall probability of human failure can be estimated by multiplying all 
factors together. 
3.2.2 Behaviour Based Safety (BBS) 
As described by Agnew and Snyder (2008) this is a method of assessing the 
presence of unsafe behaviours and implementing corrective measures to 
prevent them occurring in future.   The corrective measures are the 
consequences of the behaviour; generally negative for unsafe behaviours.   
Behaviours are observed and recorded, often by using small purpose-
designed checklists, and are reinforced immediately by the observer.   
Positive reinforcement occurs when a person is observed to be doing the right 
thing and negative reinforcement is provided when unsafe behaviours are 
observed.   Safe behaviour associated with a small task or sub-task can be 
encouraged and positively reinforced by an action (behaviour) as simple as a 
thumbs up signal from a distance between colleagues while unsafe behaviour 
may result in a thumbs down.   Both types of observation would be formally 
recorded and eventually included in the site behavioural safety statistics.   
Potentially serious unsafe behaviours can be stopped immediately by anyone.   
Authorised intervention is therefore a key requirement of the operation of this 
method of reducing risk.   All personnel must feel empowered to be able to 
intervene for the right reasons and they should be encouraged to do so. 
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The method relies on encouraging people to think about safety in all that they 
do and to encourage the desired behaviours in colleagues to the extent that 
they become habits, i.e. to make safe behaviour the behaviour of choice with 
little or no thought given to doing the task in any way other than with the 
desired safe behaviour. 
The BBS method of implementing human factors assessment and correction 
relies on activities being observed and good behaviour being positively 
reinforced immediately by the observer and negative behaviour being 
prevented or stopped from occurring in future by applying undesirable 
consequences such as a reprimand or having a safety discussion about what 
standard of safety is required and how that wasn’t achieved.   The system is 
therefore based on continuous observation and feedback in which workers 
are involved in the observations and are continuously discussing with each 
other how to encourage safe behaviours and discourage unsafe behaviours.   
The system works best when all levels of staff actively participate in the 
administration of the system and if several key behaviours are selected for 
people to concentrate on such as applying safe methods of lifting objects, 
wearing PPE, keeping to pedestrian walkways, etc.   Once a particular 
behaviour has been assessed as becoming a habit, through auditing (no 
observed non-conformances for a certain period of time), it can be removed 
from the watch list and new behaviours introduced.   These events can be 
treated as a reason for a more significant positive reinforcement such as an 
extra reward for each worker.   This could be as simple as an extra tea break, 
a free cake at the works canteen, an early finish on the last day of the week, 
etc.   Agnew and Snyder state that the rewards work best when the whole 
team is involved in the enjoyment of the reward, i.e. a team building 
opportunity. 
Workers are actively encouraged to assist in the administration of the system 
by selecting behaviours to be monitored and the targets to be achieved.   By 
doing so everyone has a sense of ownership and everyone has the 
opportunity to make a difference.   This means that the method is an inclusive 
system from shop floor to management with none of the traditional barriers 
such as the “them and us” attitude. 
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Observation records created are anonymous and they can be carried out by 
shop floor workers observing senior staff and vice-versa.   People are not 
expected to specifically stop their task to go off and do some observing but 
are expected to do this while carrying out their normal tasks.   A simple tally 
record of what was observed and where is sufficient so that analysis can be 
carried out by the system administrator when all records have been assessed 
and counted. 
Such a system fundamentally requires good working relationships to be in 
place for it to work effectively.   People need to be able to listen to each other 
without taking offence when some negative reinforcement is given and to use 
such events as learning opportunities.   Companies with industrial disputes or 
poor relationships between management and shop floor are unlikely to realise 
real benefits from such a system as it is founded on trust and co-operation 
between management and shop floor. 
This type of system is clearly designed to improve overall safety by reducing 
risk in those activities known to present high risk.   Through persistent 
observation and feedback (reinforcement) a better safety culture is 
developed. 
Reason (1997) describes a good safety culture as something that “emerges 
gradually from the persistent and successful application of practical and 
down-to-earth measures.” and that “Acquiring a safety culture is a process of 
collective learning, like any other.”   Reason (1997) also asserts “It is made up 
of a number of interactive elements, or ways of doing, thinking and managing 
that have enhanced safety health as their natural by-product.”   What Reason 
describes here is a way of working and operating a business that inherently 
includes and promotes safe behaviour at all levels of the company as part of 
normal operation.   Every positive action carried out adds to the overall safety 
culture of the business and every negative action carried out is a learning 
opportunity (provided it is observed and correctly reinforced) and also assists 
in reducing risk.   His definition describes the process detailed by Agnew and 
Snyder (2008). 
Reason (1997) highlights the importance of the business to be honest in 
reporting all accidents and near misses in order to obtain realistic data that 
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can be used to reduce risk in the long term.   He identifies four key elements 
of a safety culture as listed below: 
• Reporting culture 
• Just culture 
• Flexible culture 
• Learning culture 
These four elements come together as a safety culture.   In order to achieve a 
good safety culture all four elements must be in place.   Reason asserts that 
the business activities can be engineered in order to ensure that the four 
elements are adequately addressed.    
Reporting must be encouraged to a high degree.   Reason asserts that 
humans are not good at owning up to errors and that the number of accidents 
and near misses reported will always be less than the actual number of 
incidents that occurred.   BBS attempts to get around this by ensuring that all 
filed reports are anonymous which serves to remove any accusations of a 
blame culture being present by recording only the number of safe and unsafe 
observations and no personal data.   The trust that such a reporting system 
develops is essential in order to maximise the number of near misses 
recorded.   It is debatable whether human nature would allow for this level of 
reporting to be achieved if there was no evidence (or consequences) of an 
accident or near miss occurring.   It is likely that the individual involved will 
learn from the experience without necessarily passing on the potential 
learning to others. 
A just culture is described as a culture that does not offer total immunity to 
people who blatantly carry out unsafe acts (violations) but serves to ensure 
that such acts are discouraged by ensuring that appropriate and immediate 
action is taken to rectify the situation and to prevent recurrence. 
A flexible culture is engineered by the careful assessment of peak demands 
and normal demands on the workforce and by implementing suitable controls 
to be able to respond at peak times.   The whole system must be arranged 
such that it can cope with changes through flexible, tried and tested (but safe) 
operating methods. 
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Every organisation must be able to learn from its incidents and accidents.   If 
it is incapable of doing so then near misses and accidents will continue to 
occur at a higher than acceptable frequency. 
The four elements noted by Reason (1997) require people who are willing to 
co-operate in building a better culture.   It is clear that if people are unwilling 
to participate in this co-operation then they may not be suitable for a business 
operating such methods.   The safety culture is only as good as its weakest 
person and if that person does not show any willingness to comply then it 
would be in the best interests of the business if that person was not present.   
This is one of the most difficult aspects of human factors as it requires total 
dedication from all employees for it to be most effective. 
Many methods of assessing human factors rely on carrying out a safety 
culture survey of the workforce (as carried out in this project).   These 
systems rely on the returned data to highlight any particular aspects of the 
operation that personnel feel unhappy about and that require to be addressed 
if safety culture is to be improved.   The methods of doing so vary between 
different systems but all essentially require changes in behaviour to be 
implemented.   In some cases more antecedent measures will be appropriate, 
while in others it may be preferable to reinforce behaviour by ensuring that 
the consequences of behaviours are used as a means of promoting the 
correct behaviours. 
Of all the literature read as part of this project there does not appear to be an 
assessment system that would enable small to medium sized enterprises to 
assess human factors (or safety culture) using in house personnel.   The aim 
of this research project was to fill this gap by provision of a safety culture 
survey assessment tool that would highlight potential safety culture issues 
thereby enabling SMEs to develop suitable corrective measures whether they 
be antecedents or consequence-based to reduce risk. 
3.2.3 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
The HEART method of human error prediction serves to assess the likely 
failure rates of humans to do the right thing when required.   The system was 
developed in 1985 but is still valid and being taught today.   It is a relatively 
technical method of estimating the likelihood of human error for the type of 
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activity being carried out (and under what conditions).   The method serves to 
calculate the probability of the human to complete the task without error. 
As with the TESEO method, several factors are taken into account to 
calculate the overall value of probability.   The system takes account of error-
producing conditions (EPCs) (their relevance and number of EPCs present), 
and the generic task type.   Over 800 academic papers were examined by 
Williams in order to assimilate information on human reliability and error rates 
and these were used to create the HEART system of analysis.   The 
assessment system defines the values to be used for each type of task and 
EPC present. 
Reason (1997) also references an assessment system proposed by Williams 
(1997) that estimates the probability of a violation being committed.   The 
violation-producing condition factor (VPC) is derived from a table of potential 
VPCs (as repeated in Table 3.1 below).   It is interesting to note that a factor 
exists specifically for male operatives.   This is because the data used to 
create the table of values shows that males are more likely to violate safety 
rules and procedures than females. 
By identifying the most likely causes of human-related failure for any activity it 
is possible to concentrate corrective resources on those high risk aspects.   
As a result of the technical aspects of the method it would not be easily 
applied in all small to medium sized enterprises without adequate training and 
experience. 
Table 3.1: Williams’ Violation-Producing Conditions 
Violation-Producing Condition Factor 
Perceived low likelihood of detection x 10 
Inconvenience x 7 
Apparent authority or status to violate, disregard, or override 
advice, requests, procedures or instructions 
x 3 
Copying behaviour x 2.1 
No disapproving authority figure present x 2 
Perceived requirement to obey ‘authority figure’ x 1.8 
Gender (males) x 1.4 
Group pressure (per each individual encouraging deviation / 
violation: maximum 5) 
x 1.07 
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3.2.4 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
THERP was created primarily for the US nuclear industry but can be applied 
to any high-risk, safety-critical processes (Whittingham, 2004).   It is based on 
the error rates for specific tasks on equipment present in the 1960’s and 
1970’s.   It can be argued therefore that the intrinsic data within the system 
may now be out of date given the vast changes to control room equipment 
that have occurred since that time, i.e. from panel mounted three-term 
process controllers to modern computerised distributed control systems but 
the system is still in use. 
3.2.5 Fault Tree Analysis / Event Tree Analysis 
This is a method of assessing the sequence of events that can lead to an 
accident occurring.   At each stage of the assessment the likelihood of 
success or failure of that element can be calculated and the overall likelihood 
of failure or success can be assigned a value (probability).   Event trees are 
good for visually displaying the routes / decisions to failure. 
3.2.6 Keil Centre Accident Investigation Human Factors Assessment 
Lardner and Scaife (2006) identify methods of human factors analysis in 
accident investigations to determine what behaviours may have contributed to 
the accident occurring.   The method enables the investigator to define those 
behaviours and to assist in designing changes to the process, procedures or 
activities to prevent recurrence in the future.   They describe how the ABC 
method (Komaki et al., 2000) was used to analyse intentional behaviours 
while for unintentional behaviours, human error analysis (HEA) was used.   In 
the human error assessment system four key factors are analysed; 
perception, memory, decision and action.   These are the four elements that a 
human carries out for any cognitive action or decision process.   The paper 
acknowledges that the method could also be developed into a proactive 
system of accident prevention.   The method is not conducive to being 
implemented within SMEs using in-house personnel. 
3.2.7 Health and Safety Laboratory: Safety Culture Tool 
The Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) has recently created a Safety 
Climate Tool (SCT) that enables companies to assess the safety culture 
within the workplace.   It is also based on an employee survey and uses a 
   Page 91 of 322 
series of forty multiple choice statements with a Likert scale of answers.   The 
statements are spread over eight different topics. 
The tool is relatively complex in how it operates and is a standalone 
application.   The graphical functions of this package are excellent and many 
varied graphs can be produced to represent the data collected during the 
survey.   The review of the tool reveals that perhaps an element of 
information overload may be present and picking out the most important and 
salient aspects of the analysis may be time consuming and difficult for a 
layman.   In comparison to the assessment tool created in this research 
project, it has less than half the number of statements and does not actually 
provide an overall safety culture rating that can be compared to previous 
surveys or other departments.   The data necessary for this is available but 
not in a form that makes it easy for the assessor to find quickly or easily. 
The depth of questioning in the HSL SCT is less than that within the 
assessment tool created in this project as a result of there being fewer 
statements.   The additional analysis using “quality factors” within the 
assessment tool produced in this research project provide added weight and 
depth of analysis of the surveys individually and as a group from each survey.   
The tool created by this research project is therefore deemed to be more user 
friendly than the HSL SCT.   The SCT presently has much more graphing 
capability but this too could be built into the tool created as part of this project 
as it is implemented using a spreadsheet with excellent graphing capabilities. 
3.2.8 HSE CRR430/2002 
This document, written by the Keil Centre (M Fleming and R Lardner) and 
commissioned by the UK Health and Safety Executive describes the ABC 
method of implementation as described previously.   Figure 3.1 below shows 
the implementation of a behavioural safety programme using the ABC 
process as described therein. 
Figure 3.1 reproduced through the Open Government License available to view at 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/open-government-
licence.htm. 
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Figure 3.1: ABC Implementation 
Carrying out a baseline survey of safety culture of the company is important 
as it determines how well an ABC (or BBS) system of risk reduction is likely to 
be received and implemented.   If appropriate attitudes and safety culture are 
already present then it will be much easier to get all personnel to participate in 
the ABC system.   If there are any significant issues of distrust or industrial 
disputes between management and frontline personnel then it will be much 
more difficult to implement. 
3.3 Why do people make mistakes and violate safety rules? 
Reason (1990) asserts that there are three types of human error as noted 
below: 
• Skill-based slips and lapses 
• Rule-based mistakes 
• Knowledge-based mistakes 
The skill-bases slips and lapses occur when the immediate actions carried out 
deviate from the intended actions due to execution or storage failures, i.e. the 
task is simply not carried out correctly or certain aspects of the task (or parts 
of it) were forgotten. 
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Mistakes are defined as those errors that occur when the plans and 
procedures are carried out correctly but, as a result of the plans and 
procedures containing inherent faults, a deviation from the expected outcome 
occurs. 
Skill-based slips and rule-based mistakes occur as a result of the person 
carrying out the tasks with inadequate attention, precision or cognisance of 
the rules and procedures to be followed.   They can be modelled using a 
feed-forward mechanism, i.e. the means to prevent errors are detailed prior to 
the task commencing based on sufficient knowledge and experience being 
present when the task was appraised. 
The knowledge-based mistakes can be modelled using only feedback 
mechanisms, i.e. such mistakes are error-driven and may be embedded 
within any task at the stage when people with inadequate information, 
experience, competence and knowledge have detailed how such a task is to 
be carried out.   Only when some future activity is in progress and the 
intended outcome is not achieved will the mistake become evident, thereby 
providing more knowledge and the ability to implement corrective measures. 
A “Generic Error-Modelling System” is proposed by Reason (1990) (as shown 
in Figure 3.2 of the printed version of this thesis). 
 
Figure removed due to publisher copyright assertion. 
 
Figure 3.2: Generic Error-Modelling System 
The generic error model commences at the start of the task and finishes at 
the successful completion of the task and includes all three types of error and 
mistake that can be addressed while the task is on-going.   The model 
depends on the person recognising that there is actually a problem (within the 
rule-based level) and then carrying out subsequent corrective measures (or 
attempted measures).   It can be seen from the model that the actions of 
solving a problem are divided into two areas: those that precede the detection 
of the problem (skill-based errors) and those that follow it (rule-based and 
knowledge-based mistakes).   The model shows that the first decision after 
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detection is to ascertain if the problem is familiar and to consider the 
application of previously attempted solutions to the current problem.   Reason 
(1990) asserts that this is a normal human trait to seek out familiarity and 
patterns before contemplating a move to the knowledge based level of 
problem solving, even though this may be where the root cause of the 
problem is to be found. 
Masked problems such as those associated with knowledge-based mistakes 
may be present long before a task commences but are only detected when 
the problem manifests itself in some form while the task is being carried out.    
Reason (1990) lists the types of error that can occur at each performance 
level: slips and lapses, rule-based mistakes and knowledge based errors (as 
noted in Figure 3.3 of the printed version of this thesis). 
 
Figure removed due to publisher copyright assertion. 
 
Figure 3.3: Performance Level Failure Modes 
Reason (1990) provides a detailed explanation of the different types of errors 
and mistakes (not included in this version of the thesis as a result of publisher 
copyright assertion). 
Flin, O’Connor & Crichton (2008) state that human errors are caused by 
deficiencies in either technical skills (as defined for slips and lapses by 
Reason (1990)) or non-technical skills.   These non-technical skills are 
defined as the “cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement 
technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance.”   They 
cite seven key skills that are discussed throughout their book as noted below: 
• Situation awareness (slips, lapses, rule-based) 
• Decision-making (rule-based, knowledge-based) 
• Communication (rule-based, knowledge-based) 
• Teamwork (rule-based, knowledge-based) 
• Leadership (rule-based, knowledge-based) 
• Managing stress (slips, lapses, knowledge-based) 
• Coping with fatigue (slips, lapses, knowledge-based) 
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Formal training can now be provided to assist people in improving these skill 
sets.   Previously, in the aviation sector, these aspects of pilot training were 
not covered formally but were instead taught and handed down by existing 
incumbents as part of the hands-on practical training process (similar to an 
apprenticeship).   It can be seen that non-technical skills errors can also be 
attributed to the three error types described by Reason (1990) and as added 
in brackets above. 
The authors state that their findings are derived mainly from the aviation 
industry but that the same non-technical skill set is applicable to all safety-
related tasks within any industry.   Deficiencies in any of the skills listed above 
can lead to an error occurring.   It is noted by the authors that a workplace 
employing assessment of such skill sets to minimise the risk of human error 
occurring should also have other measures in place such as procedures, 
training, physical protection measures, etc., i.e. the antecedent measures.   
They also acknowledge that the working environment, organisational 
demands and behaviours of others can also have an effect on the overall 
safety of any situation as a result of the influence on the people involved. 
Reason (2008) asserts that the main cause of all human errors is under-
specification.   Violations are described as “deliberate but non-malevolent 
deviations from safety procedures, rules and regulations.”   Sometimes 
violations are implemented through a formal process of approval such as 
operating outside the normal procedures or operating envelope but with 
alternative safety measures in place.   The other type of violation refers to 
those occasions where personnel do not have such formal approval and 
where alternative safety measures have neither been examined nor 
implemented.   Small violations are carried out frequently at the skill-based 
level of activity and the tasks are completed more often than not with a 
successful outcome.   This is unfortunate because, as described in the ABC 
system of assessment, such an outcome (or reward) is likely to promote the 
same behaviour in the future thereby increasing future exposure to risk if 
violations do not result in a negative reinforcement (or punishment) (Reason, 
2008).   Minor changes to the task conditions may result in a much less 
desirable outcome due to the workplace environment, task timing, 
simultaneous operations, etc.   It is stated that the violators choose to violate 
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for three main reasons: illusion of control, illusion of invulnerability and the 
illusion of superiority (Reason, 2008).   “Habitual violators feel powerful and 
overestimate the extent to which they can govern the outcome of a risky 
situation.”   Violators also “underestimate the chances that their rule-breaking 
will lead to adverse consequences.”   Violators have a sense of “being more 
skilled” than everyone else.   When people carry out violations they do not do 
so with the intent of causing harm to anyone or any company: they simply 
weigh up the likely outcomes and decide using their own judgement and 
previous experience of similar situations whether to follow procedures or not.   
As stated above, any previous positive reinforcement of violations will tend to 
encourage similar behaviour in the future.   A common factor with people 
violating procedures and rules is that the procedures are inadequate.   In 
such cases people will violate the procedures in order to get the job done 
(unless prevented from doing so by a rigorous system of discouraging such 
behaviour).   It is stated that managers must be able to determine the 
appropriate level of rule-based procedures in order to ensure that frontline 
workers still have the required degree of “intelligent wariness necessary to 
recognise inappropriate procedures and avoid mispliances” (Reason, 2008).   
In other words, violations are still not acceptable and should not be carried 
out but if the need arises to highlight such issues then the workers can be 
trusted to identify them as they occur and to propose options for rectification 
and approval by management. 
Whittingham (2004) asserts that “most violations have an underlying cause.” 
and that “unless this cause is properly addressed it is probable that future 
violations will occur.”   Whittingham defines an error as “an unintended or 
unknowing act or omission with the potential for an undesired consequence.” 
while violations are defined as an act where “there was some level of 
intention in violating the rule.” and also that “there was prior knowledge of the 
rule being violated.”   There is a clear difference of intent between errors and 
violations even though the consequences of both may be exactly the same.   
As stated previously, violators (as a general rule) do not intend to cause harm 
to anyone by violating a procedure or safety rule but this is sometimes what 
happens because of the violator’s failure to fully assess the possible 
consequences of their actions.   In any business, a violation may result in 
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severe consequences for the violator such as termination of employment 
while an error is likely to result in the erroneous person being retrained or 
mentored in order for them (and the business) to learn from the error and to 
prevent recurrence. 
Reason (1990) provides similar definitions for violations and uses 
intentionality to classify each type.   If there was no intention to commit the 
violation then it can be classified as erroneous or unintentional.   If it was 
deliberate then it is stated to be necessary to determine if there was an 
intention to cause damage to the system or harm to people (sabotage).   The 
violations that remain make up the majority, intended to some extent but with 
no intended malice.   Reason classifies all such violations as “routine” or 
“exceptional”.   Routine violations occur on a habitual basis due to humans 
“taking the path of least effort” and operating in an “indifferent environment, 
i.e. one that rarely punishes violations or rewards observance.” 
3.4 Methods Available to Prevent Mistakes and Violations? 
Agnew and Snyder (2008) confirm that errors and violations can be prevented 
by implementing behaviour-based systems of control where all errors or 
violations are dealt with swiftly by provision of continuous monitoring and 
feedback.   The system is focussed more on positively reinforcing good (safe) 
behaviours but for violations this feedback can also include punishment.   The 
authors describe the difference between punishment and penalty: punishment 
is when a person receives something they would rather not have; such as a 
reprimand and a penalty is when a person loses something they would rather 
have kept, such as freedom to operate autonomously.   Both are valid means 
of correcting behaviour but the punishment method is more likely to produce a 
more positive outcome than a penalty.   Deploying penalties by removing 
privileges from workers never goes down well under any circumstances and 
may lead to resentment and perhaps even distrust.   This scenario would not 
be conducive to creating a good safety culture.   A punishment such as a 
safety discussion (or reprimand) to highlight the error and discuss its potential 
consequences is an opportunity for a swift rectification of the unsafe 
behaviour and a means of ensuring that it is not repeated.   If delivered in a 
positive and professional way with no resentment on a personal level then it is 
an effective method to rectify the problem and build a better safety culture.   It 
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is noted by Agnew and Snyder (2008) that punishment can only be used if the 
unsafe act is actually observed first hand and that it must be delivered 
immediately to be effective.   Agnew and Snyder (2008) note several issues 
with punishment and penalties as listed below: 
• Effectiveness is often temporary unless the punishment is immediate, 
certain and severe. 
• It is not certain what type of behaviour will replace the unsafe 
behaviour. 
• Punishment is useless with lone workers. 
• Overuse leads to negative side effects. 
©2008 Aubrey Daniels International, Inc. Taken, in part, from Agnew & Snyder, Removing 
Obstacles to Safety. Atlanta: Performance Management Publications, p. 66, 2008. 
It would appear then that punishment should only be used if absolutely 
necessary and that perhaps this would fit more reasonably with violations 
rather than errors.   It is also clear that punishment is not an effective tool for 
preventing unsafe behaviours as it can only be used after unsafe behaviours 
have occurred, i.e. it is a lagging control measure rather than a leading 
control measure or reactive rather than pro-active.   Positively reinforcing 
good behaviours that prevent accidents and near misses is much better. 
It is the author’s experience within multi-national and SME businesses that 
safety discussions and mentoring have a far greater effect than receiving a 
punishment, i.e. as recommended by Agnew and Snyder (2008).   It is also 
the author’s experience that the vast majority of people want to work safely 
for all the right reasons and are happy to discuss safety if and when it is 
appropriate to their tasks or roles.   Intentional violations are rare in most 
workplaces and therefore punishments are not ordinarily required to be 
handed out on a frequent basis.   Agnew and Snyder (2008) recommend that 
positive means of promoting safe behaviours are far more desirable than 
negative means of reinforcement.   This involves determining why the person 
had the opportunity to make a bad choice and by implementing changes to 
the workplace or its antecedent measures to remove that situation for the 
future. 
Torner (2008) asserts that behavioural-based safety programs should 
concentrate on changing the behaviour of managers primarily as they have 
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the most influence on how work is carried out.   Any behaviour change by 
managers tends to be replicated by the subordinates due to copying 
behaviour which means that what managers do has a much stronger impact 
on subordinates than what they say. 
Whittingham (2004) asserts that control of violations is relatively 
straightforward once the nature of the violation has been assessed.   The root 
causes for its occurrence must be determined and then rectified through 
redesign of the workplace systems causing the violation to occur.   In the 
absence of any measures to completely remove the conditions giving rise to 
the violations occurring then rectification may be down to the implementation 
of procedures, rules and training along with workforce self-governance 
(Whittingham, 2004).   Supervisory auditing processes must be in place but 
they cannot (for reasons of practicality) be present for the whole time.   The 
setting of rules and procedures establishes the minimum corporate safety 
performance requirements and clearly demonstrates the requirements of 
workers to perform their tasks safely. 
For the correction of errors Whittingham (2004) asserts that three conditions 
must be met: the error must be detectable, recoverable and there must be 
time and opportunity to effect the recovery.   Errors at this stage of the 
process have already occurred and only mitigation is possible, i.e. minimising 
the scale of effects of the error. 
Reason & Hobbs (2003) state that the first priority of addressing human error 
is to capture all the available data in terms of near misses and “free lessons” 
as well as actual accidents.   From this data, reliable predictions and trends 
can be formed.   To get this data (and the potential benefits) the whole 
workforce must be prepared to submit truthful accounts of all such incidents.   
This is where the BBS method proposed by Agnew and Snyder (2008) can 
achieve this as all such data is anonymous thereby ensuring that no person 
can be singled out for punishment from the data alone.   In an accident or 
near miss situation where there are no witnesses it may be argued that 
reporting may not occur as desired.  A good safety culture must be present 
(with trust) and the system must be convenient to use in practice for all such 
incidents to be reported. 
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Reason (1997) asserts that human errors are not the cause of accidents but 
are consequences that lead to accidents.   Errors are “shaped and provoked 
by upstream workplace and organizational factors.”   Reason describes a 
blame cycle that is self-perpetuating and destructive unless a significant effort 
to break free from the cycle is made.   Reason (1997) asserts that several key 
facts must be understood to achieve this primarily associated with error 
causation / root cause. 
 
List of four key facts removed due to publisher copyright assertion. 
 
As a result of the difficulties in addressing all potential human failings it is 
postulated by Reason (1997) that situational issues are easier to remedy than 
people issues for several reasons. 
 
List of reasons removed due to publisher copyright assertion. 
 
There are various methods of error prevention available and these can be 
directed at either the human or the situation in which the human is placed.   
The actual complexity of the situation may make it an obvious choice on 
where best to direct error prevention resources.   However, in the absence of 
an obvious choice between the two, the error prevention / risk reduction 
measures must be applied taking cognisance of the human and situational 
conditions present.   This may involve a combination of human error 
assessment techniques, application of rules and procedures, physical 
protection measures, training, etc. 
The texts reviewed show that consequence-based prevention methods have 
the greatest potential for removing error producing conditions in terms of 
attempting to ensure that humans make the right choices for the right 
reasons. 
3.5 How Do Ethical Values Affect Safety Culture? 
A corporate body must have a clear system of ethical values in place in order 
to set minimum standards for the employees to align themselves to.   As the 
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ethical values of individuals may be different from that of the company, it is 
necessary for all people within a business or organisation to have a clear 
understanding of what is acceptable to the business and what is not.   
Whitbeck (1998) asserts that such measures only set “the minimal standards 
for ethical practice.”   These minimal standards can assist in “distinguishing 
malpractice from acceptable practice but are not much help in differentiating 
good or responsible practice from minimally acceptable practice.”   In a 
technically challenging field such as engineering it is clear that such minimal 
standards must be complemented by the ethical values of the people and the 
businesses for which engineers provide professional services.   Ethics 
therefore need to be applied at the personal and the corporate level and 
should be set such that the health and safety of all who may be affected by 
the engineering decision-making process are kept safe from harm. 
Fleddermann (2008) asserts “No duty of the engineer is more important than 
her duty to protect the safety and well-being of the public.”   Engineers are 
required to design safe systems and objects.   One of the issues facing an 
engineer is the question “How safe is safe enough?”   Safety is described by 
Fleddermann as a “very precise and a very vague term” as it requires to be 
measured to determine what level of safety has been achieved but also, at 
face value, it needs to be determined simply whether a design is safe or not 
safe.   Subjective decision making in such assessments are susceptible to the 
ethics of the people and corporate bodies involved.   Fleddermann cites four 
requirements for an engineer to work safely as noted below: 
• a design must comply with the local laws and regulations for safety; 
• it must meet accepted engineering practice; 
• alternative, safer designs must be explored; 
• potential misuse must be examined to determine failure modes expected 
under those conditions. 
The ethical values of the engineer’s decision-making process are built into the 
design by consideration of the safety of the design throughout the design, 
building and testing of the product or system. 
Nijhof and Rietijk (1999) state that we should think of “ethical decision making 
as the central “Behaviour” and explore all factors in the meaning of 
“Antecedents” and “Consequences”.   They provide an example of where a 
company implements an improved packaging line in a manufacturing plant.   
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The line was unreliable and adversely affected production.   A new line was 
designed and installed but this had a severe effect on the workforce.   They 
no longer needed to work a five-shift system (meaning a reduction in salary 
for those affected) and the new packaging line needed less than half the 
previous number of personnel.   The decision to install the new line was taken 
based on business needs, i.e. the line was installed and personnel no longer 
required were compensated accordingly.   The business need is far more 
important in such cases as this is why the business exists.   It does not exist 
to provide employment but exists to support the business activities in the 
generation of revenue for the minimum costs possible.   The authors 
postulate that carrying out an ABC analysis of the situation can assist in the 
ethical decision-making process. 
Robinson et al. (2007) describe the ethical relationships that must be present 
between engineers and the people or groups who may be affected by the 
engineer’s work such as employers, the public and professional bodies.   
They state that the virtues of an ethically aware engineer are “temperance, 
justice, courage, hope, respect, integrity, wisdom and empathy”.   An 
engineer must therefore be aware of the world around them and be able to 
translate the effects of their work into that arena.   It is clear that for an 
engineer to be ethically aware and effective, their employer must also be 
aware of and be in agreement with the ethical values required (or desired) 
and must be willing to support those values as part of its business model.   
Any conflicts between engineer and employer are likely to end in 
disagreement and ultimately relationship breakdown as a result of the 
engineer being forced to operate under ethical values they consider to be 
lower than their own.   This would not be conducive to building a good safety 
culture and would instead build barriers and distrust. 
Dekker (2007) describes the ethics of reporting near misses and incidents.   
He asserts that it is essential for all such events to be reported and analysed 
if the organisation is to learn from the events and prevent recurrence.   If a 
person fails to report such events they have allowed their ethical values to slip 
to such an extent that self-preservation has become more important than the 
protection of those who may be at risk if a similar event were to occur again at 
some future time. 
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Dekker asserts that reporting might be a risk to the reporter for the reasons 
listed below: 
• Fear of supervisor/manager response. 
• Uncertainty of the rights and obligations of the reporter. 
• Will the information reported stay confidential (including the reporter’s 
identity)? 
Dekker (2007) asserts that people fail to report near misses and potential 
accidents because of the fear of the consequences and not because they 
want to be or are actually dishonest.   People can become apathetic when 
they feel that even if they did report an incident that the employer would do 
little or nothing in response.   Such feelings can only come from a history of 
similar experiences with the employer.   This would not be a good safety 
culture that promotes learning and continuous improvements to safety but 
would instead be a culture that shows little care, respect and empathy for its 
own employees.   It is clear from such ethical dilemmas that procedures and 
policies must be in place (antecedents) that specify what the reporting 
process entails and what employees can expect from the employer in return 
for honest and frank reporting.   Punishment may be an option for such a 
process but the most important and overriding factor is that the risk is 
eliminated or reduced to a tolerable level.   The setting of personal and 
corporate ethical values are essential if a trusting relationship between 
employee and employer is to be nurtured for the benefit of risk reduction.   As 
described by Agnew & Snyder (2008), anonymous reporting is clearly a 
workable method of removing the blame factor from the reporting process and 
hence, a high degree of analysis and accident prevention is the potential 
result.   Dekker (2007) asserts that feedback from the reports to the relevant 
people on what was reported and what has been changed as a result of the 
reports helps to build trust and shows that the reporting process is worthwhile 
and merits continuation and support.   As stated by Agnew & Snyder (2008), 
when people see the consequences of the safe behaviour such as positive 
reinforcement they are encouraged to promote that behaviour in the future. 
Dekker (2007) discusses the options for a theoretical line to be drawn 
between “acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.”   This imaginary line 
signifies the difference between being culpable or innocent in any situation 
that arises.   The difference between the two sides is the difference between 
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the types of error that causes the accident, i.e. errors or violations.   In all 
such situations errors are described as normative or technical.   Normative 
errors include negligence, violations, etc. while technical errors occur as a 
consequence of a person’s inadequate training, knowledge and experience, 
i.e. competence. 
Part of the ethical considerations of an engineer must be an awareness at all 
times of whether they are operating beyond their own competence or 
capabilities.   All such fears must be formally highlighted to their managers if 
they are to remain on the lawful side of this imaginary line. 
Buara (2006) recommends that technical competence is considered for all 
activities carried out by an engineer.   If an engineer feels that their expertise 
is not sufficient for the task then they should acknowledge this as a means of 
protecting the public or client from the potential effects of errors.   There can 
be few actions more positive than an engineer taking such a stand as it 
means that they have placed the safety of others before their own interests. 
Armstrong, Dixon & Robinson (1999) discuss the responsibilities of an 
engineer stating that they must “take responsibility for ethical dilemmas and 
work through the ethical decision-making process – avoiding any denial of 
responsibility.” 
It can be seen that ethical decisions and dilemmas faced by engineers can be 
complex and often conflicting between safety and other corporate factors.   
Engineers therefore have the ability to protect people from harm by ensuring 
that risks are properly assessed and rectified as appropriate based on their 
personal and corporate ethical values. 
3.6 Literature Review Conclusion 
None of the literature examined has described how the results of a safety 
culture survey can be interpreted.   This interpretation is one of the most 
important aspects of any such risk reduction methods if small to medium 
sized enterprises are to implement them using in-house personnel. 
The methods of defining antecedents, behaviours and consequences are 
relatively straightforward within a business and as soon as people commence 
working with the ABC method risk can be reduced immediately when that 
organisational intervention takes place but successful implementation relies 
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on the first stage of the process (the safety culture survey) being completed 
with a high degree of assurance that it is actually correct and representative.   
Any misinterpretation of survey results could lead to costly errors in terms of 
incorrectly addressing non-issues (encysting) or; much worse, by not 
addressing a latent issue that later turns out to be a contributing factor to an 
accident where someone is hurt (thematic vagabonding).   The safety culture 
survey presents a significant quantity of data that can be used to identify 
many things in terms of all the different aspects of safety culture within any 
business but, most importantly, it should be able to identify those major 
causes of concern within the workforce that can be assigned a higher priority 
for corrective action. 
 
 
 
  
   Page 106 of 322 
4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 General 
The purpose of this research project was to create a means of assessing the 
safety culture of businesses such that a uniform system of human factors 
assessment and implementation could be carried out by small to medium 
sized enterprises in-house.   The assistance of collaborating partners was 
therefore critically important to the overall success of the project. 
Most of the identified potential collaborating companies were chosen as a 
result of the nature of the hazards present on their sites, i.e. they use or 
produce materials and substances with the potential for gas, vapour and dust 
cloud explosions to occur.   Such hazards present a real and measurable 
threat to the safety of people and manufacturing / production processes.   The 
list of potential collaborators was created based on the author’s experience of 
those companies through existing professional relationships. 
4.1.1 Collaborator Participation 
Companies were approached to determine whether they would be interested 
in taking part in the research project and a presentation was made to those 
companies that were potentially interested and wanted to hear more about 
what would be involved (as detailed in Appendix A).   The presentation 
showed the background to the research, what was expected to be gained 
from participating and how the research programme might benefit their 
companies in their own long term strategy for risk reduction and prevention of 
accidents and incidents that have the potential to cause harm to people, the 
environment and company’s profitability. 
4.1.2 Project Methodology 
The research project involved assessing the safety culture of each 
collaborating company in a logical step by step process as listed below. 
1. Carry out a baseline survey of the workforce 
2. Analyse results to highlight potential human factors issues 
3. Present results to collaborating companies and decide on particular 
aspects to be targeted as part of the risk reduction process 
4. Company implements corrective measures and monitors performance 
against targets 
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5. Carry out final safety culture survey 
6. Analyse results to establish what improvements have been achieved 
The corrective measures implemented at stage 4 of the process are critically 
important to the success of the application of human factors as a means of 
risk reduction.   The application of human factors in the workplace is centred 
on identifying risks created by potentially unsafe behaviours or situations and 
implementing methods of ensuring that those behaviours and situations are 
corrected, preferably by changing the way people think or alternatively by 
implementing antecedents to prevent or discourage unsafe behaviours. 
4.2 Safety Culture Survey 
The method of assessing a company’s safety culture was to carry out an 
employee multiple choice safety culture survey. 
The statements in the survey were formed from several donor assessment 
surveys.   They were derived from the reference documents RR365, HSE 
(1999), OTR 1999/063, HSE (2001), and the Gap Analysis Tool, Step Change 
in Safety (2007).   Statements were also inserted by the author based on 
empirical findings from working with SMEs for over eight years.   Once the 
master list of statements was finalised the statements were analysed and 
categorised into nine topics listed below based on the subject content and 
intent of each statement.   This sub-division of statements allowed each topic 
to be assessed as a group for comparison and analysis. 
The survey topics are entitled: 
• Safety Culture; 
• Organisational Measures; 
• Incident Management 
• Competence Management; 
• Influencing Factors; 
• My Role; 
• My Manager; 
• Communications; 
• The Organisation. 
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The survey was laid out in a multiple choice Likert scale format and required 
respondents to tick the box that represented their feelings of the subject that 
they were being questioned about.   The answer choices were: strongly 
agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree and strongly disagree. 
The RR365 source for survey statements did not have a Likert scale type of 
response.   This document and the described method of carrying out the 
employee safety culture survey is based on open questioning of respondents 
requiring the interviewer to record the responses.   The statements were 
therefore manipulated in order to make them suitable for use with a Likert 5-
point scale. 
The statements derived from the OTR 1999/063 reference document were 
predominantly from donor surveys also made up using Likert five-point scale 
responses.   Reliability data of the donor statements was not available but it is 
stated within the document that the original questionnaires had been properly 
validated by their creators.   Reliability analysis of the survey created for this 
research project has been carried out and is reported in section 5. 
The Gap Analysis Toolkit document used a three-point Likert-type scale with 
Yes / No / Part responses.   The statements were also manipulated in order to 
make them suitable for use with a Likert 5-point scale. 
The Likert scale of answers used in the survey appears to be simple but it 
presents a few issues in terms of the middle value (neither agree nor 
disagree).   This value may be selected by a respondent wishing to express 
an actual indifferent response but selection of the middle value may also 
signify that the respondent simply may not have understood the statement in 
the first place.   This type of survey response can therefore mask issues that 
may be present if the meaning of the survey statements has not been made 
clear enough.   Throughout this document the middle value is defined as an 
“indifferent” response. 
As the questionnaire created for this research project combines statements 
from several independently validated questionnaires along with new 
statements not previously subjected to validation, it was necessary to also 
validate this questionnaire using inferential statistical methods.   This is 
discussed further in sections 5.0, 7.0 and 9.0. 
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The front sheet of the survey provided instructions for the respondents to 
explain how the survey should be completed.   All surveys were filled in 
anonymously and the company for which they worked was not shown 
anywhere on the survey documentation.   Completed surveys were logged by 
the company letter designation (A, B, C, etc.) in the lower left corner of the 
survey. 
Emphasis was placed on answering the survey “carefully and frankly”.   The 
instructions also stated that completing the survey should take around 15 to 
20 minutes thereby implying that the respondents should not spend too much 
time thinking about the answers as it was their first impressions and 
immediate perception of their own feelings of what answer fits best that was 
to be recorded. 
Some of the statements in the survey are present specifically to estimate 
whether a respondent’s answers can be trusted to a high degree.   Although 
all statements appear to have subjective answers, the subject matter is asked 
in such a way that for certain statements within the survey, there can only be 
one correct way to answer the statement by virtue of the systems and 
processes known to be in place within the company.   The evidence of the 
correct answers to these statements is to be found within the company’s 
health and safety management system and this can be easily substantiated.   
These statements should provide unequivocal results as they are so obvious, 
i.e. either 100% agreement or 100% disagreement.   The results of these 
statements are discussed in more detail in the analysis of each company’s 
results. 
The intent of each statement is described in appendix B. 
4.3 Research Study Partners 
The author has carried out work in a professional capacity for most of the 
companies detailed below.   This was predominantly consultancy work 
associated with the health and safety aspects of operating safely in 
workplaces containing potentially explosive atmospheres.   The work carried 
out for these companies provided an intimate insight into the safety 
management systems and business activities of the companies involved and 
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thereby assisted in determining whether the companies would be suitable and 
likely to take part in the research project. 
The one thing that all the identified potential collaborators had in common 
was that they all had significant (life threatening) hazards in their workplaces. 
Agnew & Snyder (2008) believe that every workplace can benefit from the 
application of behavioural based safety as a means of improving safety 
culture and thereby reducing risk but it has been shown by this project that 
not every business is receptive to such methods. 
Such behavioural based safety systems (BBS) operate by considering the 
antecedents, behaviours and consequences (ABC) in the workplace.   The 
method is reliant on the workplace implementing antecedents that the 
workers must comply with.   These are the rules, procedures and physical 
aspects and objects of the workplace that the workers interface with.   
Behaviours are what people do in response to the workplace situations and 
antecedents.   After the behaviour has taken place the consequences 
become apparent and they can be good or bad.   It has been shown that 
people learn quickly from consequences, especially bad ones. 
Taking human factors into consideration is not an antecedent type of measure 
but is a behavioural measure, i.e. it seeks to improve safety by encouraging 
people to think safer and to perform their tasks in a safer or better way.   
While some businesses strive to reduce accident rates and accident severity 
through continuous improvement it is also the case that other businesses are 
satisfied to implement only the antecedent measures such as procedures, 
rules, training, etc. and are content with the residual baseline accident rate 
that is produced as a result of implementing only those measures.   The 
antecedent measures are essentially the minimum required in accordance 
with the health and safety legislation in place.   Whilst there are formal 
requirements to reduce risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) this 
is a subjective term and the views and opinions of the business health and 
safety manager and the regulator may differ significantly.   Whilst the 
antecedents can be considered as the legal requirements, other measures 
such as implementing consequence based behavioural safety methods (i.e. 
human factors) are optional.   The ethics of managers, resources available, 
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production deadlines and financial constraints of each business are all 
significant factors that have a bearing on whether a business is likely to 
attempt an implementation of such methods. 
A dominant factor of whether a company would participate in such research 
has been found to be the attitude of the senior manager responsible for health 
and safety management.   It has been found, as noted below, that some 
managers were keen to get involved because of the potential benefits while 
others seemed to be keen to participate because they were being offered 
something for free but without first giving any thought of assessing the 
resources required. 
With the knowledge of the hazards and activities associated with each 
business and a good working relationship with the management personnel of 
those businesses a basic assessment of each company was carried out to 
determine whether human factors could be successfully applied in the 
business and to determine whether a formal approach to the business was 
likely to result in their agreement to participate. 
As a result of client confidentiality the companies involved are simply referred 
to as Company A, Company B, etc. throughout this thesis. 
4.4 Large Businesses 
Several multi-national companies were contacted regarding collaboration in 
this research project.   These were not the intended benefactors of the 
intended outcome of this research project but they were approached to take 
part.   The companies all have hazards within their workplaces that can give 
rise to major accidents such as fires and explosions. 
Such companies invariably have large budgets for ensuring that health and 
safety is given adequate priority within the business and they have come to 
learn that the provision of a safe place of work where employees are valued 
can also pay dividends in terms of production, employee absence rates, 
employee morale, business development and overall business continuity.   
Even though such large businesses are currently operating in an increasingly 
tight regime of budgetary controls, they usually have the funds available to 
implement safety improvement methods such as human factors and safety 
culture analysis. 
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Of the list of potentially suitable collaborators, ten companies were in this 
classification but only two companies agreed to take part.   This was 
somewhat disappointing given the hazards associated with those businesses, 
the number of employees involved and the overall level of professionalism in 
terms of health and safety compliance previously observed. 
It was an assumption of the author that the data gathered from such large 
companies would still be useful for the development of a human factors 
assessment system that could be used in smaller companies. 
4.5 Small Businesses 
Small businesses with similar hazards and risk as the larger companies were 
also contacted to take part in this research project.   It was with these 
companies in mind that this research project was initiated.   Unlike the multi-
nationals, these companies do not have vast numbers of safety professionals 
or the budgets with which to implement such methods with the aid of human 
factors experts.   Such companies have limited budgets and resources and 
must make every penny of revenue count towards the bottom line. 
Of the list of suitable businesses identified, eight companies were classified 
as small and were contacted to take part in this research programme: with 
low success, i.e. none of the companies approached participated in the 
research. 
4.6 Non-Transportation Companies 
4.6.1 Company A (Large Business) 
When first approached regarding collaboration in this research project, this 
company was positive from the start.   Such an assessment of safety culture 
attitudes and perception of safety culture was seen as a means of gauging 
the status of the health and safety management system of the business and 
also the attitudes and views of their employees towards the business.   As the 
survey was to be reviewed and assessed by someone independent from the 
company it was felt by their HSE manager that it would be more likely to get 
an honest response from the employees than an in-house survey. 
Company A is a company that manufactures petroleum dispensers for use in 
garage forecourts throughout the world.   Although it is a multi-national 
company with many different departments and business streams, only a 
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specific section of the dispenser manufacturing plant took part in the 
research: the paint shop department, where a significant quantity of 
flammable and potentially explosive materials are in use at all times.   
Flammable dust hazards are also present within the department.   All of these 
hazards require employees to strictly follow compliance with explosion 
prevention measures at all times.   A small societal risk is also present as the 
main flammable materials storage area is in a locked container located 
outside the manufacturing plant. 
The department contains approximately 20 employees in a two-shift system.   
Activities such as spray painting (solvent based), powder coating and screen 
printing are carried out on a continuous basis. 
The company issued the survey for employees to fill in (results as detailed in 
Appendix B).   The survey responses were entered (and double checked) into 
an assessment system based on a spreadsheet created specifically for this 
project. 
4.6.2 Company B   (Small Business) 
Company B was a small business with around 15 employees.   The company 
specialised in the manufacture and maintenance of hydraulic systems used 
throughout industry.   The company had a particular expertise in serving 
businesses involved in explosives manufacture.   They also provided a 
systems integration service which is the design, creation and implementation 
of human / machine interfaces using programmable logic controllers (PLCs) 
coupled to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.   This 
company clearly fitted the main collaborator selection criteria. 
Initially, the business owner was keen to get his company involved but, as a 
result of the recession and other business factors, this company soon 
withdrew from the research project.   It later transpired that the vast majority 
of its employees had left en masse leaving the owner to fulfil existing 
contracts almost single-handedly. 
Analysis of this situation was not carried out but it would appear that such a 
mass exodus of employees would suggest that either a better offer for the 
employees came in from elsewhere or that there was something 
fundamentally wrong with the operation of the business that the employees 
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were not satisfied with.   Human factors assessment may have been able to 
identify such risks prior to the situation developing but unfortunately it came 
too late for this business to take part. 
4.6.3 Company C (Large Business) 
Company C is another multi-national business.   They manufacture silicon 
wafers for use in the semiconductor manufacturing industry.   As found with 
Company A, this company was keen to get involved as soon as they heard 
about the project. 
They wanted to take part for similar reasons to Company A, i.e. to gauge the 
present situation in terms of safety culture and to determine if they could do 
anything better.   They also felt that as it was a survey being carried out 
independently they would be more likely to get a better response from the 
workforce than from a similar in-house survey. 
The company identified three different departments that they wanted to take 
part in the research project.   Each department is considered as an 
autonomous business unit within the site and in terms of the number of 
employees in each they could be defined as small businesses within the 
overall company structure.   The health and safety management system is 
common to all three departments but its implementation is variable in each 
area as a result of how each department manager operates their area. 
The three departments are, slicing (C1), polishing (C2) and facilities 
management (C3). 
The facilities management team are responsible for all ancillary systems 
around the plant.   This includes the process gas storage and distribution 
systems, building ventilation systems, gas detection systems.   The process 
gases used in wafer manufacture are potentially explosive (hydrogen) and 
some are also pyrophoric (silane).   With the pyrophoric gases it is almost 
inevitable that ignition will occur on release to the atmosphere.   These 
hazards show how important the management of safety is within the plant as 
errors could lead to catastrophic events. 
The quantity of materials stored and used at the site means that the business 
is a registered COMAH site, i.e. it has fundamental safety requirements 
imposed upon it by the HSE to ensure safety is maintained, not only for their 
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own benefit but also for the people and the environment beyond the plant 
perimeter: the societal risk. 
The slicing team are responsible for cutting the raw silicon blocks into wafers 
using specialist machines.   There are approximately 30 people working in 
this area.   Many of the tasks in this area are automated but still require a 
degree of machine supervision to ensure that the process runs smoothly.   
The process fluid hazards within this part of the manufacturing process are 
not as dangerous as the other parts of the plant but the machines are capable 
of causing severe injury to personnel from entrapment and entanglement.   It 
is important for this part of the manufacturing process to be run efficiently for 
the plant to be successful.   Any hold ups in production in this part of the 
process affects all subsequent processes.    
The polishing area takes the rough cut silicon wafers and flattens then 
polishes them in special machines to specified tolerances measured in 
nanometres.   There are approximately 45 people working in this area.   
Similar hazards to the slicing area are present (machinery safety) and a 
similar level of automation is fitted to the machines. 
4.6.4 Company D (Small business) 
Company D is involved in the provision of asset management services to 
companies all over the UK.   They have around 10 employees and provide 
and configure software for client maintenance management systems.   They 
also provide consultancy services in workplaces containing potentially 
explosive atmospheres.   It is necessary for some of the workers in the 
company to carry out client site visits and many of their clients have major 
accident hazards present.   Working safely is therefore a critical requirement 
for its employees. 
This company were positive when approached and agreed to collaborate but 
later withdrew as the managing director felt that human factors assessment 
“was not applicable and he couldn’t see the long term benefit” to it.   Given 
the potential risk to employees whilst on client sites, this was a surprising 
attitude.   This was discussed with the MD and following these discussions it 
is the author’s opinion that he did not fully understand the benefits to his 
business but perhaps, more worryingly, didn’t realise or understand the risks 
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that his employees were subjected to whilst carrying out site survey work.   
There was no acceptance by the MD that human factors could be applied to 
the whole business as a means of improving efficiency, safety culture and 
behavioural safety throughout the workforce.   This is an attitude that has 
been encountered frequently during the course of this research project. 
4.6.5 Company E (Large Business) 
Company E is a company heavily involved in supplying field personnel to the 
North Sea oil industry.   They are also involved in the supply of industrial 
procurement services throughout the whole of the UK.   They have several 
offices and employ approximately 200 people (around half of which are 
directly involved in the North Sea activities). 
Field personnel are predominantly skilled to technician level and are 
responsible for oil rig equipment inspection and maintenance activities.   In 
such situations they are clearly operating in workplaces with potentially high 
risk. 
When this company was approached to take part in the research it was 
positive and expressed a willingness to do so, however, they never actually 
did. 
Their employees are usually embedded within the workforce of other 
companies (rig operators) and are required to follow all their procedures and 
work methods.   It is clear that such personnel may not be able take part in 
the research as a result of those working arrangements.   The practicalities of 
taking part were therefore deemed to be too difficult (by the company) to be 
overcome. 
4.6.6 Company F (Large Business) 
Company F is a multi-national company that provides engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) services.   In the UK this is primarily in 
the water industry (clean and waste).   This company were positive when first 
approached but were not responsive thereafter.   They have since lost out on 
some major contracts and have downsized considerably as a result of this 
and the overall cessation of public spending on the water infrastructure 
system. 
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Since being approached this company has developed its own behavioural 
safety improvement system. 
The timing of this research project was not ideal for this company and they 
therefore declined to take any further part in the project. 
4.6.7 Company G (Small Business) 
Company G is a company that provides services similar to that of Company E 
but on a smaller scale.   They have approximately 40 employees operating 
mainly in land-based workplaces containing major accident hazards.   Their 
work involves equipment installation work as well as maintenance and 
inspection. 
This company agreed to take part in the research but showed no further 
interest once they got a better understanding of what was going to be 
involved in terms of resource and time.   Despite repeated attempts to 
convince them of the potential benefits they declined any further involvement. 
4.6.8 Company H (Small Business) 
Company H is an aerosol manufacturing company that agreed to take part 
following discussions and having seen the presentation of the project.   The 
company employed approximately 60 people at the time of approach.   The 
safety culture survey was duly issued but no returns were forthcoming.   
When queried on this they failed to respond.   When the presentation was 
made (in their premises) they expressed their desire to take part but also 
utilised the time on site to discuss some other consultancy services at the 
same time.   This was provided as requested.   Repeated efforts to contact 
the business to ascertain collaboration status failed to get a response. 
Approximately one year later, long after their participation had been written off 
by the author, the company made contact once again to enquire about taking 
part in the research.   A meeting was arranged to discuss this (on an urgent 
basis at their request) at which it soon became obvious that the company was 
not interested in the research and had merely used the HF project as an 
excuse to procure the author’s professional opinion on several serious and 
fundamentally dangerous plant issues that posed a potential threat to the 
business at that time.   Following the meeting, despite repeated attempts to 
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clarify the situation with respect to the research project collaboration status, 
no further communications were received. 
It is disappointing that the business did not eventually take part as the survey 
results may have provided an excellent case study in corporate competence, 
ethics and working relationships between management, shop floor and 
external bodies. 
It was clear during the last site visit that the recently promoted health and 
safety manager was also still carrying out his previous role and was clearly in 
a position that required more time than was available.   Senior management 
had put this person in a position of responsibility and for which there simply 
was not enough time to carry out the task properly (or safely).   There are 
many human factors issues in play here that would benefit from a realistic 
appraisal of the actual risk involved. 
It was made known that a visit by the HSE was about to take place and that 
the company was desirous of ensuring that everything was in order in terms 
of potentially explosive atmospheres legislation.   This assurance could not be 
given and would not be possible until some major changes to the organisation 
and the processing equipment were made.   In order to ensure the safety of 
workers and the public it was recommended that the new production line be 
shut down and all identified issues rectified prior to re-commissioning. 
No further communications have been received from the company.   The 
situation described simply would not occur in an organisation that had a good 
safety culture.   Equipment would not be commissioned until it was proven to 
be safe for operation.   People would be trained in its operation and essential 
safety equipment would not have been removed because “it didn’t work 
correctly” but would have been rectified to ensure that a safe situation was 
maintained.   This type and size of business is exactly the type of business 
that should be taking part in such research programmes in order to determine 
how new methods of risk reduction could benefit the business by providing a 
safer place of work.   There are clearly some fundamental issues regarding 
personnel selection that the senior management probably knew about but 
opted to continue in the hope that everything would be ok.   Hope is not 
something that safety should be founded on. 
   Page 119 of 322 
4.6.9 Company I (Small Business) 
Company I is a company employing approximately 30 people.   They are a 
whisky bottling company.   The health and safety manager expressed a 
desire to take part in the research but, like the others described above, 
decided not to proceed after she had been issued with the survey. 
4.6.10 Company J (Small Business) 
Company J is a small business with approximately 15 employees.   The 
company manufactures machines and conveyance systems for 
manufacturing plants all over the world.   They also provide systems 
integration services by designing and constructing PLC control systems.   
When first approached to take part in the research they expressed some 
interest but eventually decided not to participate. 
4.6.11 Company K (Large Business) 
Company K is a specialist printing company manufacturing and printing high 
quality packaging items such as those used for cigarettes and chocolates.   
The business employs approximately 250 people in this location.   The 
business also operates similar plants all over the world.   The printing inks 
used in the process at this plant are solvent based, thereby presenting an 
explosion risk in many of the printing processes carried out.   When first 
approached to take part in the research this company also expressed an 
interest in participating but they but they opted not to do so in the end. 
4.6.12 Company M (Large Business) 
This is a multi-national pharmaceutical company with a vast number of 
personnel operating throughout the world.   The factory approached to take 
part in the research has an employee count of approximately 300.   The 
factory contains significant explosive, toxic and chemical hazards.   Meetings 
were held with the HSE manager responsible for the site and they agreed to 
take part in the collaboration as it fitted in with their policy of continuous 
improvement.   After several meetings a schedule was agreed and the survey 
was officially issued to the business.   At this point the company decided that 
it would no longer like to participate in the project.   Other than resourcing 
issues, no reason was given for the sudden withdrawal and despite efforts to 
reverse the decision this was the end of their collaboration. 
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4.6.13 Company N (Small Business) 
This is a company that makes high specification acrylic baths.   The 
processes used at the manufacturing plant use potentially explosive 
chemicals (including potentially unstable oxidising agents).   The hazards are 
well understood by the plant personnel and good systems of control and 
monitoring are in place within the factory.   The company employs 
approximately 80 people and they agreed to take part in the research firstly to 
get a better understanding of where they thought they were in terms of safety 
culture and secondly because they would receive this work free of charge.   
On agreeing to participate and then receiving the survey the company 
withdrew without formally giving a reason.   Whilst the operations director of 
the company saw the potential benefits, it would appear that the other 
directors did not agree and the employee survey never took place. 
4.6.14 Company O (Large Business) 
This is a multi-national company and employs approximately 80 people in the 
location approached.   The company manufactures refractory components 
made from carbon fibre in a highly specialised and potentially dangerous 
process.   The hazards on site are numerous and include the potential for 
dust explosions, chlorine gas releases, natural gas explosions, waste gas 
explosions, solvent based paint spraying, high temperatures (> 1000°C), toxic 
and corrosive chemicals and asphyxiant gases. 
It can be seen that without adequate controls in place this workplace would 
present a significant risk to employees within the factory and also to those 
people beyond its perimeter. 
The business has professionally qualified health, safety and engineering 
personnel and holds several quality accreditation certificates including those 
for product quality and environmental management. 
There was evidence (which became clear whilst engaged to carry out 
previous professional consultancy work) that some of the processes carried 
out on site were not fully understood by all personnel affected.   These 
processes were potentially hazardous and had caused near misses 
previously.   Root cause analysis had been carried out but this did not lead to 
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any significant learning within the current workforce.   The personnel that 
knew and understood the processes had moved on to other employment. 
When approached about taking part in the research project the managers 
responsible for health, safety and engineering within the business agreed to 
collaborate.   When they sought approval from the board of the business it 
was also agreed that the company would collaborate but with a major caveat: 
all surveys would have to be handed out not by the company but directly by 
the author and that all such administration concerning data collection and 
employee information would also be carried out by the author. 
Given the shift working systems employed within the factory (making data 
collection extremely difficult) and the complete lack of involvement of the 
business on the part of explaining to employees what the survey is about and 
why it should be filled in it was decided by the author that these conditions 
would make data collection very difficult and unreliable given the geographical 
location of the factory.   The conditions imposed suggest that the follow up 
work would also receive little support from the business.   It appeared that the 
business expected a magic wand to be waved in order to define and correct 
any issues identified.   From this it was clear that this business would not be a 
suitable collaborator and no further participation was sought. 
4.6.15 Company Q (Large Business) 
This company manufactures lithographic plates used in printing processes.   
The process involves the use of a large quantity of solvents and other 
dangerous chemicals.   Approximately 300 people are employed within the 
factory. 
When approached, the Engineering Manager and Health and Safety Manager 
of the company agreed to participate in principle but had to seek approval 
from the board.   A presentation of the research project was subsequently 
made to the board and when permission to participate had later been 
approved it came with similar conditions to those applied by Company O.   
They wanted only a few people from their workforce to participate (to be 
selected by them) and they would not fill in survey forms but would be 
interviewed by the author in the presence of a senior company representative.   
This was clearly not an open process that could be used to estimate the 
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overall safety culture of the business.   Negotiations with the company to 
remove those conditions were unsuccessful and the company would not 
agree to carry out the employee survey as first proposed. 
As described with Company O above, the survey is only the start of the 
human factors assessment process and it was difficult to see how this 
company could achieve real benefits from such methods when they were 
unwilling to have a full workforce survey carried out to establish baseline 
safety culture.   It appeared that the company executives were either afraid of 
what the survey might reveal (to the author and more importantly to 
themselves) or that they didn’t want to see this information formally recorded. 
Given the likely outcome of such an assessment process under those 
restrictive conditions the author opted not to progress collaboration with this 
company any further. 
4.6.16 Company R (Small Business) 
Company R employs approximately 110 people.   They operate a fuel oil 
depot that contains bulk fuel oil and LPG tanks.   They also operate their own 
fleet of fuel tankers that deliver fuel to client premises (commercial and 
domestic).   The effects of an explosion occurring at the depot would be 
potentially catastrophic.   All personnel at the company receive formal training 
in ignition prevention measures.   The fuel tanker drivers are provided with 
formal training and must pass the course exams in order to be certified as 
competent for operating fuel tankers. 
This company was keen to participate in the research project but on carrying 
out a trial survey with a small number of their employees they found that the 
employees had too many questions of their own regarding the meaning of 
some of the statements.   The managing director and the operations manager 
estimated the likely outcome of the survey by their own experience and by the 
responses from their own small survey and decided not to proceed with 
participation as they felt that the administration of issuing the surveys, 
collating responses and answering queries from employees would be too 
much of a burden on their resources. 
The company’s operations are already highly regulated by antecedents such 
as training and procedures and the company has an excellent safety record in 
   Page 123 of 322 
terms of driver safety and road crash statistics.   The senior management of 
the business did not therefore believe there to be significant value to the 
business from collaboration as a result of the long history of no major 
accidents and there being no obvious significant safety issues that required to 
be addressed. 
4.7 Transportation Companies 
It was an aspiration of the author that this research project would include 
several public transportation companies as a means of identifying how human 
factors methods of risk reduction could be applied to public transportation 
systems.   Attempts were made to encourage some of these companies to 
take part but it quickly became evident that they would not be doing so.   
None of the transportation companies approached were previous clients of 
the author which made meeting the correct people within the organisations 
difficult and almost impossible to build a trusting relationship with them. 
Several options for seeking out collaboration companies in the transportation 
sector were examined.   Mail shots to all bus and train operating companies 
was considered but, given the low rate of success with such communications 
and not having a guarantee of the letter arriving on the decision maker’s desk, 
it was decided to make a targeted approach to specific companies.   Two 
multinational public transportation companies were contacted both of which 
have headquarters in Scotland. 
4.7.1 Company L (Large Business) 
Company L operates public transportation systems throughout the world and 
they employ more than 130,000 staff.   This company put forward their HQ 
HSE manager directly to discuss collaboration. 
This company was easy to contact and to make arrangements with to discuss 
the project in terms of what collaboration would mean for them.   A 
presentation and meeting was held at their headquarters and they agreed to 
take part in the project.   It was agreed that all personnel in their local office 
and bus depot would take part and that other depots could also be 
approached and take part if they so desired.   Shortly afterwards, it became 
clear that this company, though positive at first, seemed to have lost all 
interest and took no further part in the research project. 
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Despite numerous attempts to ascertain what the status of their collaboration 
was they did not respond to any further requests for meetings and 
discussions. 
It was noted (from national media) that the company was going through a 
phase of industrial action such as work to rule, overtime bans, etc. as part of 
the unionised collective bargaining process.   In such a climate of uncertainty 
and distrust between employees and management, it is debatable whether an 
employee survey of safety culture within that depot would have given a true 
and realistic indication of safety culture. 
4.7.2 Company P (Large Business) 
This company preferred to refer all enquiries regarding health and safety to 
their communications branch.   The director responsible for health and safety 
was named in the company’s annual report but it was found to be impossible 
to contact him directly.   After many phone calls, waiting on hold, failed call 
transfers and subsequent referrals to other people or offices throughout the 
organisation, it became clear that this company had no intention of speaking 
to anyone outside the group with respect to health and safety performance or 
assessing the safety culture of the business. 
It would be unfair to say that this company is not interested in promoting 
health and safety as the subject receives considerable coverage in the group 
annual report and also in its marketing of the business.   Some of its most 
important key performance indicators are founded on the safety of its 
passengers and its employees.   It was found to be impossible to actually 
reach the decision maker within the business that would authorise or even 
discuss participation in the project. 
Collaboration with transportation companies was therefore not progressed 
any further. 
4.8 Collaborator Participation Issues 
It can be seen from the examples detailed that the research has been 
hindered by the continuous problem of collaborator recruitment and 
subsequent withdrawal.   Not one single company that agreed to participate 
and then subsequently withdrew explained in definitive terms why they did not 
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want to continue.   This was somewhat disappointing as the author had built 
up good working relationships with those companies (and continues to do so). 
At one point, it was beginning to look like the survey may be at fault for 
scaring off potential collaborators.   Although none of the companies ever 
admitted this, it is the author’s belief that the probing and detailed nature of 
some of the statements may have been the cause of the companies to 
withdraw from the research having previously agreed to take part.   If this is 
the true reason then it suggests that the companies were not in a position of 
strong leadership and were unwilling to face up to the true opinions of the 
workforce in terms of safety culture within the organisation.   It would appear 
that, even if they thought they knew what the real situation was, they did not 
want to see it written down in black and white.   Such an attitude is not one of 
a business with a mature safety culture but is one that is still developing (or 
perhaps even stagnant) with little scope for improvement until the attitudes of 
those in overall control are changed.   These companies are relying on the old 
way of doing things, i.e. implementing and monitoring antecedents but doing 
little to change behaviours or assessing and using the potential 
consequences of unsafe behaviours as a means of reducing risk. 
It is interesting to note that all collaborators were pleased to state that they 
would take part when they were first approached about the research project.   
It was clear from the discussions with each company that they all had a 
broadly similar view to the research and that was that anything that could 
potentially improve safety by reducing risk must be a good thing.   It is 
feasible that the most likely reason for their withdrawal was the realisation 
that human factors assessment and implementation in the workplace was not 
a magic fix-all method that could be implemented instantaneously with little or 
no resource but that it was a method of risk reduction that requires a 
considerable degree of resource and dogged determination to implement and 
maintain in order to achieve the potential benefits.   Those benefits are 
achieved through changing people’s behaviour and this is a process that can 
take a considerable period of time and resource to achieve.   The most 
important factor in the application of such methods is that the senior 
management must be willing to invest the time and resources required to 
achieve measurable results. 
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The application of human factors ultimately involves changing the way things 
are done in order to remove or modify poor behavioural safety practices and 
to implement good behavioural safety practices in their place.   This is the 
difficult part of applying human factors assessment methods of risk reduction 
and it is the author’s view that this realisation was the primary reason for the 
majority of the businesses withdrawing from the research project. 
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5.0 SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The aim of this research project was to produce a human factors assessment 
system that could be used by non-specialists to assess the safety culture of 
their own workplaces.   This information would then be used to prioritise those 
aspects that scored lowest with a view to implementing corrective measures 
as a means of reducing risk. 
A safety culture survey was created (as described in section 4) to assess the 
workplace safety culture and to detect potential human factors issues present. 
An assessment tool was created specifically for the purpose of analysing the 
responses from the safety culture surveys filled in by the participating 
companies’ employees.   The tool was created using spreadsheet software 
and is unique to the survey statements (as shown in Appendix B). 
It was a requirement to ensure that the majority of the safety culture survey 
analysis was incorporated into the assessment tool to enable non-experts to 
use it even though they may have little knowledge of human factors 
assessment or behavioural safety assessment systems. 
The tool provides no assistance to companies in determining how those low-
scoring aspects of the safety culture survey can be modified or improved.   
This can only be carried out with further detailed analysis of the business and 
its activities.   The output of the safety culture assessment tool is therefore 
only the start of the process of identifying potential HF issues as a risk 
reduction measure. 
5.1 Assessment Tool Response Values 
The survey uses a Likert scale of answers for each of the statements.   The 
assessment of the returned surveys is substantially automated by the tool by 
transposing each response on the Likert scale to a numerical value. 
The values used for the responses are shown in Table 5.1 below.   Each 
response is assigned a primary value from 1 to 5 (or blank).   This is then 
converted to a secondary value depending on whether the statement should 
have a positive or negative response to show a good safety culture.   The 
secondary value ranges between 0 and 1.0 with intermediate values of 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.   Blank responses receive a secondary value of 0. 
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In the table below, and hereafter, statements requiring an agreeable response 
for a good safety culture are designated as positive statements and those 
requiring a disagreeable response for a good safety culture are designated as 
negative statements. 
Table 5.1: Survey Response Values 
Response Primary 
Value 
Secondary Values 
Positive 
statement 
Negative 
statement 
Strongly agree 1 1.00 0.10 
Agree 2 0.75 0.25 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 0.50 0.50 
Disagree 4 0.25 0.75 
Strongly disagree 5 0.10 1.00 
No response  0.0 0.0 
 
Two example statements from the safety culture survey are listed below to 
show how the statement scoring system functions. 
Table 5.2: Example Statement Response Scoring 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
(1) 
Agree 
 
 
(2) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
(5) 
1. Permit forms and 
procedures are clear, 
unambiguous and 
easy to use. 
 
    
2. The Permit to work 
system is a way of 
covering people's 
backs. 
   
 
 
 
In statement 1 the “strongly agree” tick box is assigned a primary value of “1”.   
In this case it is a strong favourable response and is therefore assigned a 
secondary value of 1.0 (as shown in Table 5.1).   Had a “strongly disagree” 
response been selected then the primary value would have been “5” and the 
secondary value assigned would have been 0.1 (unfavourable). 
In statement 2 the “disagree” tick box is assigned a primary value of “4”.   This 
is a negative statement and a disagree response is favourable.   As it is not a 
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strong response it only merits a value of 0.75.   Had the agree tick box been 
selected the primary value would have been “2” and the secondary value 
would have been 0.25. 
5.2 Assessment Tool Quality Factors 
The twenty three quality factors listed below are used to highlight any 
particular aspects of the safety culture survey that require further 
investigation.   The values returned by these factors are not definitive 
responses to each statement but are a measure of the consistency of the 
answers provided by each respondent on each aspect of the safety culture 
survey.   The quality factors are not therefore intended to be a measure of the 
reliability of the survey tool but are a measure of the quality of the responses 
from each respondent. 
In a similar way to the nine topics derived for the 98 statements the quality 
factors were derived by examining methods of assessing the quality of each 
survey.   The creation of the quality factors was an empirical process, i.e. they 
were derived by manually examining the returned responses to detect any 
potential issues and to determine how those issues may be enumerated.   
With further analysis there are likely to be more elements of the responses 
that could be used to determine the quality of each response. 
In anticipation of foreseeable issues and the need to evaluate the quality of 
each response, most of the quality factors were created after the main 
statement master list had been finalised.   Some of the quality factors were 
created only after the participating companies returned their baseline surveys 
when it became apparent that there were some potential issues that needed 
to be addressed that had not been foreseen.   The factors falling into this 
category were “number of indifferent responses”, “motivation”, “training”, 
“strongly disagree/strongly agree ratio” and “consecutive 3s”.   A description 
of the intent and calculation of each factor is provided below. 
Each quality factor is assigned a maximum value of 10 based on the number 
of positive and negative responses for each factor’s set of statements.   The 
twenty three quality factor values are summated to give an overall rating with 
a maximum value of 230.   The arithmetic mean of these values is calculated 
and is used in the creation of a value representing the overall safety culture. 
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The quality factors are calculated for each respondent.   The average of all 
quality factors is used in the overall assessment of safety culture. 
5.2.1 Survey Response Quality 
A basic quality measurement of each returned survey is determined by 
examining the responses to S35, S38 and S87.   Based on the knowledge of 
the health and safety management systems of the companies that 
participated these are all statements that should return a very high number of 
agree or strongly agree responses as it could be shown by the companies 
that the measures described by these statements are in place and strictly 
adhered to.   Any survey returned that did not have such a response to all 
three statements may require further analysis in terms of the reliability of the 
answers to the other statements. 
The statements used for this quality factor may be changed to suit the 
company taking part in the survey.   These statements can be selected from 
any section within the survey; the only criteria being that they should 
guarantee a positive and unequivocal response. 
Each response is allocated a secondary value as shown in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3: Survey Quality 
Response Quality Factor 
All strongly agree 10 
All agree 6 
Some agree 3, 2 
All neither agree nor disagree 1 
Some disagree 0.5 
 
To show the scoring system by way of example, assume a person has 
responded “strongly agree” to S35 & S38 but has provided an indifferent 
response to S87.   The scoring for this situation would be as follows: 
S35 and S38 would have been assigned secondary values of 1.0 (maximum) 
while S87 would only have been assigned a secondary value of 0.5.   The 
total score would therefore be 2.5.   For this quality factor, a score of 3 is 
required to receive a maximum quality rating of “10” (three statements in this 
quality factor).   The “all agree” score of “6” is achieved when all respondents 
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answer favourably, i.e. secondary values of 0.75 for each statement with a 
total score of 2.25.   The formula in the assessment tool assigns a quality 
factor value of “6” if a score of greater than 2.24 is achieved.   The next 
lowest scores of “3” and “2” are achieved if one or more of the statements are 
answered with a less than favourable response.   If all statements are 
answered indifferently (total score of 1.5) then the secondary value assigned 
will be 1.0.   The tool assigns a value of 1.0 for scores greater than 1.49.   
The tool assigns a value of 0.5 for any total scores lower than 1.5. 
The analysis of the three statements is achieved by way of “IF” statements 
examining the total score of the summation of the secondary values assigned 
for each statement.   The “IF” formula for this quality factor is shown below. 
=IF(S35+S38+S87=3,10,IF(S35+S38+S87>2.24,6,IF(S35+S38+S87>1.99,3,I
F(S35+S38+S87>1.74,2,IF(S35+S38+S87>1.49,1,IF(S35+S38+S87<1.5,0.5,
0.5)))))) 
Other quality factors in the tool have a greater number of statements 
associated with them but the scoring system remains the same, i.e. all 
strongly agree, all agree, etc. are assigned as shown in the associated tables.   
The numerical values in the formula change depending on the number of 
statements being examined. 
5.2.2 Survey Thoroughness 
This factor is based on the number of statements answered in the returned 
responses   Table 5.4 below shows the values allocated.   A total of 101 
responses are required from each respondent (including the base data on the 
front page of the survey. 
Table 5.4: Survey Thoroughness 
Response Quality Factor 
> 96 statements answered 10 
> 94 statements answered 6 
> 92 statements answered 3 
> 90 statements answered 2 
> 88 statements answered 1 
< 88 statements answered 0.5 
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5.2.3 Negative Response Statements (Disagrees) 
A number of statements throughout the survey require a negative response to 
signify that the safety culture is good.   This quality measurement is an 
estimate of how willing people are to actually select the strongly disagree box, 
even when it is the correct thing to do (i.e. a positive response in the 
presence of a good safety culture).   Statements 13, 14, 20, 26, 29, 30, 37, 
50, 51, 53, 59, 76, 84 and 98 are used for the assessment of this value.   
Table 5.5 below shows the values allocated. 
Table 5.5: Negative Responses Quality Factor Allocation 
Response Quality Factor 
All strongly disagree 10 
All disagree 6 
Some disagree 3, 2 
All neither agree nor disagree 1 
Some agree 0.5 
 
5.2.4 Blame Culture 
Three statements (S4, S22 and S23) within the survey specifically seek to 
determine whether a blame culture is perceived to be present.   The allocation 
of values is as shown in Table 5.6 below. 
Table 5.6: Blame Culture Quality Factor Value Allocation 
Response Quality Factor 
All strongly agree 10 
All agree 6 
Some agree 3, 2 
All neither agree nor disagree 1 
Some disagree 0.5 
 
These values apply to all factors except where specifically noted otherwise. 
5.2.5 Colleague Trust 
An estimate of the trust in terms of safety compliance and performance that 
people place in their colleagues is measured by five statements (S7, S8, S59, 
S63 and S65).   Statement 59 is a negative statement and may have a 
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negative impact on this factor if people are minded not to select the disagree 
responses. 
5.2.6 Intervention 
The willingness of people to intervene when unsafe behaviours occur or when 
they feel they have ideas on how to improve safety within the workplace is 
estimated using this factor.   The answers to S3, S9 and S80 are examined to 
estimate the level of intervention displayed by each respondent. 
5.2.7 Communications 
Several statements throughout the survey refer to the communications 
processes within the workplace.   This factor determines a score based on the 
consistency of answers to statements related to bi-directional 
communications between management and shop floor.   Statements 28, 70, 
75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86 and 87 are all examined to calculate this 
factor. 
5.2.8 Incident Management 
The response to incidents is a measure of the safety culture of an 
organisation.   In a company with a good safety culture the response will be 
positive and will concentrate on determining root cause as a means of 
eliminating future occurrences.   The process will feedback the information to 
affected personnel as a means of ensuring learning points have been 
adequately addressed.   In a poor safety culture (with blame being a 
prominent factor in any investigation) such learning and future recurrence is 
unlikely to occur to any significant degree.   This factor uses the answers to 
statements 21, 23, 25, 28 and 32. 
5.2.9 Competence 
The response to statements 34, 35, 36, 41, 64 and 65 are used to determine 
the respondents’ perception of how their company deals with personnel and 
corporate competence requirements within the business. 
5.2.10 Roles and Responsibilities 
The response to statements 34, 37, 40, 42 and 67 are used to determine the 
respondents’ perception of how their company ensures that personnel are 
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aware of their individual and corporate roles and responsibilities.   This factor 
contains one negative statement (S37). 
5.2.11 Safety Culture 
The perceived safety culture of the company is estimated based on the 
answers to statements 2, 6, 45, 47, 68, 72, 76, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93 and 94.   As 
there are so many statements in this quality factor the potential effects of 
each negative response will have a lesser effect on the overall score 
achieved than for factors with fewer statements. 
5.2.12 Organisational Measures 
The response to statements 11, 12, 16, 17, 48 and 52 are used to determine 
the respondents’ perception of the organisational measures related to safety 
within the business. 
5.2.13 Employee Empowerment 
In a company with a good safety culture employees will feel empowered to 
intervene when they see unsafe behaviours that could result in an accident.   
They will also be encouraged to communicate issues and concerns to senior 
management and will be forthright in communicating their views and opinions 
on any proposed modifications to how work is carried out.   The response to 
statements 3, 5, 8, 54, 56, and 62 are used to determine the respondents’ 
perception of the degree of empowerment they have. 
5.2.14 Procedural Awareness 
In a company with a good safety culture employees will be aware of all the 
operational procedures relevant to their particular tasks and they will have 
been trained in those procedures.   Refresher training will be carried out and 
regular site audits will confirm procedures are being applied.   The response 
to statements 9, 11, 12, 14 and 15 are used to determine the respondents’ 
awareness of the procedures in place. 
5.2.15 Management Pressure / Stress 
The level of pressure or stress imposed on the workforce is estimated by 
analysing the responses to statements 45, 47, 49, 50 and 51.   Two of these 
are negative statements (S50 & S51). 
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5.2.16 Employee Value / Worth 
The degree of value or worth felt by each respondent was estimated using the 
responses from statements 10, 55, 57, 72, 85, 91 and 94.   Some of these 
statements relate to the management seeking the involvement of the shop 
floor workers in key management decisions and developments. 
5.2.17 Safety Promotion 
The company’s approach to encouraging the promotion of safety is estimated 
by analysing the responses from statements 18, 56, 66, 69, 71, 73, 74, 80, 
85, 88 and 93.   A good safety culture will encourage employees to support 
the safety initiatives and the management to positively reinforce them in all 
possible situations. 
5.2.18 Resources 
The company’s approach to the provision of adequate resources is estimated 
using the responses to statements 27, 46 and 96.   A good safety culture will 
always provide enough resources to ensure the minimum level of safety is 
maintained.   There may not always be sufficient resources for production 
requirements and when conflicts occur the safety of personnel should be the 
prime concern. 
5.2.19 Number of Indifferent Responses 
As described in section 4.2, an indifferent response is defined as the middle 
value of the Likert scale within the survey, i.e. “Neither agree nor disagree”. 
As a means of detecting (and possibly rejecting) poor quality surveys spoiled 
by a high number of indifferent responses this quality factor assesses the 
number of indifferent responses from each returned survey and allocates a 
quality value as shown in Table 5.7 below. 
A high number of indifferent responses in any one survey adds very little to 
the overall assessment of the safety culture within a workplace other than 
indicating what may be an inadequate attitude on behalf of the respondent 
towards the safety improvement and risk reduction methods that their 
employer is attempting to implement.   It was shown in the analysis of results 
that a significant number of indifferent responses did not adversely affect the 
overall outcome of the assessment. 
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Table 5.7: Indifferent Responses 
Response Quality Factor 
Less than 10 indifferent responses 10 
Less than 15 indifferent responses 6 
Less than 20 indifferent responses 3 
Less than 25 indifferent responses 2 
Less than 30 indifferent responses 1 
Less than 35 indifferent responses 0.5 
 
A wholly indifferent response may well be a valid representation of a 
respondent’s perception of the workplace but this is considered to be a highly 
unlikely and unrealistic situation given the clear statements and topics and the 
variety of positive and negative responses expected throughout. 
In workplaces with the potential for high risks such as explosions and with a 
highly skilled and trained workforce a survey with a high number of indifferent 
responses would be disappointing and possibly even unacceptable to the 
employer.   It is conceivable that support operatives such as cleaners, 
security staff, canteen workers, etc. may not have strong attitudes towards 
the activities carried out on the shop floor as they may have little knowledge 
of what hazards and activities are actually present.   The base data on the 
front page of the survey serves to determine the job role of the respondents to 
take account of such situations. 
An indifferent response may also be produced if respondents have been 
asked to complete the survey during their own time or if they were not given 
enough time to complete it during their normal working hours.   An 
overbearing management style or an apathetic attitude of the respondent may 
be indicated by such a response under those conditions. 
Indifferent responses need to be assessed on balance with the other 
responses taken at the same time.   If such a response occurs in isolation 
then it will be evident that any issues present are more likely to lie with the 
respondent rather than with the management style or procedures. 
Employers’ reasons for implementing HF methods include safety performance 
improvements, productivity improvements and better operability of the plant 
and equipment through increased reliability and better (safer), more efficient 
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maintenance methods.   Less obvious reasons are also present such as 
teambuilding, procedures compliance, self-preservation and empathy for 
others’ safety.   An indifferent attitude to filling in the survey would indicate a 
respondent with a mind-set that would not be receptive to development in 
terms of changing the way that work activities are planned and carried out 
and may prevent effective implementation of such measures. 
A largely indifferent response does not necessarily show that the person 
submitting it does not care about safety; more likely that they don’t care 
enough.   A person with such an attitude is likely to have a dampening factor 
on any new initiatives for risk reduction.   It has to be kept in mind that the 
respondent may well have a wholly inadequate attitude to safety. 
Any surveys that have an unacceptable number of indifferent responses are 
highlighted within the tool for further examination and to determine whether 
those results should be discarded from the analysis. 
5.2.20 Employee Motivation 
This factor estimates the degree of motivation within the workforce for doing 
things in a safe manner and for the correct reasons.   The statements serve to 
determine what factors the employees use in their own decision making 
processes, i.e. production requirements, safety, perceived line manager 
attitudes, etc.   In a good safety culture the procedures will reflect the working 
arrangements and short cuts and safety-related decisions should not 
ordinarily be required.   There should be no conflicts between safety and 
production that shop floor operatives feel pressurised to choose between.   
The level of line management support in place should always be adequate for 
such decisions to be made by line management.   Workforce motivation was 
estimated using the responses to statements 14, 43, 44, 50, 51, 53, 76 and 
97.   Four of these statements are negative statements (S50, S51, S53 & 
S76). 
5.2.21 Training 
This quality factor estimates how the respondents feel about the level and 
quality of training received for the tasks that they are required to carry out.   
The responses to statements 19, 20, 24, 33, 39, 40, 60, 61 and 87 are used 
to generate this quality factor.   The statements relate to how training is 
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updated following plant or procedure modifications, how people are trained in 
order to deal with incident investigations, how people are trained in basic risk 
analysis techniques, whether their training requirements are periodically 
reviewed and whether there is a coaching programme in place to deal with 
poor performers. 
5.2.22 Disagree / Agree Ratio 
This quality factor attempts to determine the willingness of a respondent to 
answer with a strongly disagree response to signify a good safety culture as 
well as a strongly agree response when appropriate.   There are 14 negative 
statements and 84 positive statements.   The quality factor is assigned as 
shown in Table 5.8 below. 
Table 5.8: Disagree / Agree Ratio 
Disagree / Agree Ratio Quality Factor 
> 0.167 10 
> 0.142 6 
> 0.119 3 
> 0.095 2 
> 0.071 1 
< 0.071 0.5 
 
5.2.23 Consecutive Indifferent Responses 
The maximum number of consecutive indifferent responses is calculated for 
each returned survey.   It is conceivable, though unlikely, that a whole section 
of statements may prompt an indifferent response, especially for those 
support personnel not directly involved with the main production areas or the 
business activities carried out.   The trigger level for this quality factor is 
therefore set at 13 (the maximum number of statements in any one section) 
and the factor value reduces thereafter as noted in Table 5.9 below. 
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Table 5.9: Consecutive Indifferent Responses 
No of Consecutive Indifferent Responses Quality Factor 
< 13 10 
< 20 6 
< 25 3 
< 30 2 
< 35 1 
< 40 0.5 
 
5.3 Survey Analysis 
5.3.1 Safety Culture Assessment Value 
A safety culture ranking of the company is assigned by calculating the 
arithmetic mean of the mean quality factors and the mean response totals 
from each safety culture survey carried out.   The safety culture is assigned a 
value between 0 and 10 as shown in Table 5.10 below. 
Table 5.10: Safety Culture Value 
Safety Culture Ranking Value Safety Culture Rating 
0-2 Very poor 
2-4 Poor 
4-6 Average 
6-8 Good 
8-10 Very good 
 
The role of each respondent is taken into consideration to ascertain if there 
are any significant differences between management and non-management 
personnel. 
5.3.2 Individual Survey Total 
In the assessment tool the response to each statement is assigned a primary 
and secondary value as shown in Table 5.1. 
The secondary responses (maximum value of 1.0) are summated to provide 
an overall total for each respondent for the ninety-eight statements in the 
safety culture survey.   As the number of statements in each section varies, 
the total for each section is normalised to a maximum value of ten.   The 
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totals from each of the nine survey sections are then summated and used as 
one of the factors to calculate the overall safety culture value. 
The arithmetic mean of all responses for each safety culture survey carried 
out is calculated and assigned a ranking value as noted in Table 5.11 below. 
Table 5.11: Ranking of Survey Secondary Value Total 
Mean Response Total Mean Total Ranking 
0-20 Very poor 
20-40 Poor 
40-60 Average 
60-80 Good 
> 80 Very good 
 
5.3.3 Maximum Summated Secondary Values Total 
The maximum summated secondary values total is determined for each 
safety culture survey carried out to ascertain from what group of personnel 
the maximum value comes from (manager, technician, etc.). 
5.3.4 Quality Factors Mean Value 
The arithmetic mean of the summated quality factors is also used in the 
calculation of the overall safety culture value.   The ranking of the summated 
quality factors value is assigned as shown in Table 5.12 below. 
Table 5.12: Mean Quality Factors 
Mean Response Total Mean Total Ranking 
0-11 Very poor 
11-22 Poor 
22-44 Average 
44-66 Good 
66-132 Very good 
> 132 Excellent 
 
5.3.5 Maximum Summated Quality Factors Total 
The maximum summated total is determined to ascertain from what group of 
personnel the maximum value comes from.   This information is useful in 
forming a trend with the other results available from the assessment tool to 
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determine what group of people have the strongest perception of a good 
safety culture being present. 
5.3.6 Determination of High Priority Issues 
As a means of maximising the effect of available resources to address any 
potential issues identified by the assessment tool, the lowest scoring section 
of each returned survey is determined.   This will assist the company in 
determining what aspects of the workplace are in need of improvement.   It is 
acknowledged that the lowest scoring section of the safety culture survey may 
not actually be the most vulnerable or most likely to give rise to an accident 
occurring.   Careful analysis of the assessment tool output is therefore 
necessary in order to ensure that correct decisions are made concerning 
corrective measures to be applied.   Once a plan of action has been 
determined the corrective measures can be applied in the workplace in order 
to reduce the potential risks that may be present.   These may be antecedent-
type measures such as the provision of adequate equipment, rules and 
procedures or behaviour-based measures such as those expected to be in 
place with a fully trained and competent workforce. 
The results of all surveys are compared and the modal and mean values are 
determined.   The low scoring modal value is the survey section with the 
greatest number of lowest scores.   The lowest scoring mean value is the 
section with lowest mean score of all sections and all surveys returned. 
It is possible that the mode and mean may return different results hence why 
both are determined.   In addition to the lowest-scoring sections the highest 
scoring sections are also determined. 
5.3.7 Quality Factors Average Values 
The mean of each of the quality factors is also calculated to provide an overall 
estimate of how well each factor is scored throughout the workforce.   These 
values are then ranked from highest score to lowest score and the lowest 
score is determined.   As stated above, identifying those factors with the 
lowest scores assists the company in determining where best to use available 
resources for the purposes of making improvements to the workplace and 
thereby reducing risk associated with that aspect of the assessment. 
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5.3.8 Maximum Individual Safety Culture Value 
The maximum safety culture value from each set of surveys returned is 
determined to ascertain from what group of personnel the return comes from. 
5.3.9 Survey Average Values 
The mode and arithmetic mean is determined for each of the statements in 
the returned responses for each company.   These ‘average’ values serve to 
ascertain what the most common response to each statement is, thereby 
providing an overall estimate of the workforce’s perception of that aspect of 
the workplace.   The arithmetic mean provides a measure of the strength of 
feeling for a statement, i.e. the higher or lower the value the stronger the 
feeling for that response. 
The spread of responses for each statement is also calculated to provide a 
direct comparison of the response to each statement in the baseline and final 
safety culture survey results and to provide a graphical representation of the 
spread of results. 
5.4 Safety Culture Survey Sections Reliability Analysis 
Reliability analysis of the safety culture survey questionnaire has been carried 
out using the SPSS statistical software package.   Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was derived for each of the safety culture survey sections and the 
relevant quality factors.   Dewberry (2004) states that the minimum 
acceptable value for the coefficient is 0.7.   Pallant (2007) sates that 
measurement of the coefficient in scales with less than ten items may report 
low values of the alpha coefficient and that using the inter-item correlation 
values may be a better measurement of reliability; with values between 0.2 
and 0.4 being acceptable.   Dewberry (2004) states that a minimum value of 
0.32 is required for inter-item correlation.   The minimum number of items in 
each scale (or section) being examined in this survey questionnaire was ten.   
Such issues were not therefore expected. 
5.4.1 Safety Culture Section (S1 to S10) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Safety Culture” section of each of 
the surveys carried out is shown below.   An example of the complete 
analysis is shown for the Company A baseline survey in Appendix F. 
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The values show that the series of statements in this section appear to be 
reliably measuring the respondent’s view to safety culture within the 
workplace. 
It can be seen that the Company C3 baseline survey returned a coefficient of 
0.508 which falls below the acceptable threshold.   Statements 2, 3 and 9 (if 
deleted) all returned higher coefficient values (0.603, 0.670 and 0.613 
respectively) but still not an acceptable value.   Manipulation or deletion of 
these statements may be required to raise the alpha coefficient to an 
acceptable level.   However, given the high values achieved for other surveys, 
the low coefficient is more likely to be indicative of an issue with the low 
number of respondents (7) in this case. 
Table 5.13: Safety Culture Section Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.852 0.875 0.853 0.508 
Final 0.766 0.886 0.901 0.802 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and Table 5.14 below shows which statements are associated with 
each identified factor.   Dewberry (2004) states that the item loading on a 
factor is good when it is greater than 0.55.   The table shows items (or 
statements) with loadings greater than 0.55 in bold type.   The remaining 
statements with loadings of greater than 0.32 are shown in normal type. 
Table 5.14: Safety Culture Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S1, S2, S3, S7, 
S8, S9 
S1, S3, S4, S6, 
S8, S9 
S1, S3, S5, S7, 
S10 
N/A 
Company A 
final 
S1, S4, S6, S9 S3, S8, S9, 
S10 
S3, S5, S7, S8 S2 
Company C1 
baseline 
S2, S3, S4, S5, 
S6, S8, S9 
S1, S4, S5, S6, 
S8, S10 
S2, S5, S7, 
S10 
N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S1, S2, S3, S5, 
S6, S7, S8, S9, 
S10 
S2, S3, S4, S6, 
S9, S10 
N/A N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S1, S3, S4, S5, 
S6, S9, S10 
S1, S7, S8, S9, 
S10 
S1, S2, S3, S9 N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S3, S4, S5, S6, 
S7, S8, S9, 
S10 
S1, S2, S3, S6, 
S8, S9, S10 
N/A N/A 
   Page 144 of 322 
Company C3 
baseline 
S1, S2, S3, S5, 
S7, S8, S10 
S2, S5, S9 S4, S6 N/A 
Company C3 
final 
S1, S4, S7, S8, 
S9, S10 
S2, S3, S5, S7, 
S8, S9 
S4, S5, S6, S7 N/A 
 
The results show that although four factors were identified they are all 
interlinked with statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily 
separated into three different constructs with completely different statements 
in each.   When the loading values are taken into consideration it can be seen 
that there may be a good separation between factors as there is little 
duplication of highly loaded statements in each factor. 
The results show that statement 2 had a significant effect on the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient and there may be scope for removing this statement from 
the survey or rewording it to provide better, more reliable results. 
Dewberry (2004) states that a minimum sample size of 300 is necessary to 
give “a good factor solution”.   This size of sample is unlikely to be achieved in 
SMEs.   The results from factor analysis must therefore be treated with 
caution until the reliability of the survey tool can be proven by using a greater 
sample size such as with large businesses. 
5.4.2 Organisational Measures Section (S11 to S20) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Organisational Measures” section is 
shown in Table 5.15 below. 
Table 5.15: Organisational Measures Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.509 0.597 0.438 0.546 
Final 0.601 0.422 0.708 0.393 
Baseline S13 
deleted 
0.517 0.657 0.590 0.576 
Baseline S20 
deleted 
0.698 0.602 0.648 0.468 
Final S13 
deleted 
0.688 0.503 0.701 0.453 
Final S20 
deleted 
0.713 0.659 0.860 0.625 
 
   Page 145 of 322 
The values show that the statements in this section are not reliably measuring 
the respondent’s view to organisational arrangements within the workplace as 
most of the alpha coefficient values are less than 0.7.   The “value if deleted” 
analysis shows that (for most surveys) statements 13 and 20 are adversely 
affecting the reliability. 
An issue with statement 13 was detected when it became evident that some 
people did not know that the acronym PTW meant permit to work.   This is 
likely to have adversely affected the response to this statement.   An 
improved questionnaire would remove all such acronyms to improve clarity.   
Rewording (or deleting) statement 20 to a less ambiguous form is also 
considered to be essential. 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.16 below.   Again, it can be seen that there 
are more factors identified than would be ideal. 
Table 5.16: Organisational Measures Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S11, S12, S13, 
S15, S16, S17 
S17, S18, S19, 
S20 
S13, S14, S17, 
S19 
S13, S15, S17 
Company A 
final 
S11, S16, S17, 
S18, S19, S20 
S11, S12, S13, 
S15, S16 
S12, S13, S14, 
S20 
N/A 
Company C1 
baseline 
S12, S13, S19, 
S20 
S12, S13, S14, 
S15, S18 
S11, S12, S16, 
S20 
S13, S17, S18 
Company C1 
final 
S12, S15, S16, 
S17, S19, S20 
S11, S12, S15, 
S16, S18, S19, 
S20 
S12, S13, S14, 
S20 
N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S15, S16, S18, 
S19, S20 
S11, S12, S13, 
S16 
S14, S17, S19, 
S20 
N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S11, S12, S15, 
S16, S17, S18, 
S19, S20 
S11, S13, S14 N/A N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S12, S14, S16, 
S18, S19 
S16, S17, S19, 
S20 
S11, S13, S14, 
S16, S17, S19 
S15, S18 
Company C3 
final 
S11, S12, S19, 
S20 
S15, S17, S18, 
S19, S20 
S13, S16, S17, 
S18, S20 
S14, S15, S20 
 
As found in the previous section the factors identified are largely interlinked 
with statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated 
into different constructs. 
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5.4.3 Incident Management Section (S21 to S32) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Incident Management” section for is 
shown in Table 5.17 below. 
Table 5.17: Incident Management Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.710 0.799 0.747 0.463 
Final 0.440 0.598 0.844 0.664 
Baseline S26 
deleted 
0.742 0.845 0.817 N/A 
Baseline S28 
deleted 
0.739 0.756 0.699 0.231 
Baseline S30 
deleted 
0.721 0.805 0.749 0.502 
Baseline S31 
deleted 
0.747 0.798 0.764 0.595 
Final S26 
deleted 
0.580 0.724 0.853 0.729 
Final S28 
deleted 
0.284 0.539 0.825 0.702 
Final S30 
deleted 
0.617 0.598 0.828 0.644 
Final S31 
deleted 
0.450 0.667 0.907 0.650 
 
Acceptable results in both the baseline and final surveys were achieved only 
with Company C2.   Examination of the “value if deleted” analysis showed 
that statements 26, 28, 30 and 31 were having an adverse effect on the alpha 
coefficient.   The most significant of these were statements 26 and 31. 
The information referred to in statements 28 and 30 would not normally be 
available or known to all people within a business and these statements may 
therefore promote a degree of unreliability as found in the analysis.   These 
statements could also be reworded to improve clarity.   Using a statement 
such as “I am aware of a formal communications process being in place…” in 
place of “A formal communications process is in place…” may help to bring 
these statements more into line with the intended functionality of the section 
and to remove any ambiguity of the intended meaning of the statement. 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and Table 5.18 below shows which statements are associated with 
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each identified factor.   It can be seen that there are more factors identified 
than would be ideal. 
Table 5.18: Incident Management Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Company A 
baseline 
S21, S22, 
S25, S27, 
S31, S32 
S23, S28, 
S29, S30, 
S31 
S25, S26, 
S28, S31 
S23, S24, 
S28, S31 
N/A 
Company A 
final 
S21, S22, 
S28, S30, 
S32 
S23, S25, 
S26, S30 
S24, S27 S21, S23, 
S29 
S25, S31 
Company C1 
baseline 
S21, S22, 
S23, S25, 
S27, S28, 
S32 
S22, S23, 
S24, S25, 
S26, S29, 
S32 
S25, S27, 
S29, S31, 
S32 
S24, S30, 
S32 
N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S21, S22, 
S25, S27, 
S28, S31 
S21, S23, 
S26, S28, 
S29, S30, 
S31 
S22, S24, 
S27, S29, 
S32 
N/A N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S21, S22, 
S24, S25, 
S27, S30, 
S32 
S21, S22, 
S23, S25, 
S26, S28, 
S29, S32 
S23, S29, 
S30, S31, 
S32 
N/A N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S21, S22, 
S23, S24, 
S25, S27, 
S28, S29, 
S30, S32 
S23, S25, 
S26, S27, 
S29, S30, 
S31 
S24, S25, 
S26, S29, 
S32 
N/A N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Company C3 
final 
S21, S22, 
S23, S24, 
S26, S29, 
S32 
S25, S27, 
S28, S29, 
S32 
S25, S26, 
S30, S31 
S22, S24, 
S27, S31, 
S32 
 
 
The factors identified in the analysis for this section are largely interlinked with 
statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated. 
5.4.4 Competence Management Section (S33 to S42) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Competence Management” section 
is shown in Table 5.19 below. 
The poor result in Company C3 baseline survey has been attributed to the 
low number of responses (7).   It was noted from the “value if deleted” 
analysis that statement 37 had an adverse effect on most surveys.   This 
statement needs to be deleted or modified to be less ambiguous. 
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Table 5.19: Competence Management Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.890 0.734 0.854 0.542 
Final 0.918 0.801 0.865 0.759 
Baseline S37 
deleted 
0.927 0.750 0.879 0.396 
Final S37 
deleted 
0.928 0.788 0.869 0.758 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.20 below.   It can be seen that there are more 
factors identified than would be ideal. 
The factors identified in the analysis for this section are interlinked with 
statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated into 
different constructs. 
Table 5.20: Competence Management Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S33, S34, 
S35, S36, 
S37, S39, 
S40, S41, S42 
S34, S36, 
S37, S38, 
S39, S42 
N/A N/A 
Company A 
final 
S32, S33, 
S34, S35, 
S36, S37, 
S39, S40, 
S41, S42 
S33, S34, 
S35, S37, 
S39, S40, S42 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
baseline 
S35, S36, 
S37, S40, S41 
S33, S36, 
S39, S41 
S37, S38, S42 S33, S34, S37 
Company C1 
final 
S33, S36, 
S37, S38, 
S40, S42 
S34, S36, 
S38, S39, 
S40, S42 
S35, S36, 
S39, S40 
S34, S41 
Company C2 
baseline 
S35, S36, 
S38, S39, 
S40, S41 
S33, S34, 
S35, S36, 
S39, S40, S41 
S37, S40, S42 N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S33, S35, 
S36, S37, 
S39, S40, S41 
S34, S35, 
S36, S39, 
S40, S41 
S35, S38, S42 N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S34, S35, 
S37, S38, S42 
S35, S39, 
S40, S41 
S33, S34, 
S36, S39 
N/A 
Company C3 
final 
S33, S36, 
S39, S40, S41 
S33, S34, 
S35, S37, 
S40, S42 
S33, S35, 
S37, S38, 
S39, S40 
N/A 
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5.4.5 Influencing Factors Section (S43 to S53) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Influencing Factors” section is 
shown in Table 5.21 below. 
Table 5.21: Influencing Factors Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.917 0.926 0.869 0.593 
Final 0.926 0.673 0.892 0.431 
 
It can be seen that the Company C3 survey appears to be a poor result in 
comparison with the others. 
The “value if deleted” analysis did not identify any significant statements 
common to all surveys that were having a detrimental effect on the overall 
result.   Statement 53 in the Company C1 final survey was noted to raise the 
alpha coefficient value to 0.715 if deleted.   Deletion or improving the clarity of 
this statement may therefore be an appropriate solution. 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.22 below. 
Table 5.22: Influencing Factors Section Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Company A 
baseline 
S43, S44, 
S45, S46, 
S47, S48, 
S49, S50, 
S51, S52, 
S53 
S48, S49, 
S52, S53 
N/A N/A N/A 
Company A 
final 
S43, S44, 
S45, S46, 
S47, S48, 
S52, S53 
S47, S48, 
S50, S51, 
S53 
S43, S49, 
S52 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
baseline 
S43, S44, 
S45, S46, 
S47, S49, 
S52, S53 
S43, S44, 
S45, S46, 
S47, S48, 
S51, S52 
S44, S45, 
S46, S47, 
S50, S51, 
S53 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S44, S45, 
S46, S47, 
S48 
S45, S49, 
S50, S52 
S43, S50, 
S51 
S50, S51, 
S53 
N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S43, S44, 
S46, S47, 
S48, S49, 
S52 
S44, S45, 
S46, S47, 
S50, S51, 
S53 
N/A N/A N/A 
Company C2 S44, S45, S45, S46, S49, S52 S43, S50 N/A 
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final S46, S47, 
S48, S51, 
S53 
S50, S51, 
S53 
Company C3 
baseline 
S43, S44, 
S45, S47, 
S48, S50 
S43, S46, 
S50, S52 
S47, S48, 
S52, S53 
S43, S44, 
S49 
S50, S51 
Company C3 
final 
S44, S45, 
S46, S47, 
S48 
S43, S44, 
S47, S51, 
S52, S53 
S44, S48, 
S50, S52 
S49, S52, 
S53 
N/A 
 
The factors identified in the analysis for this section are interlinked with 
statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated into 
different constructs.   It is noted that factor 1 contains many statements 
common to each survey which suggests that this section is closer to a good 
solution than the previous sections analysed. 
5.4.6 My Role Section (S54 to 66) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “My Role” section is shown in Table 
5.23 below. 
Table 5.23: My Role Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.931 0.910 0.828 0.847 
Final 0.596 0.864 0.757 0.767 
Baseline S59 
deleted 
0.951 0.911 0.858 0.885 
Final S59 
deleted 
0.731 0.891 0.740 0.851 
 
It can be seen that statement 59 appears to have a detrimental effect in all 
surveys.   This statement needs to be reviewed or deleted. 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.24 below.   It can be seen that there are more 
factors identified than would be ideal for a construct with only one intended 
measurement and twelve statements.   The factors identified are interlinked 
with statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated 
into different constructs. 
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Table 5.24: My Role Section Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Company A 
Baseline 
S54, S55, 
S56, S57, 
S58, S59, 
S60, S62, 
S63, S64, 
S65, S66 
S57, S58, 
S59, S60, 
S61, S62, 
S63, S64, 
S66 
N/A N/A N/A 
Company A 
final 
S55, S59, 
S62, S63, 
S64, S65, 
S66 
S56, S59, 
S60, S61, 
S62, S64 
S55, S57, 
S65 
S55, S58, 
S59, S61 
S54, S60, 
S61, S65 
Company C1 
baseline 
S54, S55, 
S56, S57, 
S61, S62, 
S64, S65, 
S66 
S57, S58, 
S59, S63 
S57, S58, 
S60, S62, 
S65 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S54, S55, 
S56, S58, 
S60, S61, 
S65 
S59, S60, 
S61, S63, 
S64 
S55, S56, 
S62, S64, 
S65, S66 
S57, S58, 
S63 
N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S54, S55, 
S56, S57, 
S59 
S56, S57, 
S58, S60, 
S63, S66 
S57, S61, 
S62, S63 
S58, S64, 
S65, S66 
N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S56, S57, 
S58, S60, 
S61, S62 
S54, S55, 
S63 
S55, S64, 
S66 
S57, S59, 
S65 
N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S54, S55, 
S58, S61, 
S62, S63, 
S65 
S55, S57, 
S59, S60, 
S63 
S56, S58, 
S61, S62, 
S63 
S54, S57, 
S64 
 
Company C3 
final 
S54, S55, 
S56, S59, 
S60, S61, 
S62, S63, 
S64, S66 
S54, S58, 
S59, S60, 
S61, S62, 
S64, S65 
S57, S60, 
S61 
N/A N/A 
 
5.4.7 My Manager Section (S67 to S76) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “My Manager” section is shown in 
Table 5.25 below.   The values show that this section appears to be reliably 
measuring what people think about their manager. 
Reviewing the “value if deleted” analysis shows that statement 73 had a 
detrimental effect in all surveys.   Modification or deletion of this statement is 
therefore required. 
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Table 5.25: My Manager Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.818 0.843 0.843 0.764 
Final 0.854 0.838 0.731 0.749 
Baseline S73 
deleted 
0.936 0.940 0.903 0.908 
Final S73 
deleted 
0.844 0.880 0.853 0.859 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.26 below. 
The factors identified in the analysis for this section are also interlinked with 
statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated into 
different constructs.   It is clear that there are generally two strong factors 
identified in each survey with one or two weaker factors.   The second factor 
does not appear to contain a regular pattern of statements but instead 
contains a mixture of statements in each survey. 
Table 5.26: My Manager Section Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S67, S68, S69, 
S70, S71, S73, 
S76 
S67, S68, S69, 
S70, S72, S73, 
S74, S75 
N/A N/A 
Company A 
final 
S69, S71, S72, 
S74, S75 
S67, S68, S72, 
S76 
S67, S72, S73, 
S75 
S68, S70 
Company C1 
baseline 
S68, S69, S70, 
S71, S72, S73, 
S74, S76 
S67, S69, S70, 
S71, S73, S74, 
S75 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S67, S69, S70, 
S71, S72, S74, 
S75 
S67, S68, S72, 
S74, S76 
S70, S73, S75 N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S67, S68, S69, 
S70, S71, S72, 
S74, S75, S76 
S73, S76 N/A N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S67, S68, S69, 
S70, S71, S72, 
S73, S74, S76 
S67, S69, S70, 
S71, S72, S73, 
S75, S76 
N/A N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S67, S70, S71, 
S72, S74, S75, 
S76 
S67, S68, S70, 
S71, S72, S73, 
S74, S75 
S69, S72 N/A 
Company C3 
final 
S67, S68, S69, 
S71, S72, S73, 
S74, S76 
S72, S73, S74, 
S75, S76 
S68, S70 N/A 
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5.4.8 Communications Section (S77 to S86) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Communications” section is shown 
in Table 5.27 below.   The values suggest that this section is reliably 
measuring people’s perception of communications within their workplace. 
Table 5.27: Communications Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.918 0.943 0.869 0.833 
Final 0.849 0.877 0.908 0.828 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.28 below. 
The factors identified in the analysis for this section are interlinked with 
statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated into 
different constructs.   The factors do not appear to contain a regular pattern of 
statements but instead contain a mixture of statements in each survey.    
Table 5.28: Communications Section Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A baseline S78, S80, S81, 
S82, S83, S84, 
S85, S86 
S77, S78, S79, 
S80, S81, S82, 
S85 
N/A 
Company A final S77, S78, S79, 
S85, S86 
S79, S80, S81, 
S82, S83 
S82, S83, S84 
Company C1 baseline S77, S82, S83, 
S84, S85, S86 
S78, S79, S80, 
S85, S86 
S77, S80, S81, 
S82, S83 
Company C1 final S77, S78, S79, 
S80, S81, S83, 
S85 
S79, S80, S82, 
S83, S84, S86 
N/A 
Company C2 baseline S77, S78, S79, 
S80, S81, S82, 
S83, S85 
S77, S79, S80, 
S81, S82, S83, 
S84 
N/A 
Company C2 final S77, S78, S79, 
S80, S81, S82, 
S83, S85 
S78, S79, S80, 
S84, S85, S86 
N/A 
Company C3 baseline S77, S79, S80, 
S81, S82, S83 
S77, S79, S80, 
S81, S82, S83, 
S84, S85, S86 
S78, S83, S84 
Company C3 final S77, S80, S81, 
S82, S85, S86 
S78, S79, S82, 
S83, S84 
N/A 
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5.4.9 The Organisation Section (S87 to S98) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Organisation” section is shown in 
Table 5.29 below.   The values suggest that this section is reliably measuring 
people’s perception of communications within their workplace. 
The “value if deleted” analysis showed that a small improvement could be 
made with the deletion of statement 97. 
Table 5.29: The Organisation Section Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.872 0.738 0.839 0.901 
Final 0.885 0.855 0.931 0.836 
Baseline S97 
deleted 
0.916 0.879 0.882 0.912 
Final S97 
deleted 
0.909 0.911 0.955 0.854 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for this section of the safety culture 
survey and is shown in Table 5.30 below. 
Table 5.30: The Organisation Section Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S87, S88, 
S91, S92, 
S93, S94, 
S95, S96 
S87, S88, 
S89, S90, 
S91, S92, S96 
S87, S97, S98 N/A 
Company A 
final 
S87, S89, 
S90, S95, 
S96, S98 
S88, S91, 
S92, S93, 
S94, S96 
S89, S90, 
S91, S92, 
S93, S97, S98 
N/A 
Company C1 
baseline 
S88, S89, 
S90, S91, 
S92, S95, 
S97, S98 
S88, S90, 
S91, S93, 
S94, S98 
S87, S89, 
S91, S96, 
S97, S98 
N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S87, S88, 
S89, S91, 
S92, S93, 
S94, S95, S96 
S89, S90, 
S91, S92, 
S94, S96, S98 
S87, S92, 
S94, S97, S98 
N/A 
Company C2 
baseline 
S88, S89, 
S90, S91, 
S92, S93, S94 
S89, S90, 
S91, S95, 
S97, S98 
S87, S88, 
S95, S96 
N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S88, S89, 
S90, S91, 
S92, S93, 
S94, S95, 
S96, S98 
S87, S88, 
S89, S90, 
S91, S92, 
S97, S98 
N/A N/A 
Company C3 S87, S88, S87, S88, S88, S89, N/A 
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baseline S91, S92, 
S94, S95, 
S96, S97 
S92, S93, 
S94, S98 
S90, S91, 
S92, S93, 
S97, S98 
Company C3 
final 
S88, S89, 
S90, S91, 
S92, S93 
S87, S92, 
S95, S98 
S92, S94, S97 S88, S90, 
S91, S96 
 
The factors identified in the analysis for this section are interlinked with 
statements common to each and cannot therefore be easily separated.   
Further manipulation of the statements is therefore necessary to bring the 
result more in line with the intent of this section. 
5.5 Safety Culture Survey Quality Factors Reliability Analysis 
5.5.1 Survey Response Quality Quality Factor (S35, S38, S87) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Survey Response Quality” quality 
factor is shown in Table 5.31 below.   The values are generally lower than 
0.7.   As there were only three statements in this factor this may have had an 
adverse effect on the alpha coefficient.   Pallant (2007) states that a minimum 
of ten items is required to provide an accurate alpha coefficient measurement. 
The statements included in this factor are not necessarily linked by their 
subject but are chosen based on a specific analysis of the company, its 
activities and systems to ensure that the statements selected deliver a certain 
response.   The alpha coefficient is not therefore suitable for measuring this 
factor as the statements selected may not be linked at all and that the 
descriptive analysis is more suitable.   A negative alpha value is indicative of 
the measurement being invalid (as noted below for Company C3). 
Table 5.31: Survey Response Quality Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.731 0.193 0.583 -2.2 
Final 0.859 0.427 0.443 0.642 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for the “Survey Response Quality” 
quality factor and is shown in Table 5.32.   It can be seen that the statements 
chosen for measurement of “survey response quality” are generally contained 
within the same factor. 
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Table 5.32: Survey Response Quality Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S35, S38, S87 N/A 
Company A final S35, S38, S87 N/A 
Company C1 baseline S38, S87 S35 
Company C1 final S35, S38, S87 N/A 
Company C2 baseline S35, S38, S87 N/A 
Company C2 final S35, S87 S38 
Company C3 baseline S35, S38, S87 N/A 
Company C3 final S35, S38, S87 N/A 
 
5.5.2 Blame Culture Quality Factor (S4, S22, S23) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Blame Culture” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.33 below.   As can be seen, the values are generally less 
than 0.7 and this is attributed to the measurement factor only containing three 
statements. 
Table 5.33: Blame Culture Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.301 0.803 0.718 0.295 
Final 0.612 0.780 0.776 0.769 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for the “Blame Culture” quality factor and 
is shown in Table 5.32 below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for 
the measurement of “blame culture” are generally contained within the same 
factor but this is possibly related more to the low number of statements being 
assessed.   The Company C3 result is different but this is attributed to the low 
sample size in that survey. 
Table 5.34: Blame Culture Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S4, S22, S23 N/A 
Company A final S4, S22, S23 N/A 
Company C1 baseline S4, S22, S23 N/A 
Company C1 final S4, S22, S23 N/A 
Company C2 baseline S4, S22, S23 N/A 
Company C2 final S4, S22, S23 N/A 
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Company C3 baseline S4, S23 S22 
Company C3 final S4, S22, S23 S4, S22, S23 
 
5.5.3 Colleague Trust Quality Factor (S7, S8, S59, S63, S65) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Colleague Trust” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.35 below.   Most of the values are lower than the acceptable 
0.7 threshold.   The “value if deleted” analysis also provided for poor results 
with all statements.   The poor results are attributed to this measurement 
factor containing only five statements. 
Table 5.35: Colleague Trust Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.684 0.732 0.542 0.245 
Final -0.010 0.540 0.698 0.298 
 
Factor analysis for the “Colleague Trust” quality factor is shown in Table 5.36 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“colleague trust” are generally split between two factors.   The statements 
between the two factors are not the same each time which suggests that the 
statements used for this factor require to be reviewed in order to improve the 
measurement. 
Table 5.36: Colleague Trust Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S7, S8, S63, S65 S59 
Company A final S8, S59, S63, S65 S7 
Company C1 baseline S7, S59, S65 S8, S63 
Company C1 final S7, S8, S65 S59, S63 
Company C2 baseline S7, S8, S65 S59, S63 
Company C2 final S7, S8, S63 S59, S65 
Company C3 baseline S7, S8, S65 S59, S63 
Company C3 final S7, S59, S65 S8, S63 
 
5.5.4 Intervention Quality Factor (S3, S9, S80) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Intervention” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.37 below.   The “value if deleted” analysis provided poor 
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results in most cases which are attributed to this measurement factor 
containing only three statements. 
Table 5.37: Intervention Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.843 0.802 0.640 0.233 
Final 0.381 0.613 0.865 0.339 
 
Factor analysis for the “Intervention” quality factor is shown in Table 5.38 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“intervention” appear to be closely related and are reliably measuring the 
same thing; however there being only three statements this result may be 
optimistic. 
Table 5.38: Intervention Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S3, S9, S80 N/A 
Company A final S3, S9 S80 
Company C1 baseline S3, S9, S80 N/A 
Company C1 final S3, S9, S80 N/A 
Company C2 baseline S3, S9, S80 N/A 
Company C2 final S3, S9, S80 N/A 
Company C3 baseline S3, S9, S80 N/A 
Company C3 final S3, S9 S80 
 
5.5.5 Communications Quality Factor (S28, S70, S75, S77, S78, S79, S81, 
S82, S83, S84, S86, S87) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Communications” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.39 below.   All values are greater than 0.7 which shows that 
the statements have good correlation and can be considered to be reliably 
measuring the same thing. 
Table 5.39: Communications Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.920 0.924 0.876 0.814 
Final 0.859 0.843 0.837 0.803 
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Factor analysis for the “Communications” quality factor is shown in Table 5.40 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“communications” are split between four factors.   The statements in each of 
the factors were not repeatable between surveys which suggests that the 
statements used for this factor require to be reviewed in order to improve the 
measurement. 
Table 5.40: Communications Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S75, S78, S81, 
S82, S83, S84, 
S86, S87 
S70, S75, S77, 
S78, S79, S81, 
S82 
S28, S70, S78, 
S82 
N/A 
Company A 
final 
S75, S79, S81, 
S82, S83, S87 
S28, S77, S78, 
S81, S86 
S70, S78, S86, 
S87 
S79, S81, S83, 
S84 
Company C1 
baseline 
S28, S75, S78, 
S79, S86, S87 
S70, S77, S78, 
S81, S82, S83 
S77, S82, S83, 
S84, S86 
N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S28, S77, S78, 
S79, S81, S83 
S28, S77, S79, 
S81, S84, S86, 
S87 
S28, S70, S75, 
S78, S83 
S79, S82, S83, 
S84, S86 
Company C2 
baseline 
S28, S70, S75, 
S77, S79, S81, 
S82, S83, S84 
S77, S78, S79, 
S81, S83, S86, 
S87 
S28, S78, S84 N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S70, S77, S78, 
S79, S81, S82, 
S83, S84 
S70, S75, S77, 
S78, S79, S84, 
S86, S87 
S75, S77, S81 S28, S70, S78, 
S79, S87 
Company C3 
baseline 
S70, S75, S77, 
S81, S82, S83, 
S87 
S28, S70, S79, 
S81, S86, S87 
S70, S78, S83, 
S86, S87 
S28, S70, S75, 
S82, S84, S86 
Company C3 
final 
S28, S70, S81, 
S82, S84, S87 
S28, S77, S81, 
S82, S86, S87 
S28, S78, S79, 
S83 
S75, S79, S84, 
S87 
 
5.5.6 Incident Management Quality Factor (S21, S23, S25, S28, S32) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Incident Management” quality 
factor are shown in Table 5.41 below.   All values are greater than 0.7 which 
shows that the statements appear to have good correlation and can be 
considered to be reliably measuring the same thing.   The positive result may 
not be accurate due to the low number of statements in use to measure this 
factor. 
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Table 5.41: Incident Management Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.583 0.840 0.825 0.698 
Final 0.763 0.681 0.838 0.389 
 
Factor analysis for the “Incident Management” quality factor is shown in Table 
5.42 below.   The statements selected for measurement of “incident 
management” are split between two factors and were not repeatable between 
surveys which suggests that the statements used for this factor require to be 
reviewed in order to improve the measurement. 
Table 5.42: Incident Management Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S21, S25, S28, S32 S21, S23, S28 
Company A final S21, S25, S28, S32 S21, S23, S25 
Company C1 baseline S21, S23, S25, S28, S32 N/A 
Company C1 final S21, S23, S25, S28 S23, S25, S28, S32 
Company C2 baseline S21, S23, S25, S28, S32 N/A 
Company C2 final S21, S23, S25, S28, S32 N/A 
Company C3 baseline S21, S23, S28, S32 S21, S23, S25 
Company C3 final S21, S23, S32 S25, S28 
 
5.5.7 Competence Quality Factor (S34, S35, S36, S41, S64, S65) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Competence” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.43 below.   Many values are less than 0.7 which shows that 
the statements do not have good correlation and may not be considered to be 
reliably measuring the same thing.   It was noted that the “value if deleted” 
analysis showed that minor improvements in the alpha coefficient could be 
achieved by deleting S34 and S64 but these were minimal and would not 
achieve the value of 0.7. 
Table 5.43: Competence Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.861 0.647 0.741 0.698 
Final 0.838 0.682 0.355 0.202 
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Factor analysis for the “Competence” quality factor is shown in Table 5.44 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“competence” are split between three factors.   The statements in each of the 
factors were not repeatable between surveys which suggests that the 
statements used for this factor require to be reviewed in order to improve the 
measurement. 
Table 5.44: Competence Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A baseline S34, S35, S36, 
S41, S64, S65 
N/A N/A 
Company A final S34, S35, S36, 
S41, S65 
S34, S64, S65 N/A 
Company C1 baseline S41, S64, S65 S34, S35, S36, 
S41 
N/A 
Company C1 final S34, S41, S64, 
S65 
S34, S35, S36 N/A 
Company C2 baseline S34, S35, S36, 
S41, S65 
S64, S65 N/A 
Company C2 final S34, S35, S36, 
S41, S64 
S65 N/A 
Company C3 baseline S34, S35, S41 S34, S36, S64, 
S65 
S34, S65 
Company C3 final S36, S41, S64, 
S65 
S34, S35, S64 N/A 
 
5.5.8 Roles & Responsibilities Quality Factor (S34, S37, S40, S42, S67) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Roles & Responsibilities” quality 
factor are shown in Table 5.45 below.   Most values are less than 0.7 which 
shows that the statements do not appear to have good correlation and may 
not be considered to be reliably measuring the same thing.   It was noted that 
the “value if deleted” analysis showed that minor improvements in the alpha 
coefficient could be achieved by deleting S37 but these were minimal and 
would still not achieve the value of 0.7.   The poor result is primarily attributed 
to there being only five statements in this factor. 
Table 5.45: Roles & Responsibilities Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.775 0.438 0.658 0.649 
Final 0.841 0.815 0.636 0.547 
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Factor analysis for the “Roles & Responsibilities” quality factor is shown in 
Table 5.46 below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for 
measurement of “roles & responsibilities” are split between two factors.   
There appears to be good correlation between S34, S40, S42 and S67.   This 
also suggests that S37 may be adversely affecting the reliability and accuracy 
of this quality factor.   The statements in each of the factors were not 
repeatable between surveys which suggests that they require to be reviewed 
and modified in order to improve the measurement. 
Table 5.46: Roles & Responsibilities Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S34, S40 S42, S67 S34, S37 
Company A final S34, S40 S42, S67 S37, S40 S42 
Company C1 baseline S37, S40 S42, S67 S34, S37, S40 
Company C1 final S34, S37, S40, S42, S67 N/A 
Company C2 baseline S40, S42, S67 S34, S37, S42 
Company C2 final S34, S37, S40 S67 S42 
Company C3 baseline S34, S37, S42, S67 S40, S67 
Company C3 final S34, S37, S42 S40, S67 
 
5.5.9 Safety Culture Quality Factor (S2, S6, S45, S47, S68, S72, S76, S88, 
S89, S90, S92, S93, S94) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Safety Culture” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.47 below.   All values are greater than 0.7 which shows that 
the statements appear to have good correlation and may be considered to be 
reliably measuring the same thing. 
Table 5.47: Safety Culture Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.919 0.946 0.875 0.915 
Final 0.907 0.915 0.951 0.832 
 
Factor analysis has been carried out for the “Safety Culture” quality factor and 
is shown in Table 5.48 below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for 
measurement of “safety culture” are split between four factors and were not 
repeatable between surveys which suggests that they require to be reviewed 
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and modified in order to improve the measurement and reduce the number of 
factors present. 
Table 5.48: Safety Culture Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A baseline S6, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S72, S88, 
S92, S93, 
S94 
S2, S68, 
S72, S88, 
S89, S90, 
S92, S94 
S47, S68, 
S72, S76 
N/A 
Company A final S2, S76, 
S88, S90, 
S92, S93, 
S94 
S2, S45, 
S68, S72, 
S76 
S2, S6, S68, 
S72, S89, 
S90, S93 
S45 S47, 
S88, S92 
Company C1 
baseline 
S2, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S72, S76, 
S88, S90, 
S92 
S2, S6, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S72, S88, 
S89, S92, 
S93 
S45, S68, 
S88, S90, 
S93, S94 
N/A 
Company C1 final S47, S68, 
S72, S88, 
S89, S92, 
S93 
S6, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S88, S89, 
S90, S94 
S2, S68, 
S72, S76, 
S89 
S76, S89, 
S90, S92, 
S93, S94 
Company C2 
baseline 
S6, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S72, S88, 
S90, S92, 
S93, S94 
S45, S76, 
S89, S90, 
S93 
S2, S45, 
S88, S89 
N/A 
Company C2 final S45, S47, 
S68, S72, 
S76, S88, 
S89, S90, 
S92, S93 
S6, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S72, S76, 
S88, S90, 
S93, S94 
S2, S6, S45, 
S47, S92, 
S93, S94 
N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S6, S45, 
S47, S68, 
S72, S88, 
S90, S92, 
S93 
S2, S45, 
S47, S72, 
S76, S88, 
S89, S92, 
S94 
S47, S68, 
S72, S89, 
S93, S94 
N/A 
Company C3 final S45, S88, 
S89, S90, 
S92, S93 
S6, S45, 
S47, S72, 
S76, S92 
S2, S45, 
S47, S89, 
S90, S93, 
S94 
S2, S47, 
S68, S90 
 
5.5.10 Organisational Measures Quality Factor (S11, S12, S16, S17, S48, 
S52) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Organisational Measures” quality 
factor are shown in Table 5.49 below.   It can be seen that Company C3 has 
produced a poor result.   This is attributed to the low sample size and also 
that there were only six statements in this factor. 
   Page 164 of 322 
Table 5.49: Organisational Measures Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.807 0.749 0.756 0.189 
Final 0.851 0.759 0.822 0.662 
 
Factor analysis for the “Organisational Measures” quality factor is shown in 
Table 5.50.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“organisational measures” are split mainly between two factors.   Company 
C3 has again provided a poor result.   The statements in each of the factors 
were not repeatable between surveys which suggests that the statements 
used for this factor require to be reviewed and modified in order to improve 
the measurement. 
Table 5.50: Organisational Measures Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A baseline S11, S12, S16, 
S17 
S11, S48, S52 N/A 
Company A final S11, S16, S17, 
S48, S52 
S11, S12, S16 N/A 
Company C1 baseline S11, S12, S16, 
S48 
S17, S48, S52 N/A 
Company C1 final S11, S12, S17, 
S48 
S12, S16, S17, 
S52 
N/A 
Company C2 baseline S11, S12, S17, 
S48 
S11, S12, S16, 
S48, S52 
N/A 
Company C2 final S12, S16, S17, 
S52 
S11, S12, S16, 
S48 
N/A 
Company C3 baseline S11, S16, S17, 
S48, S52 
S12, S16 N/A 
Company C3 final S11, S12, S48, 
S52 
S17, S48 S16, S52 
 
5.5.11 Empowerment Quality Factor (S3, S5, S8, S54, S56, S62) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Empowerment” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.51 below.   It can be seen that Company C3 has produced a 
poor result.   This is attributed to the low sample size and also that there were 
only six statements in this factor.   Whilst the other values are greater than 0.7 
these may not be valid as a result of the low number of statements being 
assessed. 
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Table 5.51: Empowerment Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.877 0.824 0.800 0.246 
Final 0.619 0.805 0.719 0.916 
 
Factor analysis for the “Empowerment” quality factor is shown in Table 5.52 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“empowerment” are split mainly between two factors.   Company A and 
Company C3 provided poor results.   Factor 1 appears to be very strong in 
most surveys and exclusive in three surveys.   The result shows that the 
series of statements selected appear to have strong correlation and are 
reliably measuring the intended factor. 
Table 5.52: Empowerment Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A baseline S3, S5, S8, S54, 
S56, S62 
N/A N/A 
Company A final S3, S5, S8, S56, 
S62 
S5, S56, S62 S54, S62 
Company C1 baseline S3, S8, S54, S56, 
S62 
S5, S54, S62 N/A 
Company C1 final S54, S56, S62 S3, S5, S8 N/A 
Company C2 baseline S3, S5, S8, S54, 
S56, S62 
N/A N/A 
Company C2 final S3, S54, S56, 
S62 
S3, S5, S8, S54 N/A 
Company C3 baseline S3, S8, S54, S56 S8, S54, S56, 
S62 
S5, S56 
Company C3 final S3, S5, S8, S54, 
S56, S62 
N/A N/A 
 
5.5.12 Procedural Awareness Quality Factor (S9, S11, S12, S14, S15) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Procedural Awareness” quality 
factor are shown in Table 5.53 below.   It can be seen that most surveys have 
produced a poor result.   This is attributed to the low number of statements 
(five) in this factor.   Also, it is noted that negative alpha values have been 
produced by the Company C3 analysis which is indicative of there being poor 
reliability.   This may also be as a result of the low sample size in this survey 
(seven).   Descriptive methods are therefore considered to be more suitable 
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for such situations when the statistical analysis provides a non-robust 
analysis. 
Table 5.53: Procedural Awareness Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.545 0.727 0.684 0.214 
Final 0.405 0.747 0.651 0.447 
Baseline S14 
deleted 
0.725 0.752 0.771 -0.317 
Final S14 
deleted 
0.378 0.834 0.709 0.555 
 
Factor analysis for the “Procedural Awareness” quality factor is shown in 
Table 5.54 below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for 
measurement of “procedural awareness” are split mainly between two factors.   
The result shows that the series of statements selected for this factor 
produced a strong Factor 1 with weaker second and third factors.   The 
analysis shows that the statements selected are reliably measuring the 
intended factor. 
Table 5.54: Procedural Awareness Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A baseline S9, S11, S12, 
S15 
S9, S14 N/A 
Company A final S11, S12, S15 S9, S11, S12 S11, S14 
Company C1 baseline S11, S12, S14, 
S15 
S9, S11, S14 N/A 
Company C1 final S9, S11, S12, 
S15 
S9, S12, S14, 
S15 
N/A 
Company C2 baseline S9, S11, S12, 
S15 
S14, S15 N/A 
Company C2 final S9, S11, S12, 
S15 
S9, S11, S14 N/A 
Company C3 baseline S9, S11, S12, 
S14, S15 
N/A N/A 
Company C3 final S11, S12, S15 S9, S15 S14 
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5.5.13 Management Pressure / Stress Quality Factor (S45, S47, S49, S50, 
S51) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Management Pressure / Stress” 
quality factor are shown in Table 5.53 below.    
Table 5.55: Management Pressure / Stress Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.873 0.820 0.774 0.706 
Final 0.827 0.584 0.784 0.119 
 
It can be seen that most surveys have produced an acceptable result showing 
that the intended aspect is being reliably measured but as there are only five 
statements being assessed this measurement may not be reliable even 
though the alpha coefficients may suggest otherwise.   Company C3 has 
produced a poor result in the final survey. 
Factor analysis for the “Management Pressure / Stress” quality factor is 
shown in Table 5.56 below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for 
measurement of “management pressure / stress” are concentrated within 
Factor 1 which suggests that the intended factor is being reliably measured. 
Table 5.56: Management Pressure / Stress Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A baseline S45, S47. S49, 
S50, S51 
N/A N/A 
Company A final S45, S47. S49, 
S50, S51 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 baseline S45, S47. S49, 
S50, S51 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 final S45, S49, S50 S45, S47 S50, S51 
Company C2 baseline S45, S47. S49, 
S50, S51 
N/A N/A 
Company C2 final S45, S47. S50, 
S51 
S49, S50, S51 N/A 
Company C3 baseline S45, S47. S50, 
S51 
S49, S51 N/A 
Company C3 final S45, S47 S45, S51 N/A 
 
   Page 168 of 322 
5.5.14 Employee Value Quality Factor (S10, S55, S57, S72, S85, S91, S94) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Employee Value” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.57 below.    
Table 5.57: Employee Value Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.867 0.840 0.860 0.866 
Final 0.723 0.872 0.892 0.818 
 
It can be seen that most surveys have produced an acceptable result showing 
that the intended factor is being reliably measured but as there are only seven 
statements being assessed this measurement may not be reliable even 
though the alpha coefficients may suggest otherwise. 
Factor analysis for the “Employee Value” quality factor is shown in Table 5.58 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“employee value” are split between two factors.   The statements in each of 
the factors were not repeatable between surveys which suggests that the 
statements used for this factor require to be reviewed and modified in order to 
improve the measurement. 
Table 5.58: Employee Value Pressure / Stress Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Company A baseline S55, S57, S72, S85, S91, 
S94 
S10, S55, S57, S94 
Company A final S10, S55, S57, S85 S72, S85, S91, S94 
Company C1 baseline S55, S57, S72, S85, S91, 
S94 
S10, S57, S72, S85, S94 
Company C1 final S10, S55, S72, S85, S91, 
S94 
S10, S57, S72 
Company C2 baseline S10, S55, S57, S72, S85, 
S91, S94 
N/A 
Company C2 final S10, S57, S72, S85, S91, 
S94 
S55, S85 
Company C3 baseline S55, S57, S72, S85, S91, 
S94 
S10, S57, S94 
Company C3 final S10, S57, S85, S91, S94 S55, S72, S85, S91 
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5.5.15 Safety Promotion Quality Factor (S18, S56, S66, S69, S71, S73, S74, 
S80, S85, S88, S93) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Safety Promotion” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.59 below. 
Table 5.59: Safety Promotion Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.822 0.850 0.846 0.658 
Final 0.859 0.880 0.820 0.765 
Baseline S73 
deleted 
0.910 0.935 0.896 0.820 
Final S73 
deleted 
0.853 0.910 0.900 0.869 
 
It can be seen that most surveys have produced an acceptable result showing 
that the intended factor is being reliably measured.   The “value if deleted” 
analysis showed that statement 73 was having an adverse effect on the 
overall analysis.   This statement also had an adverse effect in the “My 
manager” section of the questionnaire and should be deleted or modified. 
Factor analysis for the “Safety Promotion” quality factor is shown in Table 
5.60 below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“safety promotion” are split between four factors.   The statements in each of 
the factors were not repeatable between surveys which suggests that the 
statements used for this factor require to be reviewed and modified in order to 
improve the measurement. 
Table 5.60: Safety Promotion Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S18, S66, S69, 
S71, S73, S74, 
S80 
S55, S56, S74, 
S80, S88, S93 
S18, S69, S71, 
S80, S85, S88, 
S93 
N/A 
Company A 
final 
S69, S71, S74, 
S80, S88, S93 
S56, S73, S80, 
S93 
S18, S56, S85, 
S93 
S66, S80 
Company C1 
baseline 
S56, S66, S69, 
S71, S73, S74, 
S80, S85, S88, 
S93 
S18, S69, S73, 
S74, S85, S88, 
S93 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S66, S71, S74, 
S80, S85, S88, 
S93 
S18, S56, S69, 
S71, S88, S93 
S18, S73 N/A 
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Company C2 
baseline 
S18, S56, S66, 
S69, S71, S73, 
S74, S80, S85, 
S88 
S73, S80, S85, 
S88 
N/A N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S56, S69, S71, 
S73, S74, S80, 
S85, S88, S93 
S18, S66, S73, 
S74, S80, S85, 
S88, S93 
N/A N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S66, S71, S73, 
S74, S88 
S74, S80, S85, 
S88, S93 
S18, S56, S73, 
S80 
S18, S69, S80 
Company C3 
final 
S18, S69, S71, 
S73, S74, S80, 
S85, S93 
S56, S66, S69, 
S71, S73, S74 
S18, S71, S85, 
S88, S93 
N/A 
 
5.5.16 Resources Quality Factor (S27, S46, S66) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Resources” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.61 below.   It can be seen that most surveys have produced 
an unacceptable result but this is attributed primarily to the low number of 
statements being analysed.   Descriptive methods or inter-item correlations 
are therefore more suitable. 
Table 5.61: Resources Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.795 0.624 0.445 0.250 
Final 0.609 0.555 0.809 0.591 
 
Factor analysis for the “Resources” quality factor is shown in Table 5.62 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“resources” were exclusively contained within one factor.   This to be 
expected in a factor with only three statements. 
Table 5.62: Resources Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 
Company A baseline S27, S46, S96 
Company A final S27, S46, S96 
Company C1 baseline S27, S46, S96 
Company C1 final S27, S46, S96 
Company C2 baseline S27, S46, S96 
Company C2 final S27, S46, S96 
Company C3 baseline S27, S46, S96 
Company C3 final S27, S46, S96 
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5.5.17 Motivation Quality Factor (S14, S43, S44, S50, S51, S53, S76, S97) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Motivation” quality factor are 
shown in Table 5.63 below.   It can be seen that most surveys have produced 
an acceptable result showing that the intended factor is being reliably 
measured. 
Table 5.63: Motivation Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.492 0.423 0.679 0.143 
Final 0.817 0.397 0.752 -0.27 
Baseline S97 
deleted 
0.722 0.689 0.784 0.360 
Final S97 
deleted 
0.873 0.566 0.857 -0.160 
 
The “value if deleted” analysis showed that statement 97 was having an 
adverse effect on the overall analysis.   This statement also had an adverse 
effect in the “The Organisation” section of the questionnaire.   The statement 
should therefore be modified or deleted from the survey instrument. 
Factor analysis for the “Motivation” quality factor is shown in Table 5.64 
below.   It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of 
“motivation” are split between four factors.   The statements in each of the 
factors were not repeatable between surveys which suggests that the 
statements used for this factor require to be reviewed and modified in order to 
improve the measurement. 
Table 5.64: Motivation Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Company A 
baseline 
S43, S44, S50, 
S51, S97 
S14, S50, S51, 
S97 
S53, S56 N/A 
Company A 
final 
S43, S50, S51, 
S53, S76 
S14, S43, S44, 
S76 
S14, S44, S76, 
S97 
N/A 
Company C1 
baseline 
S14, S43, S44, 
S51, S76, S97 
S14, S44, S50, 
S51 S53, S76, 
S97 
N/A N/A 
Company C1 
final 
S43, S51, S53, 
S76, S97 
S14, S43, S50, 
S51 
S14, S44, S51, 
S76 
N/A 
Company C2 S14, S50, S51, S43, S44, S53, N/A N/A 
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baseline S53,  S76, S97 S97 
Company C2 
final 
S44, S50, S51, 
S53, S76 
S14, S50, S53, 
S76, S97 
S14, S43, S50 N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S14, S53, S97 S43, S44 S44, S50, S76 S50, S51, S97 
Company C3 
final 
S14, S44, S51, 
S53 
S44, S51, S76 N/A N/A 
 
5.5.18 Training Quality Factor (S19, S20, S24, S33, S39, S40, S60, S61, 
S87) 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the “Training” quality factor are shown 
in Table 5.65 below.   It can be seen that most surveys have produced an 
acceptable result showing that the intended factor is being reliably measured. 
Table 5.65: Training Reliability Analysis 
 Company A Company C1 Company C2 Company C3 
Baseline 0.655 0.419 0.694 -0.395 
Final 0.775 0.743 0.743 0.754 
Baseline S20 
deleted 
0.826 0.702 0.849 -0.565 
Final S20 
deleted 
0.824 0.824 0.883 0.845 
 
The “value if deleted” analysis showed that statement 20 was having an 
adverse effect on the overall analysis.   As discussed previously, in the 
“Organisational Measures” analysis section, the survey instrument would 
have a greater reliability value if S20 were to be deleted. 
Factor analysis for the “Training” quality factor is shown in Table 5.66 below.   
It can be seen that the statements chosen for measurement of “training” are 
split between three factors.   The statements in each of the factors were not 
repeatable between surveys which suggests that the statements used for this 
factor also require to be reviewed and modified in order to improve the 
measurement and reduce the number of factors. 
Table 5.66: Training Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Company A 
baseline 
S19, S20, S24, S39 S20, S33, S40, S60, 
S61 
S39, S40, S60, S87 
Company A S19, S20, S24, S33, S19, S20, S60, S61 S24, S60, S87 
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final S39, S40, S61, S87 
Company C1 
baseline 
S19, S20, S24, S33, 
S39 
S33, S40, S60, S61, 
S87 
S20, S24, S39, S40, 
S61 
Company C1 
final 
S20, S24, S33, S40, 
S61, S87 
S20, S33, S39, S40, 
S60 
S19, S20, S24, S33 
Company C2 
baseline 
S19, S20, S24, S33, 
S39, S60, S61 
S19, S20, S24, S33, 
S39, S40, S61, S87 
N/A 
Company C2 
final 
S19, S20, S24, S33, 
S39, S40, S60, S61, 
S87 
S33, S87 N/A 
Company C3 
baseline 
S19, S33, S39, S40, 
S61, S87 
S19, S20, S24, S39 S24, S40, S60, S61 
Company C3 
final 
S20, S24, S33, S40, 
S60, S61, S87 
S24, S33, S39, S61, 
S87 
S19, S20, S33, S60 
 
5.5.19 Safety Culture Reliability / Factor Analysis Conclusion 
The reliability of the survey appears to show a reasonable result with most 
surveys achieving an alpha coefficient value greater than 0.7 for each section 
of the questionnaire. 
In the quality factors analysis the alpha coefficient provided good results for 
those factors with a greater number of statements but less reliable results for 
those with a lower number of statements.   The inter-item correlation values 
are considered to be more suitable methods of measurement for such 
situations, as recommended by Pallant (2007). 
Whilst several strong factors have been identified throughout the safety 
culture survey it is clear that more reliability and factor analysis is necessary 
to enable further development and accuracy of the survey instrument.   Many 
of the factors measured using the inferential methods did not produce good 
results and the reasons for this are primarily the sample size and number of 
statements being assessed. 
It is essential that further analysis and development of the survey instrument 
is carried out using a much greater sample size than those surveys already 
completed, as recommended by Dewberry (2004), in order to provide 
sufficient data for factor analysis to provide reliable results and to build 
confidence in the reliability of the survey instrument. 
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6.0 COLLABORATOR RESPONSE ASSESSMENT 
6.1 Company “A” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output 
6.1.1 All Personnel 
The assessment tool output from the baseline and final safety culture surveys 
for Company A is detailed below.   The quality factors details can be found in 
Appendix D. 
Table 6.1: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.84 4.28 
Maximum safety culture 7.58 6.79 
No of returned surveys 19 12 
Quality factors: mean value 76.18 60.67 
Response total mean value 57.24 53.3 
Maximum Response Total 75.43 70.12 
Management Supervisory 
Maximum quality factors total 149 127.5 
Management Supervisory 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees Indifferent 
responses 
Lowest scoring section: mode Incident 
management 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode The 
organisation 
Competence 
management 
Lowest scoring section: mean Incident 
management 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean The 
organisation 
My manager 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.73 2 6.30 3 
Organisational measures mean 6.04 8 5.54 8 
Incident management mean 5.68 9 5.73 6 
Competence management mean 6.12 7 6.32 2 
Influencing factors mean 6.12 6 5.20 9 
My role mean 6.64 4 5.95 5 
My manager mean 6.70 3 6.33 1 
Communications mean 6.31 5 5.70 7 
The organisation mean 6.90 1 6.23 4 
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The overall safety culture rating has reduced from 4.84 to 4.28 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 11.5%.   The maximum 
safety culture value returned from an individual response has reduced from 
7.58 to 6.79 (10.4%). 
The baseline survey received nineteen responses while the final survey 
received only twelve.   The same number of personnel were employed within 
the department that took part at the time of both surveys (twenty).   This 
shows that the final survey did not receive the same support as the baseline 
survey.   The number of management responses between surveys did not 
change (three).   The potential causes for this reduced number of responses 
have been discussed with the company and these were: 
1. Time / production pressures 
2. Inadequate motivation 
3. Complacent attitude of production personnel 
At the time of the final survey the whole company was under considerable 
time and resource pressures because of the need to fulfil their existing orders 
while still preparing for an increase in production due to new orders.   The 
increased workload was being prepared for with several manufacturing 
process development projects taking up people’s time.   This was in contrast 
to the recent downturn which required a shorter working week being enforced 
for a period of approximately 6 months. 
It was clear that personnel (management and non-management) were under 
pressure to keep up with production requirements and while the health and 
safety manager attempted to encourage the production staff to complete the 
surveys, the workplace priorities at the time simply meant that it was not 
possible to enforce this.   Also, it has to be noted that the company does not 
have a history of any significant health and safety issues and improving the 
health and safety performance of a workplace that already has a good safety 
record (by their own standards and also those of the HSE) is perhaps a lower 
priority given the production pressures present at the time.   It would appear 
that at the time of the second survey a greater focus was being placed on 
production rather than safety and that this approach may increase the level of 
risk present. 
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The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   This 
would suggest an unwillingness of respondents to select the “disagree” 
options for negative statements even when this is actually a positive 
response.   In the final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Indifferent 
Responses”.   Two surveys were identified that had an unacceptable number 
of indifferent responses. 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Incident Management” and the highest scoring modal value 
was “The Organisation”.   Having examined the company’s health and safety 
performance it was no surprise that “The Organisation” section scored highly.   
The statements associated with the “Incident Management” section contained 
three statements in which disagreement is a positive response (S26, S29 & 
S30).   It was considered that there might be a psychological reluctance of 
people to select disagreement responses throughout the survey but the 
analysis carried out for all surveys suggests that this is not the case.   The 
“Organisational Measures” quality factor was sixteenth lowest in the quality 
factors ranking (out of twenty-three) while “Incident Management” ranked 
twentieth.   The “Organisational Measures” and “Incident Management” 
survey sections were equally the next lowest scoring sections which may also 
lend weight to this theory regarding an unwillingness to respond positively to 
disagreement answers.   Another contributing factor may be that as incidents 
and accidents are infrequent, the shop floor operatives may not be aware of 
or familiar with the procedures and processes in place to assess and 
investigate any incidents that occur.   Their knowledge of these aspects of the 
workplace procedures may therefore be compromised leading to non-positive 
or indifferent responses.   The mean values calculated for the baseline survey 
replicated the modal results, i.e. the lowest score was “Incident Management” 
(5.68) and the highest score was “The Organisation” (6.9). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The section with the greatest number of 
highest scores was “Competence Management”.   The next highest modal 
values in the final survey were “The Organisation” and “Safety Culture” (each 
scoring highest with three of the respondents each).   The mean values 
calculated showed that “My Manager” was highest (6.33) while the lowest 
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scoring section was “Influencing Factors” (5.20).   The “Competence 
Management” section mean value (6.32) was only marginally lower than the 
“My Manager” section.   This example serves to highlight why the modal and 
mean values are determined and reported in the assessment tool.   Average 
values can be misleading and should be considered in combination with other 
data to provide the context in which the measurements being calculated are 
made. 
With new employees being taken on and new processing and manufacturing 
equipment systems being designed and constructed, a significant quantity of 
new and refresher training is being carried out throughout the workforce.   
This may be a contributing factor to the “Competence Management” section 
scoring so highly in the final survey.   It is interesting to note that the 
“Training” quality factor ranked only twenty-first out of twenty-three.   The 
response to statement 87 was much worse than it should have been.   This 
statement simply enquires if an induction process is in place.   A strict 
induction process is in place and all employees and contractors require to be 
inducted before being allowed on the shop floor.   The statement should 
therefore have returned a very high number of favourable responses.   In the 
baseline survey, nine people responded indifferently with five selecting agree 
and disagree each.   The management team were very surprised at this 
result.   This would suggest that there is a potential issue with the induction 
procedures.   Additionally the assessment tool may be giving rise to a 
pessimistic training quality factor.   Further examination and development of 
the training and competence assessment statements is necessary to identify 
the cause. 
The mean and mode values for each section of the surveys were calculated 
and ranked as shown in Table 6.1.   The purpose of using both values is to 
ensure that the sections with the lowest scores are given the highest priority 
in terms of defining what aspects of the workplace the implementation of 
corrective measures should be focussed.   These can be antecedent-type 
measures or behaviour-based measures (based on personnel learning from 
or being made aware of the consequences of their actions through training or 
by direct example). 
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The intended purpose of the assessment tool must be referred to in order to 
understand what the output of the tool needs to achieve.   It is a 
measurement aid that enables a company to assess the safety culture in its 
own workplace and assists in ascertaining those aspects most in need of 
corrective measures.   The values representing safety culture and quality 
factors have no extrinsic meaning beyond this assessment tool and are used 
simply to prioritise against other aspects of the safety culture measured in 
exactly the same way.   Those aspects that scored highly or even in the 
middle of the range of results, whilst still important, do not present the issues 
of most significant concern and are therefore relatively unimportant in the 
context of the purpose of the assessment tool.   The tool is predominantly 
intended for use in small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and as such is 
intended only to address those most critical aspects of the workplace one at a 
time.   This method of analysis and rectification is easier to manage than 
addressing all issues at once.   In a large multi-national company where there 
may be many people and departments available to implement such schemes 
it may be possible to tackle an array of issues at the same time but this would 
be very difficult in most SMEs because of the lack of people and resources.   
Such an implementation may also lead to an increased risk if too many 
aspects of the workplace are changed at the same time.   Unless absolutely 
necessary, as a result of imminent danger, it is considered better to make 
many small manageable changes over time than to implement major changes 
all at once as this gives people time to adapt to new methods and therefore 
less likely to make mistakes.   In the case of the prevention of violations being 
carried out a major change through strict antecedent measures would be 
expected.   Unfortunately, the consequences of such measures are not good 
for the violator but they provide an excellent behaviour-based consequence 
learning opportunity for others. 
6.1.2 Management Personnel 
The modified management-only response for Company A is detailed in Table 
6.2 below.   For Company A only three personnel were classified as 
management. 
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Table 6.2: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 6.21 5.55 
Maximum safety culture rating 7.58 6.79 
No of returned surveys 3 3 
Quality factors: mean value 117 94 
Response total mean value 66.08 63.05 
Maximum Response Total 75.43 70.12 
Management Supervisory 
Maximum quality factors total 149 127.5 
Management Supervisory 
Lowest scoring quality value Incident 
management Disagrees 
Lowest scoring section: mode Incident 
management N/A 
Highest scoring section: mode N/A Competence 
management 
Lowest scoring section: mean Organisational 
measures 
Incident 
management 
Highest scoring section: mean The 
organisation 
My manager & 
Safety culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 7.92 2 7.58 1 
Organisational measures mean 6.75 9 6.42 8 
Incident management mean 6.81 8 6.14 9 
Competence management mean 7.33 5 7.25 4 
Influencing factors mean 7.65 4 6.97 5 
My role mean 7.69 3 6.86 6 
My manager mean 7.02 6 7.58 1 
Communications mean 6.83 7 6.75 7 
The organisation mean 8.08 1 7.50 3 
 
The overall safety culture rating has reduced from 6.21 to 5.55 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 10.6%.   Whilst the 
general result is worth noting it would be unwise to make any firm conclusions 
regarding these values as only three personnel are in this category. 
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The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 7.58 to 6.79 (10.4%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Incident Management”.   
This supports the analysis of the survey sections.   In the final survey the 
lowest-scoring quality factor was the “Disagree” statements with “Indifferent 
Responses” ranked just behind it. 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of highest scores 
(the mode) could not be determined as all three respondents scored three 
different sections highest (“Safety Culture”, Competence Management” and 
“The Organisation”).   The section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
was “Incident Management”.   The mean values calculated showed that the 
“The Organisation” section was highest (8.08) while the lowest scoring 
section was “Organisational Measures” (6.75). 
The results from the management personnel show that the “Incident 
Management” section scored lowest.   If the management score is low for this 
factor it is likely that the shop floor workers would score it even lower.   It 
would be expected that the management would know more about those 
procedures associated with incident management, and their implementation, 
than the shop floor workers.   As stated previously, the low accident rate 
already achieved and henceforth the likely unfamiliarity with the incident 
management procedures is expected to have had an impact on this value.    
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) could not be determined as all three respondents scored three 
different sections lowest (“Incident Management, “Competence Management” 
and “Communications”).   The highest-scoring section was “Competence 
Management”.   The mean values calculated showed that “Safety Culture” 
and “My Manager” scored highest equally (7.58) while “Incident Management” 
scored lowest (6.14). 
6.1.3 Non-Management Personnel 
The non-management response for Company A is detailed in Table 6.3 
below.   For Company A, sixteen personnel were classified as non-
management in the baseline survey while in the final survey six personnel 
were in this category. 
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Table 6.3: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.58 3.83 
Maximum safety culture rating 6.83 4.52 
No of returned surveys 16 6 
Quality factors: mean value 68.53 49.58 
Response total mean value 55.59 49.58 
Maximum Response Total 71.86 56.4 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 127 63.5 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees Indifferent 
responses 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors & 
Organisational 
measures 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode The 
organisation 
The 
organisation 
Lowest scoring section: mean Incident 
management 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean The 
organisation 
The 
organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.51 3 5.89 3 
Organisational measures mean 5.90 6 5.29 8 
Incident management mean 5.47 9 5.47 7 
Competence management mean 5.89 7 5.64 4 
Influencing factors mean 5.84 8 4.22 9 
My role mean 6.45 4 5.56 5 
My manager mean 6.64 2 6.00 2 
Communications mean 6.21 5 5.48 6 
The organisation mean 6.68 1 6.04 1 
 
The overall safety culture rating has reduced from 4.58 to 3.83 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 16.3%. 
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The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 6.83 to 4.52 (33.8%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Indifferent Responses”.   
The “Disagrees” factor ranked seventeenth out of twenty-three. 
In the baseline survey there were two sections that scored an equal number 
of lowest scores: “Influencing Factors” and “Organisational Measures”.   The 
highest scoring modal value was “The Organisation”.   The mean values 
calculated showed that the “The Organisation” section was highest (6.68) 
while the lowest scoring section was “Incident Management” (5.47). 
The results from the non-management personnel show that the lowest 
scoring section was “Incident Management”.   Additionally the “Influencing 
Factors” section is the modal value in the baseline (along with “Organisational 
Measures”) and final surveys.   The “Influencing Factors” section may be an 
indicator of the feeling of the workforce as a result of the changes to the 
workplace caused by the recession and recent upturn. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “The Organisation”.   The next highest modal value in the final survey 
was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that “The 
Organisation” scored highest (6.04) while “Influencing Factors” scored lowest 
(4.22). 
6.1.4 Poor Quality Responses Removed: All Personnel 
To determine if those responses judged to be of poor quality could have a 
detrimental effect on the overall assessment of safety culture, the results 
were assessed by removing the data from the assessment tool from surveys 
that had a high number of indifferent responses or a high number of 
consecutive indifferent responses. 
The results of the baseline and final surveys with poor quality responses 
removed are detailed in Table 6.4 below.   For Company A, two such 
responses were recorded for the baseline survey and one in the final survey. 
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The overall safety culture rating reduced from 5.04 to 4.35 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 13.6%. 
Table 6.4: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
All Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 5.04 4.35 
Maximum safety culture rating 7.58 6.79 
No of returned surveys 17 11 
Quality factors: mean value 81.82 62.68 
Response total mean value 58.67 53.84 
Maximum Response Total 75.43 70.12 
Management Supervisory 
Maximum quality factors total 127 127.5 
Management Supervisory 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees Indifferent 
responses 
Lowest scoring section: mode Incident 
management 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode The 
organisation 
Competence 
management 
Lowest scoring section: mean Incident 
management 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean The 
organisation My manager 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.95 2 6.28 4 
Organisational measures mean 6.10 8 5.57 8 
Incident management mean 5.78 9 5.73 7 
Competence management mean 6.28 6 6.44 2 
Influencing factors mean 6.24 7 5.21 9 
My role mean 6.84 4 6.04 5 
My manager mean 6.89 3 6.45 1 
Communications mean 6.46 5 5.76 6 
The organisation mean 7.12 1 6.34 3 
   Page 184 of 322 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 7.58 to 6.79 (10.4%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Indifferent Responses”.   
The “Disagrees” ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three in the final survey. 
In the baseline survey the section with the highest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Incident Management”.   The highest scoring modal value 
was “The Organisation”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “The 
Organisation” section was highest (7.12) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Incident Management” (5.78).   In comparison to the baseline analysis, the 
mean values are slightly different but the modal and mean results from the 
survey sections are unchanged. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “Competence Management”.   The next highest modal value in the final 
survey was “The Organisation” followed by “Safety Culture”.   The mean 
values calculated showed that “My Manager” scored highest (6.45) while 
“Influencing Factors” scored lowest (5.21). 
6.1.5 Poor Quality Responses Removed: Non-Management Personnel 
The results of the baseline and final surveys for non-management personnel 
with poor quality responses removed are detailed in Table 6.5 below.   There 
were two such responses recorded for the baseline survey and only one in 
the final survey. 
The overall safety culture rating has reduced from 4.79 to 3.91 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 18.3%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 6.83 to 4.52 (33.8%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Indifferent Responses”.   
The “Disagrees” ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three in the final survey. 
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Table 6.5: Company “A” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
Non-Management Personnel Only 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.79 3.91 
Maximum safety culture rating 6.83 4.52 
No of returned surveys 14 5 
Quality factors: mean value 74.29 51.8 
Response total mean value 50.08 50.03 
Maximum Response Total 71.86 56.40 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 127 63.5 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees Indifferent 
responses 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors & 
Organisational 
measures 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode The 
organisation 
The 
organisation 
Lowest scoring section: mean Incident 
management 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean The 
organisation 
The 
organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.74 3 5.77 3 
Organisational measures mean 5.96 7 5.30 8 
Incident management mean 5.57 9 5.43 7 
Competence management mean 6.06 6 5.77 3 
Influencing factors mean 5.94 8 4.06 9 
My role mean 6.65 4 5.67 5 
My manager mean 6.86 2 6.20 2 
Communications mean 6.38 5 5.57 6 
The organisation mean 6.92 1 6.25 1 
 
   Page 186 of 322 
In the baseline survey the sections with the highest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) were “Influencing Factors” and “Organisational Measures”.   The 
highest scoring modal value was “The Organisation”.   The mean values 
calculated showed that the “The Organisation” section was highest (6.92) 
while the lowest scoring section was “Incident Management” (5.57).   These 
results are essentially the same as those achieved in the uncorrected non-
management baseline survey.   In comparison to the all-personnel analysis, 
the mean values are slightly different but the modal and mean results from 
the survey sections are unchanged.   This result assists in showing that the 
assessment tool is capable of providing consistent data even in the presence 
of potentially poorly filled in responses. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “The Organisation”.   The next highest modal values in the final survey 
were “The Organisation” and “Competence Management” which scored 
equally.   The mean values calculated showed that “The Organisation” scored 
highest (6.25) while “Influencing Factors” scored lowest (4.06). 
The values calculated are expected to be relatively sensitive as a result of the 
low number of responses in these categories.   Whilst this is not ideal it is a 
factor that is inescapable with small businesses with a low number of 
employees. 
6.1.6 Company “A” Analysis Summary  
It can be seen from the modal and mean assessment calculations that 
“Influencing Factors”, “Incident Management” and “Organisational Measures” 
generally achieved a low ranking while “The Organisation”, “Competence 
Management”, “My Manager” and “Safety Culture” achieved a high ranking. 
It would therefore be prudent for Company A to concentrate its efforts on 
those three aspects that ranked low in the analysis.   It is difficult from the 
outside to determine what measures could be implemented in order to 
improve the “Influencing Factors” responses other than ensuring that the 
company’s good news and continuous progress towards building a full order 
book and fulfilling orders on time and in budget is continuously communicated 
to the personnel.   This is unlikely to lead to a directly significant change in 
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safety culture but is one of the underlying factors concerning operative 
attitudes to the workplace.   A positive attitude should be encouraged. 
It is the author’s view that the low ranking of the “Incident Management” 
section is not as important as the other low ranking sections.   The company 
already has an excellent safety record.   Only three personnel from the team 
surveyed were classified as “management”.   Those personnel would not 
actually carry out accident investigations and incident management on their 
own.   All such investigative activities are handled by the senior health and 
safety management team with assistance from the shop floor supervisory 
personnel.   It is not surprising therefore that this section ranked relatively low. 
The “Organisational Measures” section was ranked lowest or near to lowest in 
most analyses carried out.   The statements in this section relate mainly to 
work procedures, permits to work, worker attitudes to following procedures, 
availability of written procedures and guidance and involvement of the shop 
floor operatives in any proposed modifications to plant or processes being 
considered.   This may be the most effective section of the safety culture to 
address in the first instance.   The aspects of the safety culture addressed in 
this section are those that may present the greatest risk to workers.   The 
corrective measures that could be implemented to rectify this situation would 
be antecedent measures in the first instance such as brief training sessions 
on the procedures in place for routine activities, including permits to work, job 
planning, etc.   Additionally the processes involved in determining what to do 
when an unplanned occurrence takes place can also be reinforced.   Periodic 
communications briefs can be implemented specifically to ensure that 
workers are aware of all information that is relevant to their ability to work 
safely within their allotted roles within the workplace.   This also provides an 
opportunity for face-to-face discussions with line management and senior 
management, thereby building trust and confidence in the workplace 
situation, i.e. teambuilding.   Addressing such issues is also likely to have a 
positive effect on the outcome of the statements in the “Influencing Factors” 
section.   Only detailed analysis of the workplace will highlight the possible 
measures that can be put in place but the analysis tool has provided a good 
estimate of where the company should begin the process. 
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The HSE statistics for the last two years is detailed in Table 6.6 below.   It can 
be seen that for a company with approximately 325 people in total through all 
departments that the figures represent a low accident rate but not so low that 
the company can be complacent. 
Table 6.6: Company “A” Accident Statistics 
Accident Type 2009 2010 
Near miss 
(gas alarms, minor substance release, 
etc.) 
N/A N/A 
Minor accident 
(elastoplasts, etc.) 
31 42 
In-house recordable accident 
(more significant effects than minor, 
production or health and safety 
endangered) 
7 8 
HSE recordable accidents 
(in accordance with RIDDOR) 
0 0 
Lost time injury 0 0 
 
Near misses are not specifically recorded as such in Company A.   They are 
classified as minor accidents, even though no losses are actually 
encountered. 
The company operates a continuous improvement system within the 
production plant.   This system not only addresses faults and unplanned 
incidents that occur but it attempts to implement corrective measures to 
prevent recurrence in the future.   Not only are faults fixed but they are fixed 
better.   This increases reliability and productivity and is likely to have a 
knock-on effect of increasing the level of safety in the plant as a result of 
fewer instances of unplanned and potentially poorly planned maintenance 
activities being carried out.   The company implements this system through 
the guidance provided in a book by Deming (1997).   The company records 
the identification of such proposals for improved operability and productivity 
on what they call their Kaizen forms.   Kaizen comes from the Japanese 
language and means “improvement”.   O’Connor (2002) describes the method 
of continuous improvement being “taken up enthusiastically in Japan, where it 
is called Kaizen”.  
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6.2 Company “C1” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output 
6.2.1 All Personnel 
The output from the safety culture assessment tool for Company C1 is 
detailed in Table 6.7 below. 
Table 6.7: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 5.10 5.22 
Maximum safety culture 8.60 8.20 
No of returned surveys 15 13 
Quality factors: mean value 85.53 86.69 
Response total mean value 58.30 60.07 
Maximum Response Total 82.59 79.34 
Supervisory Management 
Maximum quality factors total 176.5 167 
Supervisory Management 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees Motivation 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture Safety culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean Competence 
management 
The 
organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 7.01 2 7.10 3 
Organisational measures mean 6.20 8 6.30 7 
Incident management mean 6.24 6 6.66 5 
Competence management mean 7.05 1 7.23 2 
Influencing factors mean 5.75 9 6.11 9 
My role mean 6.47 4 6.14 8 
My manager mean 6.23 7 6.38 6 
Communications mean 6.40 5 6.70 4 
The organisation mean 6.95 3 7.44 1 
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The overall safety culture rating has increased from 5.1 to 5.22 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 2.35%.   In contrast, the 
maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response has 
reduced from 8.6 to 8.2 (1.2%). 
The baseline survey received fifteen responses while the final survey 
received only thirteen.   When the baseline survey was taken approximately 
25 people were employed within the department.   When the final survey was 
taken approximately 16 people were employed within the department.   A 
much higher return ratio was therefore achieved for the final survey.   The 
number of management responses between surveys did not change (five).   
The difference between the number of people employed within the 
department was attributed to the installation of new processing plant / 
machinery.   The new plant was substantially automated thereby enabling 
personnel to monitor more than one machine at a time.   The output from the 
department is now double what it was capable of before with a little over half 
the number of people. 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   As 
discussed for Company A this would suggest an unwillingness of respondents 
to select the “disagree” options for negative statements even when this is 
actually a positive response.   In the final survey the lowest-scoring quality 
factor was “Motivation” with “Indifferent Responses” following closely behind.   
Two surveys were identified that had more than 50 indifferent responses but 
the maximum number of consecutive indifferent responses was relatively low 
(nine). 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Influencing Factors” and the highest scoring modal value 
was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the 
“Competence Management” section was highest (7.05) while the lowest 
scoring section was “Influencing Factors” (5.75). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was also “Safety Culture” as found in the baseline survey.   The next highest 
modal values in the final survey were “Communications” and “Organisational 
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Measures” which scored equally (two respondents each).   The mean values 
calculated showed that “The Organisation” scored highest (7.44) while 
“Influencing Factors” scored lowest (6.11). 
6.2.2 Management Personnel 
The modified management-only response for Company C1 is detailed in 
Table 6.8.   Five personnel were classified as management in the baseline 
and final surveys. 
The overall safety culture rating has reduced from 6.26 to 5.60 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 10.5%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 8.6 to 8.2 (4.6%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was the “Strongly 
disagree/Strongly agree Ratio” with “Disagrees” ranked just behind it. 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of highest scores 
(the mode) could not be determined as all five respondents scored different 
sections lowest.   The lowest scoring section was “Organisational Measures”   
The mean values calculated showed that the “My Role” section was highest 
(8.09) while the lowest scoring section was “Organisational Measures” (6.27). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring sections were “Safety 
Culture” and “Competence Management”.   The mean values calculated 
showed that “Safety Culture” scored highest (7.75) while “Organisational 
Measures” scored lowest (6.35). 
The results from the management personnel show a potential issue with 
“Organisational Measures” as it was ranked lowest in three of the four 
assessment factors. 
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Table 6.8: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 6.26 5.60 
Maximum safety culture rating 8.60 8.20 
No of returned surveys 5 5 
Quality factors: mean value 114.8 95.7 
Response total mean value 67.84 63.38 
Maximum Response Total 82.59 79.34 
Supervisory Management 
Maximum quality factors total 176.5 167 
Supervisory Management 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees SD/SA Ratio 
Lowest scoring section: mode Organisational 
measures 
Influencing 
Factors 
Highest scoring section: mode N/A Safety Culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Organisational 
measures 
Organisational 
measures 
Highest scoring section: mean The organisation Safety Culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 7.80 4 7.75 1 
Organisational measures mean 6.27 9 6.35 9 
Incident management mean 6.79 8 6.88 6 
Competence management mean 7.92 3 7.60 2 
Influencing factors mean 7.41 7 6.64 8 
My role mean 8.09 1 6.92 5 
My manager mean 7.77 6 6.95 4 
Communications mean 7.80 4 6.75 7 
The organisation mean 7.99 2 7.54 3 
 
6.2.3 Non-Management Personnel 
The non-management response for Company C1 is detailed in Table 6.9 
below.   Eight personnel were classified as non-management in the baseline 
survey while in the final survey seven personnel were in this category. 
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Table 6.9: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.58 4.97 
Maximum safety culture rating 6.73 7.34 
No of returned surveys 8 7 
Quality factors: mean value 73.88 80.07 
Response total mean value 53.57 58.12 
Maximum Response Total 69.32 76.75 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 126.5 135.5 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Training Motivation 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors My role 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture The 
organisation 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors My role 
Highest scoring section: mean Competence 
management 
The 
organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.56 2 6.73 4 
Organisational measures mean 6.20 4 6.23 6 
Incident management mean 5.97 5 6.59 5 
Competence management mean 6.67 1 6.89 3 
Influencing factors mean 4.91 9 5.69 8 
My role mean 5.71 7 5.52 9 
My manager mean 5.38 8 6.11 7 
Communications mean 5.74 6 6.91 2 
The organisation mean 6.43 3 7.45 1 
 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.58 to 4.97 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 8.5%. 
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The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
increased from 6.73 to 7.34 (9%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Training”.   In the final 
survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Motivation”.   The “Disagrees” 
ranked twentieth in the baseline survey and twenty-second in the final survey. 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
was “Influencing Factors”   The highest scoring modal value was “Safety 
Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “Competence 
Management” section was highest (6.67) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Influencing Factors” (4.91). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “My Role”.   The highest-scoring sections was “The Organisation”.   
The mean values calculated showed that “The Organisation” scored highest 
(7.45) while “My Role” scored lowest (5.52). 
The results from the non-management personnel show that the “Influencing 
Factors” section scored lowest again which would suggest that the shop floor 
operatives feel more at risk than their management counterparts.   This has 
occurred between surveys, i.e. after major changes to the workplace were 
implemented. 
6.2.4 Poor Quality Responses Removed: All Personnel 
The results of the baseline and final surveys with poor quality responses 
removed are detailed in Table 6.10. 
It was noted that the baseline survey contained no such poor quality 
responses and there was only one such poor quality response in the final 
survey.   Fifteen personnel were in the baseline survey while twelve were in 
the final survey. 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 5.1 to 5.4 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 5.8%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 8.6 to 8.2 (4.6%). 
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The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Motivation”.   The 
“Disagrees” ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three. 
Table 6.10: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
All Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 5.10 5.40 
Maximum safety culture rating 8.60 8.20 
No of returned surveys 15 12 
Quality factors: mean value 85.53 91.42 
Response total mean value 58.30 61.38 
Maximum Response Total 82.59 79.34 
Supervisory Management 
Maximum quality factors total 176.5 167 
Supervisory Management 
Lowest scoring quality value Disagrees Motivation 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture Competence 
management 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean Competence 
management 
The 
organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 7.01 2 7.22 3 
Organisational measures mean 6.20 8 6.40 7 
Incident management mean 6.24 6 6.80 5 
Competence management mean 7.05 1 7.40 2 
Influencing factors mean 5.75 9 6.26 9 
My role mean 6.47 4 6.27 8 
My manager mean 6.23 7 6.56 6 
Communications mean 6.40 5 6.82 4 
The organisation mean 6.95 3 7.65 1 
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In the baseline survey the section with the highest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest scoring modal value was 
“Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “Competence 
Management” section was highest (7.05) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Influencing Factors” (5.75).   Other than the highest modal score in the final 
survey, these results are essentially the same as those achieved in the 
baseline survey without the poor quality data being removed.   In the baseline 
survey the highest-scoring modal survey section was “Safety Culture” while 
with the poor quality responses removed the highest-scoring section changed 
to “Competence Management”. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “Competence Management”.   The next highest modal values in the final 
survey were “The Organisation”, “Safety Culture” and “Incident Management” 
all with two respondents each.   The mean values calculated showed that 
“The Organisation” scored highest (7.65) while “Influencing Factors” scored 
lowest (6.26). 
6.2.5 Poor Quality Responses Removed: Non-Management Personnel 
The results of the baseline and final surveys for non-management personnel 
with poor quality responses removed are detailed in Table 6.11.   There were 
eight such responses recorded for the baseline survey and six in the final 
survey.   These also included those surveys that did not have the job role field 
filled in (two in each survey) as it could not be determined whether the 
responses were from management personnel or otherwise. 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.58 to 5.28 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 15.2%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
increased from 6.73 to 7.34 (9%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Training”.   In the final 
survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Motivation”.   The “Disagrees” 
ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three. 
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Table 6.11: Company “C1” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
Non-Management Personnel Only 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.58 5.28 
Maximum safety culture rating 6.73 7.34 
No of returned surveys 8 6 
Quality factors: mean value 73.88 88.42 
Response total mean value 53.57 60.40 
Maximum Response Total 69.32 76.75 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 126.5 135.5 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Training Motivation 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors My role 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety Culture The 
organisation 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors My role 
Highest scoring section: mean Competence 
management 
The 
organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.56 2 6.89 4 
Organisational measures mean 6.20 4 6.43 6 
Incident management mean 5.97 5 6.85 5 
Competence management mean 6.67 1 7.17 3 
Influencing factors mean 4.91 9 5.92 8 
My role mean 5.71 7 5.67 9 
My manager mean 5.38 8 6.42 7 
Communications mean 5.74 6 7.18 2 
The organisation mean 6.43 3 7.86 1 
 
In the baseline survey the section with the highest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest scoring modal value was 
“Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “Competence 
Management” section was highest (6.67) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Influencing Factors” (4.91).   These results are essentially the same as those 
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achieved in the baseline survey.   In comparison to the baseline non-
management analysis, the mean values are slightly different but the modal 
and mean results from the survey sections are unchanged. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “My Role”.   The highest-scoring section modal value was “The 
Organisation”.   The mean values calculated showed that “The Organisation” 
scored highest (7.86) while “My Role” scored lowest (5.67).   It can be seen 
that the mean and modal values are the same. 
6.2.6 Company “C1” Analysis Summary 
It can be seen from the modal and mean assessment calculations that 
“Influencing Factors”, “My Role” and “Organisational Measures” generally 
achieved a low ranking while “The Organisation”, “Competence Management” 
and “Safety Culture” achieved a high ranking. 
It would therefore be prudent for Company C1 to concentrate its efforts on 
those three aspects that ranked low in the analysis.   As described for 
Company A, it is difficult for an outsider to determine what measures could be 
implemented in order to improve the “Influencing Factors” responses.   The 
company has gone through a phase of re-organisation over the past 18 
months and, by their own admission, they have allowed certain 
underperforming personnel to leave the company.   They believe that this has 
assisted them in the reorganisation and has provided a stronger foundation 
on which to base all of their future business activities by ensuring that the 
people that remain have the attitude that the company desires for its 
business.   Production targets have already been surpassed and new 
investment is currently on-going.   A gentle reinforcement of the good news 
would be beneficial in terms of ensuring the workforce is aware of its 
achievements and its goals. 
The “Organisational Measures” section was ranked near to lowest in most 
analyses carried out.   As described for Company A, this may be the most 
effective section of the safety culture to address in the first instance.   The 
aspects of the safety culture addressed in this section are those that may 
present the greatest risk to workers, especially considering the hazards that 
are actually present within this workplace. 
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Table 6.12: Company “C” Accident Statistics 
Accident Type 2009 2010 
Near miss 
(gas alarms, minor substance release, 
etc.) 
27 36 
Minor accident 
(elastoplasts, etc.) 
19 9 
In-house recordable accident 
(more significant effects than minor, 
production or health and safety 
endangered) 
7 5 
HSE recordable accidents 
(in accordance with RIDDOR) 
0 0 
Lost time injury 0 0 
 
The company operates a rigorous safety regime which involves all personnel 
from managing director down to support staff.   The accident record for the 
last two years is noted in Table 6.12 above. 
It can be seen that for a company with approximately 300 personnel on one 
site (made up of many small departments) these accident statistics are 
representative of a very good safety record and potentially, a very good safety 
culture.   The company acknowledges that they are not perfect and they are 
not complacent with this accident rate, hence their willingness to participate in 
this research study.   Given the hazards present on site (highly explosive and 
also pyrophoric gases) and the conditions in which those materials are used 
(5bar & 1700°C within the reactors), the low accident rate is indicative of the 
high regard the team give to safety aspects within the plant. 
Much of the work carried out in the C1 department is procedural and does not 
ordinarily require a great deal of complex decision making.   When an 
unplanned event occurs the personnel are trained for these eventualities in 
terms of how to safely recover from the situation.   This may be by automatic 
plant shutdown systems or by manual intervention. 
As with Company A, the organisational measures that could be implemented 
to improve the scoring of this section would be antecedent measures in the 
first instance with a view to carrying out periodic communications briefs to 
ensure that workers are aware of all information that is relevant to their 
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workplaces, thereby building trust and confidence in the workplace situation, 
i.e. teambuilding while doing so.   As stated previously, addressing such 
issues is also likely to have a positive effect on the outcome of the statements 
in the “Influencing Factors” section. 
The “Training”, “Motivation”, “Communications” and “Disagree” quality factors 
were frequently ranked very low.   These would suggest that people are in 
need of some formal training in order to satisfy them that they have adequate 
skills and knowledge with which to carry out their present duties.   This may 
be a false positive if the personnel are already adequately trained but as long 
this quality factor only achieves a low ranking it should not be dismissed from 
any discussion on how to improve the situation. 
As discussed previously, the “Disagree” quality factor is ranked very low on 
most surveys returned.   This was anticipated hence the insertion of such a 
quality factor and is discussed further in section 7.0 and section 9.0 of this 
thesis. 
The “Training” quality factor is also suspected of providing a false low value.   
Statements 20 and 24 are noted to have provided a consistently poor 
response and these two statements do not relate directly to the majority of 
operatives.   Further analysis of this reveals that if those two statements were 
removed from the training quality factor the ranking would rise from 21st to 
17th.   Whilst this lends weight to show that those two statements are giving 
rise to a falsely low value, the overall quality factor rating is still relatively low 
and consideration should be given to rectification through more training in the 
workplace. 
The “Motivation” quality factor may be scored low if there is an overbearing 
management style in place or if personnel are free to take shortcuts and not 
adhere strictly to written instructions and procedures.   This factor is not so 
much about how good people feel about the workplace but is more about 
what motivates people to do the things they do (especially if this means 
violating safety rules).   Communication of what is acceptable behaviour is 
critically important if this section is to score highly.   Not only that, 
communication of such information is not simply to threaten the workforce 
with punishment if they break the rules but it should be done to ensure that 
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the workforce understand that the antecedent measures in place are there for 
their own safety and that of the plant, i.e. to avoid the potentially irreversible 
consequences of the incidents that may occur if rules are not followed. 
6.3 Company “C2” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output 
6.3.1 All Personnel 
The output from the safety culture assessment tool for Company C2 is 
detailed in Table 6.13. 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.42 to 5.00 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 13.1%.   The maximum 
safety culture value returned from an individual response has increased from 
7.83 to 8.30 (6%). 
The baseline survey received forty six responses while the final survey 
received only twenty-three.   When the baseline survey was taken 
approximately 50 people were employed within the department.   When the 
final survey was taken approximately 30 people were employed within the 
department.   A slightly higher return ratio was therefore achieved for the 
baseline survey.   The number of management responses in the baseline 
survey was ten while in the final survey this was only three.   This department 
has also been substantially reorganised over the past eighteen months and 
as a result of new investment in machines and process plant equipment 
another four personnel have recently been recruited to work in this area. 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Training” closely 
followed by “Disagrees”   In the final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor 
was “Disagrees” and “Communications”. 
Six surveys were identified that had more than 50 indifferent responses but 
the maximum number of consecutive indifferent responses was relatively low 
(eleven).   All returned surveys were therefore considered to be acceptable 
for the purposes of further analysis. 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Influencing Factors” and the highest scoring modal value 
was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “Safety 
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Culture” section was highest (6.65) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Influencing Factors” (5.09). 
Table 6.13 Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.42 5.00 
Maximum safety culture 7.83 8.30 
No of returned surveys 46 23 
Quality factors: mean value 69.22 85.24 
Response total mean value 52.39 56.73 
Maximum Response Total 78.48 78.25 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 152.5 174 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Training Disagrees & 
Communications 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture Safety culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors 
Communications 
Highest scoring section: mean Safety culture Safety culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.65 1 6.99 1 
Organisational measures mean 5.84 5 6.23 5 
Incident management mean 5.85 4 6.41 4 
Competence management mean 6.08 3 6.67 2 
Influencing factors mean 5.09 9 5.92 8 
My role mean 5.76 6 6.18 7 
My manager mean 5.68 7 6.18 6 
Communications mean 5.34 8 5.57 9 
The organisation mean 6.10 2 6.59 3 
 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
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was also “Safety Culture” as found in the baseline survey.   The next highest 
modal value in the final survey was “Competence Management”.   The mean 
values calculated showed that “Safety Culture” scored highest (6.99) while 
“Communications” scored lowest (5.57). 
6.3.2 Management Personnel 
The modified management-only response for Company C2 is detailed in 
Table 6.14.   Ten personnel were classified as management in the baseline 
survey and in the final survey three personnel were classified as 
management.   As stated previously, the low number of personnel in the final 
group may make this analysis highly sensitive to certain factors calculated.   
Whilst this may invalidate the data in a broad sense, it is the same data from 
the same team in any one workplace and the most important measure is the 
difference between baseline and final surveys. 
The overall safety culture rating increased from 5.03 to 5.26 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 4.5%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 7.02 to 6.37 (9.2%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Training”.   In the final 
survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was also “Training”. 
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of highest scores 
(the mode) was “Safety Culture”.   The sections with the greatest number of 
low scores were “Influencing Factors and “My Role” (each with two 
respondents scoring these lowest).   The mean values calculated showed that 
the “Safety Culture” section was highest (7.37) while the lowest scoring 
section was “Communications” (5.95). 
In the final survey no conclusion can be drawn from the lowest-scoring modal 
values as each respondent scored a different section lowest.   The three 
sections that were scored lowest were “Safety Culture”, “Influencing Factors” 
and “Communications”.   Similarly in the final survey three different sections 
were scored highest, namely “Safety Culture”, “Competence Management” 
and “Communications”.   It is interesting to note in this case that all three 
surveys were returned from supervisory staff yet a significant difference 
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appears to be present in terms of the “Safety Culture” section being scored 
lowest and highest within such a small group of similar personnel.    
Table 6.14: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 5.03 5.26 
Maximum safety culture rating 7.02 6.37 
No of returned surveys 10 3 
Quality factors: mean value 83.9 89.0 
Response total mean value 57.74 59.87 
Maximum Response Total 72.15 64.69 
Supervisory Supervisory 
Maximum quality factors total 135 122 
Supervisory Supervisory 
Lowest scoring quality value Training Training 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
Factors & My 
Role 
N/A 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety Culture N/A 
Lowest scoring section: mean Communications Influencing Factors 
Highest scoring section: mean Safety Culture The organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 7.37 1 6.58 5 
Organisational measures mean 6.29 5 6.42 7 
Incident management mean 6.07 7 6.39 8 
Competence management mean 6.27 6 6.92 3 
Influencing factors mean 5.98 8 6.36 9 
My role mean 6.40 4 6.92 2 
My manager mean 6.74 2 6.75 4 
Communications mean 5.95 9 6.58 5 
The organisation mean 6.68 3 6.94 1 
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The mean values calculated showed that the “The Organisation” section was 
scored highest (6.94) while the lowest scoring section was “Influencing 
Factors” (6.36). 
The results from the management personnel show that “Influencing Factors” 
and “Communications” were ranked lowest in three of the four assessment 
factors. 
In the final survey the sample size was not conducive to forming any firm 
conclusions as all three respondents scored the survey sections differently 
(but with some commonality). 
6.3.3 Non-Management Personnel 
The non-management response for Company C2 is detailed in Table 6.15.   
Twenty-nine personnel were classified as non-management in the baseline 
survey while in the final survey twenty personnel were in this category. 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.25 to 4.97 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 16.9%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
increased from 7.83 to 8.3 (6%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Motivation”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   The 
“Disagrees” ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three in the baseline survey. 
In the baseline survey the lowest modal score was “Influencing Factors” 
(eleven respondents) with “Communications” following closely behind (with 
seven respondents); equal with “My Manager”.   The highest scoring modal 
value was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the 
“Safety Culture” section was highest (6.52) while the lowest scoring section 
was “Influencing Factors” (4.85). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that “Safety 
Culture” scored highest (7.06) while “Communications” scored lowest (5.42). 
The results from the non-management personnel also appear to show a 
potential issue with the “Influencing Factors” section. 
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Table 6.15: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.25 4.97 
Maximum safety culture rating 7.83 8.3 
No of returned surveys 29 20 
Quality factors: mean value 65.47 84.68 
Response total mean value 50.94 56.26 
Maximum Response Total 78.48 78.25 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 152.5 174 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Motivation Disagrees 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture Safety culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors Communications 
Highest scoring section: mean Safety culture Safety culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.52 1 7.06 1 
Organisational measures mean 5.77 4 6.20 5 
Incident management mean 5.70 5 6.42 4 
Competence management mean 6.15 2 6.63 2 
Influencing factors mean 4.85 9 5.86 8 
My role mean 5.58 6 6.06 7 
My manager mean 5.29 7 6.09 6 
Communications mean 5.18 8 5.42 9 
The organisation mean 5.88 3 6.53 3 
 
6.3.4 Poor Quality Responses Removed: All Personnel 
The results of the baseline and final surveys with poor quality responses 
removed are detailed in Table 6.16. 
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It was noted that the baseline survey contained no such poor quality 
responses and there was only one such poor quality response in the final 
survey.   This was detected by the number of consecutive responses over the 
last two sections (twenty) with the two final statements not even answered. 
Table 6.16: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
All Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.42 5.08 
Maximum safety culture rating 7.83 8.30 
No of returned surveys 46 22 
Quality factors: mean value 69.22 87.52 
Response total mean value 52.39 57.2 
Maximum Response Total 78.48 78.25 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 152.5 174 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Training Communications 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors 
Influencing factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture Safety culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors 
Communications 
Highest scoring section: mean Safety culture Safety culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.65 1 7.04 1 
Organisational measures mean 5.84 5 6.26 5 
Incident management mean 5.85 4 6.51 4 
Competence management mean 6.08 3 6.71 2 
Influencing factors mean 5.09 9 5.97 8 
My role mean 5.76 6 6.26 6 
My manager mean 5.68 7 6.21 7 
Communications mean 5.34 8 5.60 9 
The organisation mean 6.10 2 6.66 3 
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The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.42 to 5.08 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 14.9%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
increased from 7.83 to 8.3 (6%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Training”.   In the final 
survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Communications”.   The 
“Disagrees” ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three in the baseline and 
final surveys. 
In the baseline survey the section with the highest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest scoring modal value was 
“Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “Safety 
Culture” section was highest (6.65) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Influencing Factors” (5.09).   These results are essentially the same as those 
achieved in the baseline survey without the poor quality data being removed. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   Eight respondents scored this section 
lowest.   The next lowest modal score was “Communications” (with seven 
respondents scoring this lowest).   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “Safety Culture” with seven respondents scoring this highest.   The next 
highest modal values in the final survey were “Competence Management” 
with five respondents scoring this highest.   The mean values calculated 
showed that “Safety Culture” scored highest (7.04) while “Communications” 
scored lowest (5.6). 
6.3.5 Poor Quality Responses Removed: Non-Management Personnel 
The results of the baseline and final surveys for non-management personnel 
with poor quality responses removed are detailed in Table 6.17 below. 
There were twenty-nine such responses recorded for the baseline survey and 
nineteen in the final survey.   These also included those surveys that did not 
have the job role field filled in; seven in the baseline survey and none in the 
final survey. 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.25 to 5.05 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 18.8%. 
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Table 6.17: Company “C2” Assessment Tool Output: Poor Surveys Removed 
Non-Management Personnel Only 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.25 5.05 
Maximum safety culture rating 7.83 8.30 
No of returned surveys 29 19 
Quality factors: mean value 65.47 87.29 
Response total mean value 50.94 56.78 
Maximum Response Total 78.48 78.25 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 152.5 174 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Motivation Disagrees 
Lowest scoring section: mode Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety Culture Safety Culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors Communications 
Highest scoring section: mean Safety Culture Safety Culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.52 1 7.11 1 
Organisational measures mean 5.77 4 6.23 5 
Incident management mean 5.70 5 6.53 4 
Competence management mean 6.15 2 6.67 2 
Influencing factors mean 4.85 9 5.91 8 
My role mean 5.58 6 6.15 6 
My manager mean 5.29 7 6.12 7 
Communications mean 5.18 8 5.44 9 
The organisation mean 5.88 3 6.61 3 
 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
increased from 7.83 to 8.30 (6%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor was “Motivation”.   In the 
final survey the lowest-scoring quality factor was “Disagrees”.   The 
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“Disagrees” ranked twenty-second out of twenty-three in the baseline survey. 
In the baseline survey the section with the highest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest scoring modal value was 
“Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the “Safety 
Culture” section was highest (6.52) while the lowest scoring section was 
“Influencing Factors” (4.85).   These results are essentially the same as those 
achieved in the baseline survey.   In comparison to the baseline non-
management analysis, the mean values are slightly different but the modal 
and mean results from the survey sections are unchanged. 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that “Safety 
Culture” scored highest (7.11) while “Communications” scored lowest (5.44). 
6.3.6 Company “C2” Analysis Summary 
It can be seen from the modal and mean assessment calculations that 
“Influencing Factors”, “Communications” and “My Manager” sections 
generally achieved a low ranking while “The Organisation”, “Competence 
Management” and “Safety Culture” achieved a high ranking.   The “Safety 
Culture” section was ranked highest in every assessment (mode and mean).   
This is in contrast to company C1 (part of the same organisation) in which 
“Influencing Factors”, “My Role” and “Organisational Measures” scored 
lowest.   This analysis shows that even within the same organisation, the 
assessment tool is able to identify departmental differences in safety culture 
and to assist in defining those aspects most in need of attention. 
It would be prudent for Company C2 to concentrate its efforts on those three 
aspects that ranked lowest in the analysis.   However, as the “Influencing 
Factors” section scored lowest overall between Company C1 and Company 
C2 perhaps a unified approach from the whole company to address these 
issues would be best in order to apply any corrective measures to all 
departments. 
The “Communications” section was ranked near to lowest in most analyses 
carried out.   In combination with the “My Manager” section, which also 
scored relatively low in Company C2, this highlighted a particular issue with 
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the management personnel or the management structure within the 
department.   In recognition of this and as part of the restructuring that has 
occurred in this department, the department managers are now located within 
the production area instead of being based in a remote office elsewhere on 
the site.   This has made the management more approachable and the 
company state that this has already had a positive effect on the workplace 
(but unfortunately too late to be measurable in the final safety culture survey). 
As with Company C1, much of the work carried out in the C2 department is 
procedural, using an array of highly complex and potentially dangerous 
machinery.   The work carried out does not ordinarily require a great deal of 
complex decision making from the shop floor operatives. 
The “Training”, “Motivation”, “Communications” and “Disagree” quality factors 
were again ranked very low as found with Company C1.   The quality factors 
therefore serve to show that there are common issues within the site that can 
be addressed as a whole and applied throughout. 
6.4 Company “C3” Analysis: Assessment Tool Output 
6.4.1 All Personnel 
The output from the safety culture assessment tool for Company C3 is 
detailed in Table 6.18. 
The overall safety culture rating has increased from 4.29 to 4.38 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; an increase of 2%.   The maximum 
safety culture value returned from an individual response has increased from 
5.94 to 6.59 (10.9%). 
The baseline survey included seven responses while the final survey included 
twelve.   When the baseline survey was taken approximately twenty-six 
people were employed within the department.   When the final survey was 
taken approximately twenty-two people were employed within the department.   
A much higher return ratio was therefore achieved for the final survey.   The 
number of management responses in the baseline survey was one while in 
the final survey there were three. 
This department provides technical support services to all other departments 
within the site.   It has also been re-organised over the past eighteen months 
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and has lost a few personnel but also changed several more through internal 
transfers. 
Table 6.18: Company “C3” Assessment Tool Output 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.29 4.38 
Maximum safety culture 5.94 6.59 
No of returned surveys 7 12 
Quality factors: mean value 64.86 67.21 
Response total mean value 51.84 52.60 
Maximum Response Total 63.83 69.38 
Technician N/A 
Maximum quality factors total 105.5 120.5 
Technician N/A 
Lowest scoring quality value Motivation & 
Organisational 
measures 
Motivation 
Lowest scoring section: mode Organisational 
measures 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture Safety culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean The organisation Safety culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.24 2 6.51 1 
Organisational measures mean 5.21 8 5.92 4 
Incident management mean 5.79 5 5.73 7 
Competence management mean 5.69 6 5.91 5 
Influencing factors mean 5.06 9 4.80 9 
My role mean 6.13 3 6.18 2 
My manager mean 5.84 4 5.83 6 
Communications mean 5.55 7 5.64 8 
The organisation mean 6.35 1 6.08 3 
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The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factors were “Organisational 
Measures” and “Motivation” which scored equally.   “Disagrees” was ranked 
twentieth out of twenty-three.   In the final survey the lowest-scoring quality 
factor was “Motivation” with “Disagrees” ranked twenty-second. 
Two questionnaires were identified in the baseline survey that had more than 
50 indifferent responses but the maximum number of consecutive indifferent 
responses was relatively low (eight).   In the final survey two questionnaires 
were also identified but the maximum number of consecutive responses was 
still relatively low (fourteen).   All returned surveys were therefore considered 
to be acceptable for the purposes of further analysis.  
In the baseline survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
(the mode) was “Organisational Measures” and the highest scoring modal 
value was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that the 
“The Organisation” section was highest (6.35) while the lowest scoring 
section was “Influencing Factors” (5.06). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was also “Safety Culture” as found in the baseline survey.   The mean values 
calculated showed that “Safety Culture” scored highest (6.51) while 
“Influencing Factors” scored lowest (4.80). 
6.4.2 Management Personnel 
The modified management-only response for Company C3 is detailed in 
Table 6.19.   Only one person was classified as management in the baseline 
survey and in the final survey three personnel were classified as 
management.   It can be argued that such small numbers will not provide 
reliable data but the trend between surveys is also important, irrespective of 
the number of people in the survey. 
The overall safety culture rating decreased from 4.23 to 3.97 between the 
baseline survey and the final survey; a decrease of 6.1%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
increased from 4.29 to 4.88 (13.7%). 
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Table 6.19: Company “C3” Assessment Tool Output: Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.23 3.97 
Maximum safety culture rating 4.29 4.88 
No of returned surveys 1 3 
Quality factors: mean value 64.0 56.67 
Response total mean value 51.07 49.26 
Maximum Response Total 51.07 57.50 
Supervisory Supervisory 
Maximum quality factors total 64.0 74 
Supervisory Supervisory 
Lowest scoring quality value 
N/A 
Safety culture, 
Management 
pressure & 
Resources 
Lowest scoring section: mode N/A Influencing Factors 
Highest scoring section: mode N/A Safety Culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
Factors 
Influencing 
Factors 
Highest scoring section: mean Competence 
management The organisation 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 5.60 5 5.78 2 
Organisational measures mean 5.25 7 5.62 4 
Incident management mean 6.46 2 5.49 7 
Competence management mean 6.50 1 5.62 4 
Influencing factors mean 4.77 9 4.41 9 
My role mean 6.15 3 5.92 1 
My manager mean 5.00 8 5.13 8 
Communications mean 5.50 6 5.58 6 
The organisation mean 5.83 4 5.71 3 
 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factor could not be determined as 
there was only one response in this analysis causing many factors to be 
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scored equally.   In the final survey the lowest-scoring quality factors were 
“Safety Culture”, “Management Pressure” and “Resources”. 
In the baseline survey the section with the highest score was “Competence 
Management” (6.5).   As there was only one response no mode or mean 
rankings were possible.   The section with the lowest score was “Influencing 
Factors” (4.77). 
In the final survey no conclusion can be drawn from the highest-scoring 
modal values as each respondent scored a different section lowest.   The 
three sections that were scored highest were “Safety Culture”, “My Role” and 
“The Organisation”.   The section with the greatest number of lowest scores 
was “Influencing Factors” (all three respondents scored this the lowest).      
The mean values calculated showed that the “My Role” section was scored 
highest (5.92) while the lowest scoring section was “Influencing Factors” 
(4.41). 
The results from the management personnel again show a potential issue 
with “Influencing Factors” as it was ranked lowest in all four assessment 
factors. 
As stated previously the sample size was not conducive to forming any firm 
conclusions in this analysis although some commonality in the responses is 
clearly present. 
6.4.3 Non-Management Personnel 
The non-management response for Company C3 is detailed in Table 6.20.   
Five personnel were classified as non-management in the baseline survey 
while in the final survey six personnel were in this category. 
The overall safety culture rating has reduced slightly from 4.27 to 4.25 
between the baseline survey and the final survey; a reduction of 0.4%. 
The maximum safety culture value returned from an individual response 
reduced from 5.94 to 5.69 (4.2%). 
The baseline survey lowest-scoring quality factors were “Motivation” and 
“Organisational Measures”.   In the final survey the lowest-scoring quality 
factor was “Motivation”.   The “Disagrees” ranked eighteenth out of twenty-
three in the baseline survey an twentieth in the final survey. 
   Page 216 of 322 
Table 6.20: Company “C3” Assessment Tool Output: Non-Management Personnel 
Measured Variable Baseline Survey Final Survey 
Overall safety culture rating 4.27 4.25 
Maximum safety culture rating 5.94 5.69 
No of returned surveys 5 6 
Quality factors: mean value 65.5 63.58 
Response total mean value 51.22 51.62 
Maximum Response Total 63.83 62.88 
Technician Technician 
Maximum quality factors total 105.5 96.5 
Technician Technician 
Lowest scoring quality value Organisational 
measures & 
Motivation 
Motivation 
Lowest scoring section: mode Organisational 
measures 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mode Safety culture & 
Competence 
Management 
Safety culture 
Lowest scoring section: mean Influencing 
factors 
Influencing 
factors 
Highest scoring section: mean Safety culture Safety culture 
 Value Rank Value Rank 
Safety culture mean 6.21 2 6.50 1 
Organisational measures mean 4.95 8 6.14 2 
Incident management mean 5.68 5 5.53 7 
Competence management mean 5.61 6 5.69 5 
Influencing factors mean 4.95 9 4.68 9 
My role mean 6.19 3 5.91 4 
My manager mean 5.92 4 6.02 3 
Communications mean 5.32 7 5.46 8 
The organisation mean 6.39 1 5.69 6 
In the baseline survey the section that scored the greatest number of lowest 
scores was “Organisational Measures” (two respondents) with 
“Communications”, “Competence Management” and “Influencing Factors” all 
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scoring lowest once each.   The highest scoring modal values were “Safety 
Culture” and “Competence Management” equally with two respondents each.   
The mean values calculated showed that the “The Organisation” section was 
highest (6.39) while the lowest scoring section was “Influencing Factors” 
(4.95). 
In the final survey the section with the greatest number of lowest scores (the 
mode) was “Influencing Factors”.   The highest-scoring section modal value 
was “Safety Culture”.   The mean values calculated showed that “Safety 
Culture” scored highest (6.5) while “Influencing Factors” scored lowest (4.68). 
The results from the non-management personnel also appear to show a 
potential issue with the “Influencing Factors” and the “Organisational 
Measures” sections. 
6.4.4 Poor Quality Responses Removed: All Personnel 
It was noted that the baseline survey and the final survey contained no such 
poor quality responses.   The results for this are therefore identical to that 
described for the baseline and final responses (section 6.4.1). 
6.4.5 Poor Quality Responses Removed: Non-Management Personnel 
As stated above there were no poor quality responses from this survey.   The 
results for this are therefore identical to that described for the baseline non-
management and final non-management responses (section 6.4.3). 
6.4.6 Company “C3” Analysis Summary 
It can be seen from the modal and mean assessment calculations that 
“Influencing Factors” and “Organisational Measures” sections generally 
achieved a low ranking while “The Organisation”, “Competence Management” 
and “Safety Culture” achieved a high ranking.   This was a very similar result 
to Company C2. 
Much of the work carried out in the C3 department requires permits to work 
as the personnel frequently enter operational process areas to carry out 
routine and non-routine activities; often requiring process and plant isolations 
to be in place prior to commencing work.   Communications and planning are 
therefore particularly important requirements for this department.   The 
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“Communications” section of the survey was scored lowest by a few 
personnel but never so often that it became the modal survey section. 
The work carried out often requires the personnel to act upon their own 
experience, training and competence in the fulfilment of their tasks.   Some of 
the written comments on the returned surveys referred to the need for senior 
management to be more realistic in terms of how tasks requiring permits to 
work are planned and executed, especially during plant outages.   This is 
reflected in the scoring achieved for “Organisational measures”. 
The “Training”, “Motivation”, “Organisational Measures”, and “Disagree” 
quality factors were ranked very low.   The quality factors measured for 
Company C3 therefore also confirm that common dominant factors have been 
detected by the assessment tool. 
6.5 General Analysis 
6.5.1 Management Scoring versus Non-Management Scoring 
In the tables below it can be seen that in Company A and in the 
manufacturing departments C1 & C2 the management personnel consistently 
provide higher scores than the non-management personnel.   In the service 
department (C3) the opposite is true but the difference is much smaller. 
Table 6.21: Company “A” Management / Non-Management Comparison 
Baseline Non-Management Management 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.58 6.21 
Quality Factors Mean 68.53 117 
Response Total Mean 55.59 66.08 
Final 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 3.83 5.55 
Quality Factors Mean 49.58 94 
Response Total Mean 49.58 63.05 
 
It is worthy to note that the management personnel’s perception of safety 
culture is considerably higher than the non-management personnel in most 
cases.   The “Management” classification for the purposes of this analysis is 
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defined as those responses received from supervisory, professional and 
management personnel (as denoted by the base data fields filled in on the 
front page of each survey).   Non-management responses are therefore the 
responses remaining from technician and support personnel.   In all of the 
safety culture surveys carried out only a small proportion of responses were 
from management personnel.   Such a small sample size makes it difficult to 
form any firm conclusions and any such conclusions must be treated with 
caution. 
There may be many reasons for the perceived difference in safety culture 
between management and non-management personnel.   It is the author’s 
experience that those personnel classified as management in this analysis 
are more aware of the health and safety policies and procedures in place as it 
is they who are responsible for creating and implementing them.   In the 
companies that took part in this research project the non-management 
personnel predominantly receive health and safety information and guidance 
through the line management and formal training processes in place 
(antecedents).   This method of disseminating information may give rise to 
some dilution and shop floor operatives may therefore be less aware of the 
formal arrangements in place. 
Table 6.22: Company “C1” Management / Non-Management Comparison 
Baseline Non-Management Management 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.58 6.26 
Quality Factors Mean 73.88 114.8 
Response Total Mean 53.57 67.84 
Final 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.97 5.60 
Quality Factors Mean 80.07 95.7 
Response Total Mean 58.12 63.38 
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Table 6.23: Company “C2” Management / Non-Management Comparison 
Baseline Non-Management Management 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.25 5.03 
Quality Factors Mean 65.47 83.9 
Response Total Mean 50.94 57.74 
Final 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.97 5.26 
Quality Factors Mean 84.68 89.0 
Response Total Mean 56.26 59.87 
 
Table 6.24: Company “C3” Management / Non-Management Comparison 
Baseline 
 Non-Management Management 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.27 4.23 
Quality Factors Mean 65.5 64.0 
Response Total Mean 51.22 51.07 
Final 
Overall Safety Culture Rating 4.25 3.97 
Quality Factors Mean 63.58 56.67 
Response Total Mean 51.62 49.26 
 
The only way that higher scores can be achieved in the assessment tool is for 
personnel to answer the statements with a greater number of “strongly agree” 
or “strongly disagree” responses. 
It can be seen from the results of the C3 department that this situation is 
reversed and there appear to be good reasons for this.   It was noted during 
the consultations with the company and in the returned surveys that the C3 
department had a particularly strong willed and outspoken team.   Many of the 
personnel in this department are time-served craftsmen / technicians with 
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many years of high tech engineering experience in the hazardous industries.   
The management style within the department also encourages people to 
communicate any issues as a means of rectifying them for the benefit of all.   
A blame culture is almost certainly not present.   The personnel were keen to 
participate in the research as a means of assisting in risk reduction and they 
showed this in their enthusiastic participation. 
6.5.2 Indifferent Responses 
Several surveys were noted to have an unacceptable number of indifferent 
responses or an unacceptable number of consecutive indifferent responses 
(as defined in section 5.2.19).   Analysis of the overall survey results was also 
carried out with these survey responses removed to assess the difference 
that they may have made to the original (complete) results.   It was found that 
an unacceptable number of indifferent responses did little to affect the overall 
assessment tool output in terms of calculating the modal and mean values of 
the survey sections.   There were no surveys returned that had an 
unacceptably high number of “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree” 
responses.   It is clear that such a response would adversely affect the 
outcome of the analysis.   The surveys received assisted in showing that 
human nature favours the neutral option when in doubt or when displaying an 
indifferent attitude. 
6.5.3 Baseline versus Final Mean Values 
There is no strong evidence from the results in the tables above that shows a 
trend for the final survey analysis scoring lower or higher than the baseline 
analysis.   The results from the analysis tool are dependent only on the 
activities, attitudes and influencing factors prevalent at the time that the 
surveys were filled in.   There does not appear to be any specific time related 
factors other than the effect that changes to the workplace can have over a 
given time period. 
6.5.4 Disagrees Quality Factor 
The “Disagree” quality factor consistently ranked very low or lowest for all the 
analyses carried out.   This appeared to show that people were unwilling to 
select the “disagree” answers even when the statement may have been 
worded negatively to prompt such a response.   The results obtained may 
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also point to the fact that people simply selected what they felt were true and 
honest representations of their feelings at that time. 
Further analysis was carried out by cross-linking some specific statements to 
clarify this situation. 
The answers to statements 26 and 30 were compared.   These statements 
are specifically about the people who cause accidents.   Statement 26 asserts 
“The people who cause incidents are not held sufficiently accountable for their 
actions.” while S30 asserts “A trend is present which shows that incidents are 
repeatedly caused by the same people.”   In a good safety culture both 
statements should return “disagree” responses.   The results are shown in 
Table 6.25.   In Company A the mean value for S26 rose from 0.45 to 0.48 
between baseline and final surveys.   In company C1 it rose from 0.48 to 
0.56.   In Company C2 it fell from 0.48 to 0.43 and in Company C3 it rose 
from 0.50 to 0.58.   There is no significant difference between the baseline 
and final surveys for S26.   In Company A S30 response did not change by a 
significant margin.   In Company C1 a similar result occurred.   In Company 
C2 the response fell from 0.61 to 0.57 and in Company C3 it rose from 0.57 to 
0.67.  The responses show a slight improvement between baseline and final 
surveys but very few people actually responded with expected results.   The 
results could be classified as random and therefore not showing that people 
are particularly averse to selecting the disagree response. 
Statements 37, 40 and 42 were also compared.   Statement 37 should 
promote a “disagree” response while the other two should promote “agree” 
responses.   Statement 37 is about the respondent being unsure what to do 
sometimes to maintain health and safety.   Statement 40 should confirm that 
adequate training has been provided to maintain health and safety while 
statement 42 asserts that the respondent is clear about their role in health 
and safety.   There was much more agreement between people on these 
statements and many more responded with the expected results.   It could be 
stated that these statements are more straightforward than S26 and S30 and 
thereby promote fewer indifferent responses and more favourable responses. 
Statements 59 and 65 were compared.   Statement 59 seeks the 
respondent’s view on the working practices of their colleagues in terms of 
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how safely they actually work in practice.   It is worded negatively and should 
promote a “disagree” response.   Statement 65 is a very similar statement but 
is worded in a positive and different manner.   This statement asks about the 
capability of their colleagues to asses risk and act accordingly rather than 
what they actually do in practice.   This statement should promote a positive 
response. 
Table 6.25: Additional Disagree Statements Analysis 
 S26 / S30 S37 / S40 / S42 S59 / S65 
Company A 
Baseline 
2/19 
M:1 NM:1 
4/19 
M:1 NM:3 
5/19 
M:2 NM:3 
Company A 
Final 
1/12 
M:0  NM:0  N/A:1 
4/12 
M:1  NM:1  N/A:1 
1/12 
M:0  NM:0  N/A:1 
Company C1 
Baseline 
1/15 
M:0 NM:1 
10/15 
M:4 NM:6 
3/15 
M:2 NM:1 
Company C1 
Final 
2/13 
M:1 NM:1 
7/13 
M:3  NM:3  N/A:1 
2/13 
M:1 NM:1 
Company C2 
Baseline 
4/46 
M:1  NM:2  N/A:1 
18/46 
M:4 NM:12  N/A:2 
6/46 
M:0  NM:4  N/A:2 
Company C2 
Final 
3/23 
M:1 NM:2 
7/23 
M:2 NM:5 
6/23 
M:1 NM:5 
Company C3 
Baseline 
0/7 
M:0 NM:0 
0/7 
M:0 NM:0 
1/7 
M:1 NM:0 
Company C3 
Final 
2/12 
M:1  NM:0  N/A:1 
4/12 
M:1  NM:2  N/A:1 
6/12 
M:2  NM:2  N/A:2 
M: Management NM: Non-Management N/A: Not available 
(The numbers in the table above are the number of people who responded to the 
statements as described in section 6.5.4.) 
It is clear from the results listed and in the detailed analysis of the statement 
responses that people appear to have a good respect for their colleagues in 
terms of their competency (S65) but less so for their ability to put those skills 
into practice (S59).   Such issues are exactly what behaviour-based safety 
systems of control can rectify.   Intervention can reduce risk in such situations 
when people know that they are doing something wrong but are taking a 
chance on using a shortcut. 
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The analysis shows that people do not appear to be averse to selecting 
“disagree” responses any more than they would the “agree” responses. 
In the charts below the blue bars represent the baseline survey while red bars 
represent the final survey. 
 
Figure 6.1: Company A Colleague Competence Assessment 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Company C1 Colleague Competence Assessment 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Company C2 Colleague Competence Assessment 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Company C3 Colleague Competence Assessment 
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6.5.5 Test Statements (S35, S38 & S87) 
Survey quality is estimated from the responses to these statements.   These 
statements should have prompted a 100% favourable response but this did 
not occur for any of the surveys carried out.   In Company A only S38 
prompted negative responses in the baseline survey while S35 did so in the 
final survey.   In Company C1 all three statements prompted negative 
responses while in the final survey only S35 did so.   In Company C2 negative 
responses were received for all three statements in the baseline survey but 
only in S35 for the final survey.   C2 was the largest survey (with 46 surveys 
returned).   In Company C3 negative responses were recorded for S35 & S38 
in the baseline and final surveys.   This was somewhat disappointing as it 
showed that the respondents either did not take the survey seriously by not 
reading the statements and potential responses with enough care or simply 
that they did not understand the statement.   The answers to the statements 
entered for this purpose should have been so simple (to the respondent) that 
it is difficult to comprehend how better results were not achieved. 
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7.0 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH 
7.1 Research Project Objectives 
7.1.1 Intended Beneficiaries 
This research project was aimed at creating a system of human factors 
assessment that could be used by SME in-house personnel that do not 
possess the underpinning knowledge and understanding the subject would 
normally require.   The system was not intended to replace the role of the 
professional industrial psychologists that are able to implement such methods 
in more depth and with far greater understanding and analysis of the 
situation.   Such implementation may well be capable of identifying all the 
major and minor issues present but this could be a long and expensive 
process.   The intention of this research project was to implement a more 
basic method of identifying the most significant issues thereby enabling the 
company to act upon them and prevent an accident that may have otherwise 
occurred. 
Eighteen companies were contacted to take part in the research; including 
SMEs and multi-nationals; but only two actually took part and they were multi-
nationals.   It is disappointing that no SMEs took part as it means that the use 
of the safety culture assessment tool by in-house personnel could not be 
verified directly.   The tool has been created and made ready for such an 
implementation but this needs to be tested and developed by the companies 
for which it was intended in order to prove its worth and usability. 
7.1.2 Collaborator Commitment 
The companies approached to take part in this research project were mostly 
enthusiastic to take part when they first heard about its aims and what it could 
achieve for them.   When the companies realised that it would require some 
resource and commitment from them they were somewhat cooler to the idea 
of taking part.   The method used to recruit potential collaborators was to 
contact previous and present clients of the author as good working 
relationships were already in place.   It became apparent that many of the 
businesses seemed to believe that HF was some form of magic bullet that 
could be brought in to fix a multitude of problems with little or no cost or 
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resource requirements.   The realisation that this was not the case appears to 
be the point at which most of them decided to withdraw from collaboration. 
None of the companies stated as such but there is a possibility that their 
decision not to take part may have been guided by a concern about the data 
from the surveys getting into the public domain and potentially being used 
against them commercially or even in litigation in the event of an accident. 
7.1.3 Collaborator Activities: Post Survey 
Once the safety culture survey has been analysed the company is then able 
to implement suitable and adequate control and mitigation measures to rectify 
any issues highlighted such as rewriting procedures, purchasing new 
equipment, re-training, etc.   The full implementation of a behaviour-based 
safety system using antecedents, behaviours and consequences (ABC), as 
described previously, may also be implemented.   This stage of the risk 
reduction process appears to be the stumbling block for the businesses 
approached as they seemed to be able to detect what may be required in the 
future before they had even started the process.   It is feasible that the 
businesses may already be acutely aware of their present situation in terms of 
existing hazards and issues and that identifying such things in written form 
may not be a prudent thing to do if they do not want those issues brought out 
into the open.   This is a somewhat negative and cynical hypothesis but it 
cannot be ignored or assumed to be absent from the minds of personnel in 
those companies without them proving otherwise.   Only further collaboration 
and testing of the assessment tool in real SME situations will prove whether 
this is the case or not. 
If a business is to implement an HF assessment system it must be prepared 
to provide sufficient resources to address any issues highlighted in order to 
keep up the risk reduction momentum and to actively promote potentially new 
methods of working.   Until companies attempt to implement such measures it 
is likely that the best they will achieve will plateau based on the antecedent 
measures currently in place. 
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7.2 Safety Culture Survey 
7.2.1 Unnecessary Sections 
In some companies the safety culture survey may be too extensive for their 
requirements.   An example of this is the incident management section.   The 
companies that took part have very good safety records with very few 
incidents per year.   In some cases the statements in this section may 
therefore be considered irrelevant to the shop floor workforce and possibly 
also the middle management.   A low accident rate means that familiarity with 
incident management situations may not be sufficient to answer the 
statements with a high degree of certainty.   This is likely to give rise to a high 
number of indifferent responses but it has been shown that the assessment 
tool is insensitive to such responses and the outcome is not adversely 
affected. 
7.2.2 Balance of Negative / Positive Statements 
In this survey there were eighty-four positively-worded statements and 
fourteen negatively worded statements.   The format and polarity of the 
statements within the survey remained relatively unchanged from the original 
surveys from which they were derived.   In hindsight the survey would have 
been better if there had been a similar number of positive and negative 
statements.   This would have placed less emphasis on the need to consider 
whether people were minded to select “disagree” responses.   The quality 
factor that assesses the ratio between “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree” responses has served to show that this initial concern was not 
apparent in the actual results.   There was also no discernible difference 
between different groups of people in their willingness to answer strongly at 
either end of the scale. 
The quality factors that are used within the analysis would also benefit from a 
more balanced series of statements to ensure that the ratio between positive 
and negative statements was as close to 1:1 as possible.   The same is also 
true for each of the nine different sections within the survey. 
It was also noted that there are sections within the survey that have a high 
number of consecutive positive or negative statements.   The survey would 
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benefit from a more balanced layout that spreads positive and negative 
statements more evenly throughout the survey. 
7.2.3 Survey Quantity 
The number of surveys returned for analysis was low in some cases.   This is 
not considered to be of major concern as the assessment tool was designed 
for use with SMEs which may only have a few people.   The largest survey 
had forty six respondents while the smallest one had only seven respondents.   
It was shown in the assessment tool output that surveys of this size can be 
carried out and that reasonable and repetitive results can be obtained. 
7.2.4 Quality Factors 
The quality factors were created based on the themes addressed by the 
statements in the safety culture survey.   Some factors were ranked 
consistently high while others were ranked consistently low.   Completely 
different factors can be created based on the specific requirements of the 
company carrying out the survey. 
There is no limit to the number of factors that could be introduced to the 
assessment tool but these would require a degree of coding into the 
calculations.   With more development of the assessment tool it is feasible 
that this could be carried out by the company directly.   The assessment tool 
is currently implemented using a spreadsheet but the same functionality could 
be developed into a fully functional standalone application with all such 
configurability embedded within the application. 
7.2.5 Safety Culture Survey Base Data 
A small number of returned surveys did not have the base data filled in.   This 
was in the form of tick boxes just below the safety culture survey instructions / 
guidance on the front page.   The design of the survey front page may be 
such that these statements may have simply been missed by some 
respondents rather than ignored.   Improvements to the survey layout are 
necessary to ensure that such issues are designed out of the forms. 
7.2.6 Safety Culture Survey Reliability 
As described in section 5, the reliability of the safety culture survey could not 
be proven using the data available from this study.   To provide acceptable 
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and reliable factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha coefficient analysis it is 
necessary to conduct surveys with a much greater number of respondents.   
Dewberry (2004) states that around 300 responses is required to provide 
enough data for reliable factoring and analysis.   This presents an integrity 
issue in the short term for this safety culture survey as it needs to be properly 
validated before it can be used with a high degree of confidence that it is 
actually performing the task for which it was intended.   This situation can be 
improved by engaging more businesses to take part in the research.   Clearly 
engaging businesses with a much greater number of employees would be 
beneficial in order to assist in proving the integrity of the safety culture survey 
tool and to assist in developing the sections and statements therein in order 
to assist with its implementation within SMEs. 
The factor analysis carried out shows that there are potentially more factors 
present than desired (and expected) and that the factor analysis results were 
not repeatable between surveys even within the same company.   This would 
suggest that there may be too many statements in each section and that 
perhaps more sections need to be identified with a tighter scope of the aspect 
being measured.   Reduction of the number of items to less than ten in any 
section may result in a better factor analysis but may also result in poorer 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient analysis (Pallant, 2007). 
7.3 General Comment on Research 
This research project has encountered several challenges as listed below. 
• Collaborator recruitment and subsequent withdrawal 
• Part-time study programme 
• Reluctance to seek early help and assistance from supervisors 
The recruitment of participating companies has been a long running problem 
with this research programme.   Many have been recruited only for them to 
drop out later, wasting much time and resource. 
This lack of involvement from the group that represented the main 
benefactors of the research project has precluded the original aims of the 
project from being fully realised as the quantity and type of data collected may 
not be directly applicable to that type of company.   This is not believed to be 
the case but remains a possibility. 
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The part-time study programme is an excellent method of continuing 
academic achievement but it presents a very difficult time management 
situation in terms of balancing commitments to work, home and research.   
This has given rise to a longer than expected research programme. 
The issues encountered with recruitment of suitable collaborators could have 
been handled differently and the effects of these issues on the overall 
research programme could have been minimised if they had been discussed 
with academic and industrial supervisors earlier.   The collaborator issues 
may have had less impact if alternative options had been discussed and 
implemented through discussion of ideas with supervisors. 
7.4 HF Implementation Process (Think, Plan, Consult, Do, Review) 
The five-stage process of human factors implementation as proposed in 
section 2 and subsequently trialled has been found to be suitable for the 
companies that participated.   No significant issues have been identified that 
would prevent the method being applied within SMEs or multi-nationals. 
The “think” and “plan” stages were fundamentally completed prior to 
discussing (consulting) implementation with potential participants.   Once the 
companies agreed to participate the “plan” and “consult” stages were 
completed and the employee survey questionnaires were issued.   The 
consultation phase included discussion of how and when the surveys would 
be distributed to employees and how and when the results would be available 
and presented back to the business.   This phase also included a review of 
the survey questionnaires and to modify as necessary prior to issuing to the 
workforce.   The scope of application within the business was also discussed 
and agreed at the “consult” stage of the implementation process.   The “do” 
phase of the implementation process is comprised of two distinct stages: 
firstly to carry out the baseline survey and secondly to review the survey 
results and implement appropriate improvement measures.   The “do” stage 
prompted more consultation between the author and participating companies 
but, more importantly, prompted consultation within the participating 
companies in identifying potential improvement measures to build a better 
safety culture and reduce risk. 
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After a period of time the review stage commenced with a second employee 
safety culture survey.   The results of the second survey were analysed and 
compared to the baseline survey to determine if the safety culture had 
changed (as measured by the survey analysis tool) as a result of the 
measures implemented by the companies. 
The review phase serves two purposes: firstly, for the participating companies 
to determine where improvements may be implemented thereby promoting a 
better safety culture and reducing risk and secondly, to enable the HF 
assessment system to be reviewed and modified as necessary to develop 
and improve the system for future implementations. 
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Background 
The type of human factors assessment proposed by this research project is 
one that creates a snapshot of the perceived safety culture of a business at a 
single point in time.   The data from this snapshot is then used to prioritise the 
issues raised as a means of applying corrective measures for the reduction of 
risk.   The system therefore attempts to measure the present safety culture 
status with a view to affecting how that status may be changed for the better 
in the future as a result of the rectification of any identified problems. 
In the introduction and background to this research project, several high-
profile example accidents are discussed as examples of what can go wrong 
when the human element of accident causation is inadequately addressed.   
Every day in industry the same errors and failings also play themselves out in 
small businesses in the form of accidents that are not high profile but which 
cause the same injuries and suffering to people just as in the high profile 
cases noted.   The examples are all large companies with a wide array of 
professionally qualified people with which to implement safety systems and 
controls but even in such situations, accidents still occur.   In a small business 
the level of resourcing available is often significantly less than in large 
businesses and those businesses need all the help they can get if they are to 
continually reduce accident rates. 
Not all human errors are immediately detectable.   Covert latent errors within 
systems may only manifest themselves after many years of operation and 
even then, perhaps only after a series of events or factors combine to cause 
the accident.   This is one of the issues of accounting for human error: after 
many years of operation or after doing the same thing countless times, 
humans become complacent and use their previous knowledge and 
experience of a situation to estimate what will happen in the present situation.   
There is an element of behaviour in every human that wants to believe that “it 
won’t happen to them”; but it often does.   If any factors in the present 
situation are different to those previously encountered and not sufficiently 
accounted for then the judgement and decision-making process may be 
flawed, leading to an accident. 
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Human errors can occur at any time in the lifecycle of plant or equipment and, 
as noted above, latent errors may lie dormant for many years before their 
effects are realised.   Only constant review and monitoring can lead to their 
discovery before the accident occurs and effective management systems 
therefore need to be in place to maximise the probability of detecting such 
errors.   In the context of human factors, effective management means a good 
safety culture is present and a good safety culture is one that is comprised of 
the elements listed below. 
• The activities carried out have been correctly assessed and designed; 
• the activities are adequately controlled and monitored and sufficient 
resources are in place to ensure they can be carried out safely; 
• people are adequately trained and competent for the tasks they 
perform and in how to cope with non-routine events that may occur; 
• all near misses and accidents are recorded and treated as a source 
for learning and future prevention; 
• personnel interact with each other at all levels and can have open 
safety discussions without fear of retribution; 
• personnel continually seek to improve the safety and operability of the 
workplace and they are encouraged to do so by management; 
• operating procedures reflect working practice and procedures are 
routinely obeyed and regularly audited; 
• a good balance between production and safety exists and that the two 
are not treated as separate entities: more that they go hand in hand as 
part of the way the business is run and operated; 
• a mutual respect exists between management and shop floor and the 
overall aims and objectives of the business are understood by all. 
This is not a finite list but represents the main factors likely to be present in 
most workplaces that could give rise to unsafe behaviours and accident 
causation. 
8.2 Literature Review 
A literature review was carried out to determine what human factors 
assessment and implementation systems were currently in use.   Many texts 
provide information and guidance on human factors, safety culture and 
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behavioural safety.   None of the literature reviewed actually offered a system 
of analysis that a layman employed within a small business could use.   The 
assessment tool created as part of this research project serves to fill this gap.   
A tool is available from the Health and Safety Laboratory that also performs a 
similar function but is more complex in its application, use and analysis. 
The assessment tool created as part of this research project serves to assist 
in the application of HF methods of risk reduction and can be considered as a 
more simplistic version of what industrial psychologists would assess and 
implement through a full scale implementation.   The tool enables the 
assessment to be carried out with much lower costs and complexity thereby 
enabling the assessment to be carried out by in-house personnel. 
8.3 Safety Culture Survey Design 
The design of the safety culture survey is spread over nine different topics 
and presents employees with a series of statements about their workplace.   
The overall design of the survey in terms of topics and statements presented 
no major issues in the execution of the surveys but it was noted (as described 
in the future work section) that there were elements of the survey that could 
be developed to provide a more balanced set of statements and quality 
factors analysis and to ensure that the base data is properly filled in. 
8.4 Assessment Tool 
The assessment tool was created using a spreadsheet for data entry and 
analysis.   This may not be the most efficient method of implementing such a 
system but the benefits of this are that it makes it easy for small businesses 
to use without the need for purchasing any more specialist software 
packages.   Minimal training would be required (if at all) in order to use the 
tool as all functionality is implemented simply in accordance with using the 
spreadsheet software.   Also, the spreadsheet format allows company-
specific modifications to be implemented quickly and easily.   Its simplicity 
means that it is ultimately configurable by the end user: a key requirement.   
The simplistic data entry and output from the tool masks the many 
calculations and statement response comparisons being carried out within the 
tool.   The intelligence within the assessment tool lies with the statement 
cross-linking that is contained within the spreadsheet formulas and these are 
   Page 236 of 322 
easily modified to suit each company should this be required.   The output of 
the assessment tool enables companies to prioritise what aspects of the 
workplace should be addressed. 
8.5 Data Analysis 
The various graphs and values currently available from the assessment tool 
are shown in Appendix D.   The output shown is for Company A only and 
serves to present an example of what is currently incorporated into the tool 
rather than being provided for detailed analysis of the company’s responses 
and safety culture rating.   The output serves to show that meaningful results 
can be obtained from the assessment tool and that the analysis system 
incorporated is capable of separating out the most critical human factors 
aspects of the business for remediation to be implemented. 
The main output from the tool is the calculation of safety culture values and 
the baseline and final surveys statement comparison bar graphs.   The bar 
graphs display mean values of all the statements.   The values shown on the 
graphs represent the assigned secondary values.   Using the secondary value 
takes account of the negative statements incorporated within the survey and 
means that a 1 is favourable and a 0 is unfavourable irrespective of whether 
the statement is positive or negative. 
The graphs currently available within the tool are the baseline and final 
surveys but other graphs representing the different demographics in place 
would be easily implemented. 
The analysis tool output is dependent on the base data being used to be 
reliable.   The internal reliability and consistency of the safety culture survey 
tool has been subjected to reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient) to 
ensure that the base data is valid.   The internal reliability for each section of 
the safety culture survey tool has been shown to be acceptable with alpha 
coefficient values generally greater than 0.7.   Factor analysis was also 
carried out and it was noted that this did not provide a good result in terms of 
matching factors with questionnaire sections.   Further development of the 
statements within the survey tool is necessary in order to make the desired 
and actual results converge. 
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8.6 General Conclusions 
The overriding finding of this research study is that small to medium sized 
enterprises do not appear to want to change; as evidenced by the number of 
businesses that took part.   Two out of eighteen companies does not show a 
committed approach to the implementation of new methods of risk reduction.   
Whilst those companies may not have been satisfied with their current 
antecedent arrangements and safety performance they showed minimal 
interest in working for a better safety culture.   They all stated they would like 
to see this in their workplaces but none of them were willing to commit to it. 
The two companies that took part already had good safety cultures in place 
with good safety records.   The health and safety managers in those 
companies were not complacent and they were both genuinely concerned for 
the safety and welfare of their employees.   This situation highlights the main 
cause of the non-participation of the small businesses: people are all different 
and they have different levels of care and empathy for others.   The level of 
responsibility and accountability felt and displayed by the managers of the 
companies that took part was far greater than that shown by the people in 
those businesses that did not participate. 
It is therefore postulated that the level of success achieved with any health 
and safety management system or human factors assessment system is not 
dependent entirely on the rules and procedures in place within a company, 
but is more dependent on the professionalism, competence and duty of care 
of those people responsible for the creation, implementation and enforcement 
of such systems, policies and procedures. 
The work carried out as part of this research project shows that it is feasible 
for small to medium sized enterprises to carry out an in-house assessment of 
the safety culture within their own workplaces.   The benefits of doing so are 
continuous safety performance improvements which will ultimately bring with 
it cost reductions in terms of less absenteeism, more efficient processes, less 
accidents, less production down time and hence lower operating costs with 
greater profits. 
The theory stands up well to scrutiny and there is evidence in the referenced 
texts to show that antecedents, behaviours and consequences (ABC) and 
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behaviour-based safety systems (BBS) of risk reduction are effective when 
implemented correctly and with the commitment required.   This commitment 
is one of the weak points of the system as it may require a fundamental 
change in the way people think about their safety in the workplace. 
It is clear that competent people create good safety cultures and that the 
antecedent and behavioural measures in place are only effective if they are 
actually used and enforced.   Human factors assessment of the workplace 
enables all such measures to be reviewed and highlights any underlying 
problems that may be present.   What happens beyond this assessment is 
dependent entirely on the people involved. 
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9.0 FURTHER WORK 
There are several options for taking this research programme further. 
1. Recruitment of many more SMEs to test the assessment tool in real 
workplace situations. 
2. Development and verification of the assessment tool quality factors 
through more collaboration partners. 
3. Consider alternative methods for recruiting SMEs into the research 
programme such as driving participation from the bottom up through 
initiation with union and shop floor operatives rather than from the 
senior management downwards. 
4. Development of the assessment tool to include configurable options for 
company size and complexity, selection of part surveys, selection and 
configuration of new quality factors. 
5. Development of the assessment tool to include guidance on the 
potential measures that can be implemented based on the assessment 
findings. 
6. Development of the assessment tool to include weighting factors to 
assist companies to concentrate on the issues most important to them. 
7. Development of the tool to enable sorting of returned surveys to be 
carried out.   This will enable similar groups of personnel to be 
analysed separately. 
8. Development of the assessment tool to automatically reject or ignore 
those surveys that are judged to be of poor quality. 
9. Development of the tool to be a standalone fully-functional application 
perhaps with a web-based survey and results analysis interface. 
10. Develop guidance and instructions for SMEs to enable them to 
implement the assessment tool in-house with little or no assessment 
tool designer input.   Develop guidance for safety culture re-
assessment recommended frequencies to detect any improvements 
and also (more importantly) to detect any new issues caused by the 
introduction of new control measures. 
11. Seek more involvement with future respondents to determine their 
views on the safety culture survey design and also to determine 
whether they believe that the survey is comprehensive (hence the few 
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written comments received) or if there is anything missing that they 
would preferred to have seen included. 
9.1 Recruitment of More Participating Companies 
The recruitment of more companies is essential if the usefulness and 
repeatability of the assessment tool is to be proven. 
The companies contacted as part of this research programme predominantly 
had high risk situations within the workplace.   Any proposed changes to 
operating procedures or work methods in such situations may be considered 
to present an unnecessarily high risk unless rigorous pre-assessment work is 
carried out. 
An option for progressing this research may therefore lie with those 
companies that have a lower level of inherent risk present but still present 
enough risk such that the HF methods would be able to implement a 
discernible and worthwhile risk reduction. 
A weakness of this research project was the lack of many more suitable 
participating companies.   As noted within this thesis one of the most 
challenging aspects of the research project was to recruit companies to take 
part. 
9.2 Assessment Tool Quality Factors 
There are currently twenty three quality factors within the assessment tool.   
They can be developed to increase accuracy and variance.   Some of the 
factors continuously scored low or high and these need to be examined in 
more detail to determine any particular sensitivities that may be present as a 
result of the statements chosen for their assessment. 
New quality factors can be developed and implemented to suit the 
companies’ particular requirements. 
9.3 Alternative Recruitment Methods 
Using unions and shop floor workers to get companies interested in the HF 
assessment system of risk reduction may be a valid option in some cases.   
The difficulty in attempting such methods is that of identifying the correct 
personnel to initiate such collaboration.   Given the likely support the unions 
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would attract in any such scheme this may well be a strong possibility for 
future development of the system. 
9.4 Assessment Tool Development 
The tool can be developed to make it ultimately configurable by the end user 
to enable it to be modified according to the size, complexity and hazards 
present within the business.   Partial implementation can also be configured 
for the creation of company-specific safety culture surveys with fewer sections 
and statements if this is what is required.   Any such modification would also 
necessitate the safety culture survey tool reliability to be reassessed. 
Based on the assessment tool output of any issues identified the tool can be 
developed to provide guidance to the user as to how these issues may be 
addressed.   This would be based on statistical analysis of the safety culture 
survey and the categorisation of the personnel filling in the surveys, in terms 
of job role, department and employment status.   The guidance given would 
be based on industry best practice for each particular type of industrial 
situation such as chemical plants, manufacturing plants, etc. 
The tool can be developed to include weighting factors for any aspects that a 
company would like to pay particular attention to either permanently or for a 
temporary period to focus on any one particular topic that they are trying to 
rectify.   The weighting assessment system must be formed such that it does 
not degrade or mask other significant issues. 
The assessment tool (as currently designed) requires to be manually modified 
to collate information from any particular group of similar personnel or 
workplace situation.   An enhanced tool would enable all such collation of 
results to be executed much more efficiently. 
When poor quality surveys are detected by the assessment tool the data 
associated with those surveys needs to be manually discarded from the 
analysis.   Development of the tool to automatically reject such poor quality 
surveys (whilst still retaining the data in the background for future reference 
and analysis) would be a welcome and highly usable function. 
It is considered feasible that the tool can be implemented as a standalone 
application, preferably web-based, whereby all surveys and analysis can be 
accessed by a multitude of personnel at any time for the purposes of 
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providing reports and guidance.   Whilst this may be an expensive 
implementation there is evidence to suggest that such software has 
commercial merit.   The experience gained from this research project 
suggests that there are not enough SMEs interested enough to warrant such 
a development at the present time. 
As a means of enabling companies to use the assessment tool as designed 
an instruction manual and guidance document would be essential in order to 
explain how to use the tool and to explain what it is and what it is not capable 
of doing. 
9.5 More Respondent Involvement 
In this research project the intended method of implementation was for 
companies to introduce their employees to the safety culture survey and to 
request them to fill in the surveys as necessary.   Some companies wanted 
more of a hands-on implementation with complete involvement of the author 
overseeing all surveys returned.   It is the view of the author that the best 
solution lies somewhere between the two options described. 
It is impossible for any person to single-handedly oversee every survey filled 
in.   Such tight control and observation of surveys being completed may also 
curtail the willingness of the respondent to answer the statements honestly.   
It would severely affect the perception of a truly anonymous survey being 
possible and again may result in the survey being filled in differently than if 
real anonymity was seen to be in place. 
The main issue found with stepping back from overseeing the completion of 
surveys is that they tend not to be carried out at all or are very slow to be 
carried out.    
A satisfactory alternative is considered to be several people filling in surveys 
at the same time (preferably by computer) to protect anonymity and with a co-
ordinator on standby should any support be required.   These sessions would 
be by pre-arranged appointment thereby ensuring that a formal programme of 
safety culture surveys is adhered to.   These sessions would allow the co-
ordinator to engage the respondents in conversation to determine any 
particular issues they may have encountered with the survey or its intended 
outcome. 
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9.6 Safety Culture Survey Development 
The reliability analysis and factor analysis carried out showed that there may 
be potential issues with safety culture survey tool. 
The sample size in each of the surveys completed was lower than would be 
ideal for the accurate estimation of reliability and factor analysis.   The alpha 
coefficient results, though useful, must therefore be treated with caution until 
the reliability of the survey tool can be proven through repeating the 
assessment with a number of surveys containing a sample size suitable for 
validation. 
Reliability was assessed using SPSS to calculate the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient for each questionnaire section within each survey carried out.   The 
reliability values achieved were generally acceptable with most values being 
greater than 0.7.   Several statements within the survey were identified as 
having an adverse effect on the reliability coefficient.   These statements can 
be modified to remove any ambiguities or simply deleted if the information 
obtained is not considered to be providing significant value to the overall 
survey (whether unreliable or unnecessary). 
Factor analysis showed that there was not a clear identification of one aspect 
to each section of the survey.   The distribution of statements throughout the 
factors identified suggests that a number of separate (but indistinct) factors 
are present within each section.   The safety culture survey tool was formed 
by the agglomeration of statements from several similar surveys and also 
those statements specifically entered by the author.   The original surveys 
from which the statements in this survey were formed were stated to have 
been validated by their original developers (OTR 1999/063, HSE (2001)).   
The formation of a new survey tool with statements from a number of different 
surveys may be the cause of poor factor analysis results. 
As described above, the sample size for achieving a reliable factor analysis is 
approximately 300 (Dewberry (2004).   Such a large number is only likely to 
be achieved with the assistance and participation of large businesses.   This 
research project was primarily for the benefit of SMEs but it would appear that 
a reliable survey tool can only be designed and implemented with the 
assistance of large businesses.   The implementation of the survey and 
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assessment tools in SMEs following development within large business may 
also have inherent issues as a result of the different attitudes and methods of 
working between the two business types.   Development of a reliable survey 
tool within large business may make it unsuitable for use within SMEs without 
some modification. 
The statements within the tool were assumed to be of equal value throughout.   
It is feasible that each statement within the survey does not have the same 
value or relevance and that weighting may therefore be necessary in order to 
accurately measure the real situation.   Further assessment with larger 
sample sizes and development of the survey and analysis tools will be 
necessary to identify, develop and implement any such weighting necessary 
so as to achieve reliable and accurate results. 
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A. APPENDIX: COLLABORATOR PRESENTATION 
 
Care
Removing the Human Factor from Industry 
and Transportation
Culture
Competence
William Rose 4 Square Engineering Consultancy Limited
In association with Napier University
 
 
 
 
Human Factors
 Human Factors
The study of why people do what they do
Assessment of human capability
 Human Factors Engineering
A means of ensuring that people do what they 
should
Guaranteed operation within human capability
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Why we need to care
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Why we need to care
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What can human factors achieve?
 Improved safety performance
Reduced number of accidents, scale of 
effects
 More robust safety management systems
Specification, design, planning, operation, 
maintenance
 Improved training, competence, motivation
 Reduced operating costs
 Better use of existing resources
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Research Project Objectives
 Confirm non-specialist engineers / 
managers can implement HFE with 
positive results
 Create a HFE risk reduction system for 
application within industry / transportation
 Achieve high percentage of the HFE-
related benefits without the associated 
costs of external consultants, e.g. 80% of 
the benefits / 20% of the costs
 
 
 
 
Major Industrial Accidents
 Flixborough
 Seveso
 Grangemouth
 Texas City
 Buncefield
 Arianne 5
 Challenger +
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Review of Common Factors
 Human error
 Incorrect assumptions
Failure to determine / perceive risk
Failure to apply appropriate risk controls
 Management
 Inadequate procedures / systems
 Inadequate personnel competence
 Inadequate safety management system
 
 
 
 
What can be done?
 Enforced regulation – Unwilling Compliance
 Reasons for compliance not always obvious
 Costly to implement but essential (HSE/HSC)
 Requires significant co-operation between government agencies 
and industry (lack of inspectors / very slow process)
 Self regulation – Willing Compliance
 Because you want to - reasons for compliance are obvious
 Common standards and benefits
 Convergence of best practice, improved efficiency / performance
 Shared learning / more robust passage of shared knowledge
 What culture does your organisation operate?
 Does everyone think the same?
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Where does HF begin?
 Assessment of safety-critical decision making processes.
 What factors do people use during decision making?
 On what basis are these factors founded?
 Training, experience, procedures, supervision?
 Assessment of training, experience, competence.
 Assessment of safety culture, human behaviours / 
attitudes.
 Optimised procedures and processes
 Remove human-specific safety decision making by design
 Optimised review processes (safety-critical decision 
making)
 Impartial and open auditing and monitoring systems
 
 
 
 
Partner Collaboration Activity
 Assess current position (survey)
 Identify target areas for addressing 
potential issues
 Apply systems of control and safety 
management
 Monitor / review (8-12 months)
 Reap the benefits
 Measure results (re-survey)
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Partner Benefits
 Strategic review and control of safety-
critical decision processes
 Improved safety performance
 Improved productivity
 Lower operating costs
 Excellent marketing opportunity
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B. APPENDIX – SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The content of this appendix is a description of each statement within the 
survey and the intent of those statements.   The potential significance of the 
responses to those statements is described. 
B.1 Safety Culture Statements 
This series of statements serves to assess people’s perception of their own 
workplace and their own position within that workplace.   All of the answers to 
the “Safety Culture” section are subjective and entirely dependent on a 
respondent’s own experience of the workplace, its systems (physical and 
organisational), its hazards and its risk to them as they carry out their allotted 
tasks. 
Statement 1 asserts “The standard of safety is very high at my workplace.”   
This statement asks about the level of safety being “very high”, i.e. it would 
need to be impeccably high for all respondents to answer strongly agree.   
This would be a highly unlikely outcome.   If the statement had simply been to 
ask if the standard was high then it would be expected that a higher 
proportion of respondents would answer “strongly agree”.   An overall positive 
result is clearly the desired outcome for this statement. 
Statement 2 asserts “It is important to me that there is a continuing emphasis 
on safety.”   This statement serves to discover if the respondent understands 
that safety can never be taken for granted and that people must focus on 
safety-related issues at all times and must build on previous experience and 
knowledge in order to improve in the future. 
Statement 3 asserts “When I see safety rules being broken I point it out 
immediately.”   This statement not only seeks to find out if the correct action is 
taken by the respondent but also to determine if that action is taken 
“immediately” to prevent a potential accident or if it is taken to prevent 
accidents occurring in the future.   This is also a measure of the safety culture 
of the business as it shows whether people feel empowered to intervene 
immediately and stop other people carrying out unsafe acts that may cause 
harm to themselves and others.   Statement 9 (S9) also asks about this 
subject but from the respondent’s viewpoint of the actions of their colleagues 
in a similar situation and by implementing a company policy to do so. 
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Statement 4 asserts “This workplace operates a no-blame safety culture.”   
Most people working within industry will be familiar with the term “blame 
culture” and what it means in practice.   The companies with the best safety 
cultures strive to ensure that the way they operate promotes learning from 
mistakes and near misses without attribution of blame but not all companies 
have reached this goal.   A blame culture within any organisation is not 
conducive to building good relationships founded on trust.   Such a culture 
would indirectly encourage people to withhold information and not report 
accidents and near misses if they could be covered up quietly.   It also serves 
to prevent an on-going culture of learning from previous mistakes and errors.   
A company must therefore do everything in its power to avoid a blame culture 
or a perception of a blame culture being present.   In contrast to setting this 
statement in such a forthright manner, two similar statements are contained in 
the Incident Management section (S22 and S23).   These two statements 
serve to discover if a respondent truly believes if a real “blame culture” is in 
place as a result of their own experience or through colleague views and 
discussions by asking about the incident investigation process in place within 
the business in a less direct manner.   Positive responses to S22 and S23 
would show that a blame culture is not in place.   Disagreement with S4 and 
with these two statements would obviously mean that the respondent has not 
read the statements with enough care and that they believe that a blame 
culture is present through their own experience within the workplace.   It is 
clear that in some cases, especially with violations of procedures and safety 
rules, blame may be attributed to one or more people as a direct result of their 
actions.   In such cases it must be proven without doubt that there are no 
underlying causes or conditions prior to personnel being punished in 
accordance with company procedures and potentially through the judicial 
system if corporate criminal negligence has taken place.   The “blame culture” 
attitude would not apply in such cases as blame could be rightfully attributed 
to someone.   The “blame culture” tag is applied to those businesses that 
don’t have adequate systems of safety management in place such as 
personnel training, procedures, safe work equipment and machinery, PPE, 
etc. and which then subsequently attempt to blame their employees for the 
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errors and mistakes that occur when the root causes are founded in the 
organisational aspects of the business and not on the shop floor. 
Statement 5 asserts “People are willing to report accidents and near misses.”   
This statement is trying to find out if the respondent believes that employees 
are willing to own up to mistakes and errors that have caused incidents with 
the potential to cause harm.   The answer to this statement not only gives us 
a view of their perception of how they see others around them but it also 
provides us with a view (indirectly if a blame culture exists) of whether people 
are afraid of reporting incidents for fear of the consequences.   If there is truly 
a no-blame culture present and all incidents are looked upon as a means of 
learning then this statement should have a high percentage of positive 
responses.   This is one of a series of statements throughout the survey that 
attempt to ascertain the level of employee empowerment in place. 
Statement 6 asserts “Mistakes are corrected without punishment and treated 
as a learning opportunity for all.”   This is another double edged statement 
where we are trying to find out if there is a formal process in place with which 
to officially reprimand people who make mistakes and also to determine 
whether that process is carried out with care and in a manner that treats the 
incident as an opportunity for learning or improvement or if the process is in 
place for the purposes of making people afraid to make similar mistakes in 
future and to potentially give cause for some future official warning or 
dismissal process.   It would be expected in any industrial situation that a 
formal procedure would be in place to reprimand people who make mistakes 
and cause incidents with the potential to harm themselves and others but it is 
how this procedure is enforced that determines the actual safety culture in 
place within the company.   Clearly a high percentage of agreement with this 
statement is desirable but some people may focus on the negative side of the 
statement concerning punishment while others may focus on the more 
positive opportunity for learning from errors.   The perception of the personnel 
is what is important and if the emphasis is on the negative side then there is 
clearly room for improvement and this would suggest that the company’s 
policy is directed more towards a heavy-handed approach rather than the 
learning approach. 
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Statement 7 asserts “I can trust the people who I work with to work safely.”   
This statement requires the respondent to give their view on the practices and 
perceived competence of their colleagues.   Such a statement obviously 
requires some form of reference and the reference or standard to which this 
statement refers is their own safety awareness, safety behaviour and 
competence.   In a team with a good safety culture operating in an industry or 
an environment that contains significant hazards with high risk and which has 
been established for some considerable time this statement should have a 
high positive response.   In such environments it is essential that people can 
trust their colleagues to do the work safely every time as a small incident can 
easily escalate out of control, potentially affecting many others.   A negative 
response to this statement would highlight potentially serious issues with the 
workplace and could point to other factors that may be present such as 
personality clashes between colleagues and managers or perhaps a lack of 
training, equipment or resources with which to carry out work safely.   This 
statement is one of several throughout the survey that attempt to ascertain 
the level of colleague trust that is present. 
Statement 8 asserts “People in this workplace refuse to do work if they feel 
the task is unsafe.”   This statement serves to discover if the respondent 
believes that people are empowered to stop working on the grounds of safety 
or whether there is an underlying emphasis on production at all costs.   If a 
company has a good policy in place for this then the answer should provide a 
high number of positive responses.   It is true that some companies have very 
good policies but if they are not positively enforced in the workplace by the 
actions of supervisors and managers then they are worthless.   Positive 
enforcement of such policies is an essential part of a good safety culture.   
This statement can also be linked to S7.   A high positive response to S8 
should also be reflected in S7. 
Statement 9 asserts “Company policy supports the right of any person to 
intervene in the interests of safety.”   This statement seeks to find out the 
respondents perception of whether employees are empowered to stop unsafe 
acts irrespective of who is responsible through a formal policy implemented 
by the employer.   As discussed in S3 this statement is more about what the 
respondent thinks about their colleagues’ actions in the presence of a formal 
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policy allowing them to do this.   Based on personal experience, a high 
positive response would be expected from this statement as most companies 
with high risk elements to their core business have such policies in place.   
Even without a formal policy in place employees should always feel 
empowered to intervene in the interests of safety.   This statement is 
therefore important in terms of estimating the overall safety culture in place.   
It also adds to the assessment of whether people feel empowered in their 
own roles to look after the safety of others around them. 
Statement 10 asserts “Recognition is given for proactive intervention.”   This 
statement serves to discover if the safety culture of the business is such that 
positive encouragement is given to employees who have a proactive 
approach to safety and also to show whether a business is implementing 
such policies effectively by giving recognition to those personnel 
implementing them through good communications and teamwork.   This is 
one of a series of statements that attempt to ascertain the employee’s 
perception of their value within the business.   It is noted that such a policy 
can be counter-productive to the intended outcome.   Personnel invoking the 
intervention policy can use it to bring about a stoppage for the most trivial of 
reasons and this can build resentment between management and shop floor.   
In such a situation the desired outcome of the management and the person 
invoking a stoppage is clearly different and while this situation continues the 
safety culture of the business is compromised.   The frequency of such 
situations must be minimised and controlled in order to limit the potential 
damage caused. 
B.2 Organisational Measures Statements 
This series of statements serves to assess the respondent’s perception of the 
fundamental safety-related organisational measures that are in place.   All of 
the answers to the “Organisational Measures” section are also subjective.   
There are no statements in this section that can be regarded as providing a 
certain expected response. 
Statement 11 asserts “Written safety rules and procedures are easily 
understood and implemented.”   This statement serves to determine whether 
the respondent has seen written rules and procedures and if so, whether they 
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were easily understood and easily implemented.   The statement serves to 
estimate whether the respondent believes that their competence is suitable 
for the tasks for which they are responsible.   A high positive response would 
show that there are procedures in place.   Along with other answers in the 
survey this statement also serves to determine whether personnel have been 
adequately trained in order to understand and implement them in the 
workplace.   A high negative response could mean that written procedures 
are in place but that they are not easy to understand or that they are not 
written with due cognisance of the actual task to be carried out and are 
therefore difficult to implement in practice.   Whilst a positive response is 
good, a negative response does not define the problem explicitly but 
highlights a potential choice of two issues that need to be addressed. 
Statement 12 asserts “Permit forms and procedures are clear, unambiguous 
and easy to use.”   This statement refers specifically to the clarity of permit to 
work forms and procedures.   The statement tests the respondent’s 
knowledge of the permit to work system and attempts to discover whether a 
permit to work system is actually in place and to what extent training has 
been provided for its implementation in the workplace.   This is another 
statement where a high positive response is desirable.   A high negative 
response would signify that there are clear problems with the permit to work 
system.   A predominantly indifferent response would signify that a permit to 
work system is either not in place, is not implemented as part of normal 
activities or simply that the respondent did not understand the statement. 
Statement 13 asserts “The PTW system is a way of covering people's backs.”   
This statement serves to determine what the respondent thinks of the permit 
to work system in terms of its usefulness in maintaining a safe place of work.   
If the permit to work system was seen as a burden that didn’t add much in 
terms of ensuring safety then it would most likely receive a high positive 
response.   If the permit to work system is being used to its full potential and 
for the correct reasons then a high negative response is desirable. 
Statement 14 asserts “Some health and safety procedures/instructions/rules 
do not need to be followed to get the job done safely.”   This statement is an 
attempt to discover if the respondent knows of the rules and procedures 
associated with their tasks and to determine if they regularly take shortcuts in 
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the tasks they carry out rather than following the procedures.   It also provides 
us with an indication of whether the procedures are considered to be over-
cautious (from the respondent’s viewpoint) and whether the respondent’s 
perception of their own competence is greater than that for which the 
procedures were written in the first place, i.e. we are attempting to discover if 
people are making foolhardy decisions because they think they know better.   
In a team with personnel of vast experience with an excellent safety record 
but with poorly written procedures it may be expected that this statement 
would provide a high positive response (if they are answering truthfully).   The 
same team with well written procedures could give rise to a high number of 
negative responses.   In this scenario the procedures would have been 
adapted and reviewed for the tasks carried out and would therefore be a 
realistic representation of what actually occurs on the shop floor.   An 
experienced team that follows comprehensive, well-written procedures is a 
team that will have a good safety record and will be pleased to defend what 
they do by disagreeing with this statement, i.e. shortcutting safety procedures 
without approval and a good safety case to do so is simply not acceptable. 
Statement 15 asserts “Procedures reflect working practice.”   This is a 
statement that serves to discover if procedures are present and if so, are they 
actually correct in terms of how activities are carried out.   This is similar to 
S14 but is asked much more directly.   This statement should result in a high 
positive response for a company with a good safety culture. 
Statement 16 asserts “Information relative to work activities is easily 
accessible to allow comprehensive work planning.”   This statement will let us 
know if employees have access to all the relevant information necessary with 
which to ensure that the level of safety in the workplace can be maximised for 
the hazards present for any planned activities.   A high negative response 
would be undesirable and would perhaps point towards a team that was open 
to making mistakes or errors as a result of poor communications and planning 
(latent organisational errors).   In a team with a good safety culture such 
issues are likely to be detected prior to any incident occurring but in a team 
that is less organised and less experienced such failures could easily lead to 
more significant events. 
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Statement 17 asserts “Systems are in place to assess the potential impact of 
plant modifications or changes to operating procedures.”   This statement 
seeks to determine if the respondent is aware of the presence of plant 
modification procedures and what kind of modifications that those procedures 
actually refer to.   Their awareness of the procedures also suggests that a 
good communications system is present by which employees are kept 
informed of any potential modifications and developments to the process, 
plant and procedures with which they work.   A significant number of industrial 
accidents and near misses that have occurred in the past have occurred as a 
result of modifications having been carried out to plant or processes without 
due regard having been paid to the effects of those modifications.   This is a 
critically important human factor element of any industrial process with high 
risk activities.   A high positive response is desirable. 
Statement 18 asserts “Staff are encouraged to comment on proposed 
changes before they are implemented?”   This statement serves to determine 
if the company actively involves the affected people in the design of any 
proposed modifications to plant or processes.   It is also used to determine 
management attitudes to the modification procedures in terms of whether 
such procedures are actually in place and to what degree the management 
actually consult and implement these with the affected personnel.   The 
statement is worded in a positive manner by querying respondents on how 
they are encouraged to comment on proposals.   If they feel they are not 
positively encouraged to comment on proposals then this statement should 
result in a high negative response.   A high positive response would suggest 
that a good safety culture is present with good communications in a 
downward and upward direction. 
Statement 19 asserts “Personnel training is updated prior to changes being 
implemented.”   Clearly this statement should always result in a high positive 
response for companies with a good safety culture, where personnel are 
trained in all aspects of any modifications prior to implementation.   The 
statement serves to show whether the management of the company take their 
management of change responsibilities seriously. 
Statement 20 asserts “All personnel are trained in change management 
procedures.”   This statement could be considered to be potentially 
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misleading to the respondent.   It is clear that all personnel within a business 
do not require to be trained in change management procedures.   Only those 
responsible for designing and implementing the changes need be trained for 
the task and as this will be a relatively small proportion of the workforce it is 
expected that this statement will result in a high negative response.   People 
may view selecting the disagree response as an undesirable response and 
they may lean more towards the indifferent or agree response as a result.   A 
high positive response would indicate that people have either not read the 
statement thoroughly enough or that they have misunderstood the meaning of 
the statement. 
B.3 Incident Management Statements 
This series of statements was directed at the respondent’s knowledge of the 
incident management processes within the business.   All of the answers to 
the “Incident Management” section are subjective.   There are no statements 
in this section that can be regarded as providing a certain expected response. 
Statement 21 asserts “The causes of incidents and near misses are 
investigated.”   This is a simple statement that should result in a high positive 
response in all but the worst industrial situations.   Companies that do not 
investigate incidents miss out on a significant source of learning with which to 
improve safety.   A company that does not investigate incidents is also likely 
to score poorly in many other aspects of the safety culture survey. 
Statement 22 asserts “Incident investigation is an open process which 
prevents incidents recurring through good communications.”   This statement 
serves to find out what the respondent thinks about how the management 
carry out investigations and whether they believe that the mode of 
investigation and subsequent communications to the workforce will assist in 
preventing such occurrences in the future.   This statement is also related to 
S4 regarding the presence of a blame culture.   This statement asks specific 
detail of the investigation process rather than simply suggesting a blame 
culture may be present.   A high positive response is the desired outcome for 
this statement.   A high negative response along with a negative response in 
statement 4 would not be a good situation.   This would point towards a 
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company that focuses on blaming people for causing accidents rather than 
coaching them to prevent such accidents occurring. 
Statement 23 asserts “Incident investigations are carried out to discover root 
cause and not specifically to find out who is to blame.”   This statement is 
worded in a more forthright manner and directly links the answers of S4 and 
S22 to reinforce the true feelings of respondents. 
Statement 24 asserts “Personnel are formally trained in incident investigation 
techniques.”   This statement serves to find out if the respondent is aware of 
any formal training received by investigators.   If they are not aware of any 
such training it is feasible that they may still answer positively as a result of 
their own perception of how management actually carry out investigations.   In 
any case a high negative response is an undesirable outcome. 
Statement 25 asserts “Recommendations produced from incident 
investigations are always implemented and enforced.”   This statement serves 
to confirm that the investigation process in place is robust, that it is operated 
by competent management personnel and that there is a real opportunity for 
learning to occur by means of the communication processes in place.   There 
is an emphasis on the word “always” which may sway people away from 
selecting the strongly agree response but the overall response should be a 
high proportion of positives.   This would reinforce earlier statements 
concerning blame culture. 
Statement 26 asserts “The people who cause incidents are not held 
sufficiently accountable for their actions.”   This is a statement that attempts to 
discover primarily if the respondent believes that people who cause accidents 
are properly dealt with.   Additionally, the statement seeks to gauge whether 
the respondent believes that perhaps a stronger disciplinary procedure should 
be in place.   The statement is worded such that the respondent is again 
comparing the performance of others to that of themself.   A high number of 
positive responses would tend to suggest that they believe that their less-safe 
colleagues are reducing the overall performance of the team.   Such feelings 
are unlikely to be dispelled until they have been suitably addressed by 
management in terms of ensuring that all accidents are used as learning 
opportunities for all.   As discussed previously, the main cause of accidents is 
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human error, either caused by systematic failure of training, monitoring, work 
planning, etc. or violations, caused by a wanton attitude of not caring about 
the consequences.   It is the author’s own experience that violators are not 
tolerated by anyone in the high risk industries: the outcome of incidents is 
known and understood by all to be too costly in terms of human life and plant 
operations.   People who make errors as a result of inadequate training, 
experience, etc. are generally regretful for their errors and invariably express 
remorse even though the root cause may have been organisational.   They 
invariably want to improve their performance to prevent future occurrences 
and can be trained to do so.   They have the right attitude and can improve.   
Violators, by virtue of their actions, do not have this care and mutual respect 
for their colleagues and do not care of the consequences to others. 
The statement also uses the strong word “enforced”.   It implies that the 
recommendations from the incident investigation would be implemented by 
some heavy-handed solution.   As a result of the strong wording it would be 
expected that people may not select the strongly agree response, even in 
organisations with such a system in place.   The overall outcome should still 
be a high positive result in the companies with a good safety culture. 
Statement 27 asserts “Adequate resources are provided for incident 
investigations.”   This statement seeks to determine if the respondent believes 
that there are enough suitably trained management personnel in place with 
which to properly investigate incidents.   It is a common belief among 
industrial shop floor workers that there are “too many managers and not 
enough workers”.   Such widely held beliefs would therefore be expected to 
result in a high positive response.   Anything other than this type of response 
would suggest that there may be a problem.   A high negative response would 
be a worrying situation as it would indicate that there was a sufficient number 
of accidents occurring such that there would be a perceived need for more 
resources.   The expected outcome of this statement is an indifferent 
response.   It could be argued that shop floor workers may not be aware of 
the resources in place for such investigations. 
Statement 28 asserts “A formal communications process is in place to ensure 
all relevant personnel are aware of the learning points.”   This statement 
assists in confirming that such a communications process is in place, along 
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with the answers provided to S70, S75, S77, S79, S81, S83 and S86.   A high 
positive response is desirable and would show that the management operate 
a good system of investigation and communication of safety issues.   A high 
negative response would indicate that the system of investigation and 
reporting was inadequate. 
Statement 29 asserts “Management are slow to act on improvements unless 
incidents have occurred.”   This statement serves to find out if the 
management are perceived to have a pro-active or reactive attitude towards 
safety improvements.   Clearly, a high negative response is desirable.   Such 
a response can only occur if there are other systems in place that can be 
used to prevent accidents occurring such as employee suggestion schemes. 
Statement 30 asserts “A trend is present which shows that incidents are 
repeatedly caused by the same people.”   This is a statement that serves to 
determine the respondent’s own perception of whether they believe that a 
small number of people are responsible for the majority of the accidents that 
occur.   Additionally it asks if a trend is present to record this.   It follows that if 
a high positive response is received then this would indicate that the 
management are attempting to monitor the situation.   The presence of such 
monitoring would also suggest that the mentoring, personnel education and 
training systems for those people causing accidents is not achieving the 
necessary results, i.e. an inadequate management system is potentially 
present and this would not be a good indicator for a good safety culture.   
Management competence should be under question along with the 
management selection process. 
Statement 31 asserts “Most incidents occur during routine activities.”   This 
statement seeks to determine whether the respondent believes that accidents 
are caused during routine or non-routine activities.   A high positive response 
would indicate that the business may not be putting enough resources into 
the control and monitoring of routine activities.   A high negative response 
would indicate that the control of non-routine activities is not adequate and 
that additional measures or monitoring of permit to work and work planning 
processes should be implemented.   There is no clear desirable outcome of 
this statement. 
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Statement 32 asserts “When incidents occur a clear incident handling process 
is in place and people are trained in its operation.”   This statement reinforces 
the answers already given in S21 and S23.   A high positive response is 
desirable and would show that there is a transparent process in place which 
the employees believe is properly implemented.   This would also imply that 
the investigating team are sufficiently trained and competent to do so. 
B.4 Competence Management Statements 
This series of statements serves to determine what measures the company 
has in place to ensure that its employees are adequately trained and 
competent for the tasks being carried out.   Most of the answers to the 
“Competence Management” section are subjective.   There are two 
statements (S35 and S38) in this section that can be regarded as providing a 
certain expected response as a result of the measures confirmed to be in 
place within the companies that took part. 
Statement 33 asserts “I have received risk assessment and observation skills 
training.”   Companies with a good safety culture are likely to have provided 
such training as it can give workers an added dimension to their perception 
and recognition of hazards.   This statement also serves to discover if the 
management have realised the value of such basic training and will indicate if 
a good safety culture is present at the senior management level of the 
business. 
Statement 34 asserts “I only work within my capabilities and competencies.”   
This statement seeks to determine if respondents have a clear view of their 
own competence level in terms of the activities carried out.   This statement 
also serves to indicate if employees are ever asked to (or be expected to) 
carry out activities for which they may not have been adequately trained or for 
which they feel that they are not sufficiently competent.   A high positive 
response is desirable but this may disguise potential issues that may be 
present.   If we were to ask a number of drivers if they thought they were a 
good driver the vast majority of them would answer positively.   In an article 
(The Independent) by the then Institute of Advanced Motorists (IAM) Chief 
Examiner (Chris Bullock) it was stated that 86% of 17-24 year olds believed 
themselves to be good drivers.   The latest report on UK road casualties 
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shows that this age group is responsible for 25% of all fatal road collisions in 
the UK: a disproportionate ratio (Department for Transport, 2010).   It is clear 
from this that young drivers overrate their own safety awareness and skill 
levels to a high degree.   Older drivers have far fewer accidents than young 
drivers and can therefore generally be classed as safer drivers.   The same is 
not true for the workplace.   The most recently published statistics show that 
the age group with the greatest number of accidents is the 25-54 year olds 
and that with the fewest is the group below age 25 (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2011).   This outcome is the similar for self-reported injuries and 
RIDDOR injuries.   Safety awareness and safety procedures must be 
reinforced periodically to ensure that the skill levels and competence of 
employees is monitored and maintained to the required standard in order to 
ensure that an adequate degree of safety is maintained.   In this context, 
“adequate” means no accidents. 
Statement 35 asserts “I have an up to date job description clearly stating my 
role, responsibilities and required competencies.”   This is one of the test 
statements within the survey.   The companies that took part in the research 
have good systems in place and are able to provide evidence of such 
documentation and show that it is reviewed periodically.   If the employee 
answers negatively then it shows that either they have not answered truthfully 
or that they genuinely believe that such records do not exist.   Additionally, it 
may mean that they have lost interest in the survey and are not answering 
thoughtfully or that they are attempting to make their company’s attitude to 
safety look worse than it actually is.   A high positive response is desirable 
and anything less than this would suggest that the company has not placed 
enough emphasis on the competence management system to the employees 
(whether the responses are correct or not). 
Statement 36 asserts “A competency mapping system is in place with which 
my competence is periodically measured and recorded.”   This statement is 
clearly linked with the response expected from S35 but is asking directly 
about competence management only.   Companies with the best safety 
culture will have such analysis in place and will be pro-actively looking for 
assurance that their employees have sufficient knowledge, experience and 
training with which to carry out their jobs safely and efficiently.   A high 
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positive response would confirm that such a system is in place and that the 
management values its use by regularly reviewing the status of all employees 
involved in potentially high risk activities.   A negative response would be 
undesirable but may not specifically mean that the people are any less safe 
than those in companies with competence assessment systems.   The 
competence assessment system merely confirms that adequate competence 
is in place.   Provided all employees are competent the system would only be 
used to reinforce and maintain existing competence. 
Statement 37 asserts “Sometimes I am uncertain what to do to ensure health 
and safety is maintained in the work for which I am responsible.”   This 
statement is directed at finding out if respondents ever feel that they are 
potentially at risk in some situations where they may not have the relevant 
competence with which to make safety-related decisions.   A high positive 
response to this statement would raise serious doubts about personnel 
selection and the training and competence assessment systems in place 
within the business.   A high proportion of negative responses is desirable. 
Statement 38 asserts “Compliance with safety rules is a core company value.”   
This is also one of the fundamental test statements.   All companies the 
author has worked with that have high risk activities stress this requirement to 
all people who enter their factories in the company health and safety 
induction.   It is the fundamental principle on which all other activities are 
based.   A negative response to this statement would indicate that, even 
though the company standards require a high degree of professionalism, 
certain people within the business may be willing to overlook these and take 
shortcuts where it suits them, potentially putting themselves and their 
colleagues at risk.   A negative response would also show that the company 
induction and core health and safety policy requirements are not being 
adequately managed or conveyed to employees. 
Statement 39 asserts “I have been consulted to establish my training needs.”   
Most companies now carry out employee assessments or appraisals on a 
periodic basis in which performance and training requirements can be 
discussed.   This is seen as good practice as it gives management and 
employees the opportunity to formally discuss any issues of concern, 
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including training.   All such communications are indicative of attempts to 
build a good safety culture. 
Statement 40 asserts “My training covered all the health and safety risks 
associated with the work for which I am responsible.”   This is also a 
fundamentally important statement to assess whether the employee thinks 
the training is thorough enough for the activities being carried out.   Any 
negative responses to this statement would highlight potentially serious 
issues with the quality of the training received and also perhaps its method or 
pace of delivery.   Negative responses would also highlight potential issues of 
communication between management and employees as such situations 
should not be present for any significant period of time. 
Statement 41 asserts “The competence requirements of my role are 
periodically reviewed.”   This statement reinforces the answer to S35, S36 
and S39.   The responses to all these statements should be broadly similar.   
Any variance would indicate a less than careful approach to the survey or a 
misunderstanding of the statement.   As described above this statement 
should give a high proportion of positive responses. 
Statement 42 asserts “I am clear about what my responsibilities are for health 
and safety.”   This statement serves to reinforce the answers to S34, S37 and 
S40 but in a much more direct manner.   Clearly this statement should result 
in a high proportion of positive responses.   A number of negative responses 
to this statement would be highly undesirable and would be indicative of the 
fundamental health and safety information provided to people as being 
inadequate, incorrect or out of date. 
B.5 Influencing Factors Statements 
This series of statements serves to determine what state of mind the 
respondent was in when the survey was filled in and also what issues may be 
present in the respondent’s own situation.   There are no statements in this 
section that can be regarded as providing a certain expected response. 
Statement 43 asserts “I am confident about my future with the company.”   A 
high positive response is desirable as the respondents will have been in a 
frame of mind that their jobs were safe from the effects of recession and order 
book uncertainties.   A negative response may indicate that the respondents’ 
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answers may not be a true reflection of the actual situation within the 
business or perhaps that the person is doubtful about their own competence 
and capabilities compared to that of their colleagues and how they perceive 
their own security within the business as a result. 
Statement 44 asserts “Motivation among the workforce is high.”   The 
statement serves to determine the respondents’ perception of the morale of 
their work colleagues.   Clearly this is also an indicator of their own morale.   
A high proportion of positive responses is desirable. 
Statement 45 asserts “There is never any pressure to put production before 
safety.   This statement serves to determine the answer to two matters: firstly 
it tries to get behind any kind of protective feelings that the respondent may 
have towards the management style by telling us if the management have a 
culture of pressurising employees to break rules and procedures and 
secondly it tells us if there is a culture of favouring production over safety.   A 
high proportion of positive responses is desirable. 
Statement 46 asserts “There are always enough people to get the job done 
safely.”   This statement serves to determine if the respondent has personal 
experience of being under pressure due to the lack of resources.   It is fair to 
say that people will always tend to state that there are never enough 
resources and this is considered to be an expected response without coming 
to any specific strong conclusions.   A high number of negative responses 
may suggest that a resource problem is present within the workplace but the 
response to this statement would not be treated as a strong indicator as a 
result of the tendency for respondents to answer negatively irrespective of the 
real situation.   Such a shortfall in resources would most likely be recognised 
through the supervisory system rather than through a safety culture survey.   
A high proportion of positive responses would be the desired response to this 
statement. 
Statement 47 asserts “The company would stop us working due to safety 
concerns, even if it meant losing money.”   This statement serves to 
determine how deep the culture of safety is within the management style of 
the business.   The response to this statement serves to reinforce the answer 
given to S45 but it is asked in a different manner with the emphasis on the 
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financial penalty of the business for doing so rather than simply the 
management style. 
Statement 48 asserts “Systems and checks are in place to ensure that safety 
is adequately prioritised by operational staff.”   This statement serves to 
determine whether an on-going system of monitoring is in place with which 
the respondent is able to have an input to or receive information from 
regarding the safety status of their own workplace situation.   A high positive 
response is desirable which would show that such monitoring systems are in 
place and that the management style is one which constantly reviews the 
situation and feeds back information to the workforce in order to prevent 
careless and lazy practices from setting in. 
Statement 49 asserts “My supervisor is aware of the risks and pressures I 
work under.”   This statement tells us two things again: firstly it confirms the 
obvious response that the supervisor is able to understand the pressures of 
the role that the respondent fulfils and secondly: it tells us that there is an 
effective communication process between employee and supervisor.   A high 
proportion of positive responses is desirable. 
Statement 50 asserts “I can get the job done quicker by ignoring some safety 
rules.”   This statement serves to determine several things.   Firstly, it 
provides an indication of the respondent’s attitude towards safety rules and 
procedures.   Secondly it tells us if the respondent is likely to have broken 
safety rules in the past and if they have the attitude to continue to do so.   
Thirdly it tells us that the management system is ineffective as it allows for 
such violations to occur.   Admittedly, a high positive response may simply 
mean that the respondent is stating that they could do things quicker but it is 
not a clear indication that they have actually done so or ever would.   The 
most that could be read into a positive response is that the respondent has 
the attitude that they think they know better than the rules and procedures in 
place to keep themselves safe.   It is this attitude that must be changed to 
improve the safety culture of the workplace.   Even in an anonymous survey it 
is debatable whether people would respond truthfully to this statement.   The 
ABC method of observing behaviours and providing immediate feedback is 
more likely to identify such issues in practice. 
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Statement 51 asserts “Sometimes it is necessary to ignore safety rules to 
maintain production.”   This statement directly asks the respondent if they are 
aware of safety rules being broken for the purposes of maintaining 
production.   The response to this statement reinforces the answers to S45, 
S47 and S50.   A high negative response is desirable for this statement.   
Anything other than this would indicate a serious failure of management to set 
and maintain appropriate safety behaviour. 
Statement 52 asserts “My workplace is designed such that ergonomics / 
human capability issues are routinely assessed and rectified.”   This 
statement serves to determine if the respondent is content with the loads and 
position of the work carried out is within their capability.   A high proportion of 
positive responses would indicate that management have considered the 
physical effects of the work carried out. 
Statement 53 asserts” I sometimes take shortcuts which involve little or no 
risk.”   This statement determines whether the respondent has taken 
shortcuts, which may be a clear breach of safety rules, and it also gives us an 
indication of the respondent’s perception of their own competence level in 
terms of hazard recognition and workplace risk assessment.   A high 
proportion of positive responses may indicate a highly skilled and competent 
autonomous workforce that is able to take effective safety-related decisions at 
all times though this must be seen as an exception as such a situation is 
highly unlikely in practice.   This would be a good situation to be in but is 
unlikely to be effective 100% of the time and the gap must be filled with 
antecedents such as safety rules and procedures to provide the baseline level 
of safety on which no leeway can be given.   If such a situation were to exist it 
would suggest that the existing rules and procedures were inadequate.   A 
high proportion of negative responses may indicate that the management 
style may be too overbearing and may not allow competent people the 
freedom with which to do things more efficiently but still with an adequate 
level of safety or simply that the procedures are adequate and that there is no 
need to take shortcuts. 
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B.6 My Role Statements 
This series of statements serves to determine the level of engagement and 
empowerment felt by respondents, especially in safety management issues. 
There are no statements in this section that can be regarded as providing a 
certain expected response. 
Statement 54 asserts “I can influence health and safety performance in the 
workplace.”   This statement serves to determine if the respondent is 
empowered and capable of promoting and improving safety in the workplace.   
It also tells us if the safety management system is capable of using the 
information provided by employees and is able to respond by changing things 
for the better.   A high proportion of negative responses would indicate that 
people may be feeling devalued by the management style in force. 
Statement 55 asserts “My input is valued when health and safety procedures, 
instructions and rules are developed or reviewed.”   This statement not only 
tells us if the respondent’s views are sought when safety procedures are 
being drawn up or modified but the use of the word “valued” also emphasises 
that their views are important.   A high proportion of positive responses would 
indicate that a good style of management is in place which is essential for 
developing a good safety culture. 
Statement 56 asserts “I am involved in informing management of important 
safety issues.”   This statement reinforces the answers to S54 and S55.   It 
tells us if the respondent is aware of the need to inform management of 
potential issues and also confirms that they are not afraid to highlight such 
issues.   An open communications process is essential for this to work 
effectively.   A high proportion of positive responses would show that 
employees’ views on safety management are valued. 
Statement 57 asserts “Management formally recognise exceptional safety 
performance.”   The emphasis of this statement is on the words “formally” and 
”exceptional”.   A high proportion of positive responses is desirable but the 
most likely situation in reality is an informal recognition of good safety 
management.    
Statement 58 asserts “I stop work for guidance when safety rules conflict with 
the task being carried out.”   This statement serves to reinforce the answers 
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given to S34, S37, S40 and S42.   A high proportion of positive responses 
would indicate that people place safety management very high on their list of 
priorities and are willing to delay or stop production for clarification when 
necessary.   This clearly shows the presence of a good safety culture 
positively reinforced by management.   It also serves to show that a good 
communications process is present between shop floor and management. 
Statement 59 asserts “I believe that members of my team could work more 
safely.”   This statement serves to find out what the respondent thinks of the 
behavioural safety of their colleagues.   A high proportion of positive 
responses would indicate that there is something wrong with the safety 
management system.   If most people answered positively then it would again 
suggest the people involved think that they are safer than others and, as 
discussed previously, they cannot all be correct.   A high number of positive 
responses would suggest that the business has some way to go to build a 
good safety culture. 
Statement 60 asserts “The company provides a means of mentoring poor 
performers.”   This statement serves to determine if the respondent is aware 
of a mentoring system for those personnel who have made mistakes or 
caused accidents.   In a good safety culture people who have made mistakes 
and caused accidents should not be allowed to continue without corrective 
action being taken but part of that action must include rehabilitation and 
training in order to build knowledge, experience and competence and to 
reinforce company safety values and expectations.   The self-esteem of a 
person who has caused an accident must not be reduced but their 
performance must be improved through positive reinforcement.   A high 
proportion of positive responses is therefore desirable.   A high proportion of 
negative responses would suggest that a blame culture may be present. 
Statement 61 asserts “I have been trained in safety leadership and safety 
behavioural skills expectations.”   This statement serves to discover if the 
company has a safety leadership programme in place and whether that 
programme extends to all employees or just to management and supervisors.   
It would be normal to have such a programme in place for managers and 
supervisors but this would not necessarily extend to shop floor workers 
directly.   The response profile is expected to follow the supervisor / shop floor 
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worker ratio but anything more positive than this would indicate a good safety 
culture being in place. 
Statement 62 asserts “I feel empowered to stop unsafe acts or safety 
breaches by others.”   This statement serves to determine the level of 
empowerment in place for each respondent.   A high proportion of positive 
responses would indicate a good safety culture where people can intervene in 
any situation where they see a potential for harm to occur.   Such 
empowerment can only come from repeated and on-going positive 
reinforcement from the management which indicates that a good safety 
culture is present throughout the business. 
Statement 63 asserts “I can report incidents without fear of repercussions to 
me or my colleagues.”   This statement serves to determine the actual attitude 
of the management through perception of the respondents in terms of 
determining whether a blame culture is present or whether the culture is 
centred on accident prevention and development of efficient and workable 
safety systems.   A high proportion of positive responses would indicate that a 
good safety culture has been developed over a significant period of time 
through a trusting relationship between management and shop floor.   A high 
proportion of negative responses would suggest that people are fearful of 
reporting accidents and near misses indicating the presence of a blame 
culture. 
Statement 64 asserts “I often rely on my own experience in making safety-
related decisions.”   This statement serves to determine several things.   
Firstly it will indicate if the respondents’ need to make safety-related decisions 
in their work activities and secondly it provides an indication of the 
respondents’ view of their own competence being adequate to make such 
decisions.   A high proportion of positive responses could also indicate 
whether the company is satisfied that its employees have reached a level of 
competence with which they are empowered to make such decisions. 
Statement 65 asserts “My colleagues are able to determine risk and make 
appropriate decisions to maintain safety.”   This statement serves to 
determine what the respondent thinks of the competence of their colleagues 
in terms of safety-related decision making.   It gives an indication of the level 
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of trust in terms of working safely that is present between colleagues.   S64 
asks the same question of the respondents’ level of competence whereas 
S65 asks the question of the respondents’ perception of their colleagues’ 
level of competence.   A high proportion of positive responses would indicate 
the presence of good team work built on trust, mutual respect and a high level 
of competence, i.e. an element of a good safety culture. 
Statement 66 asserts “I operate in a working environment where safety-
critical decision making processes are present.”   This statement serves to 
determine if there is a perception of high risk within the workplace from the 
respondents.   For the companies that took part within the research the 
expected response would be a high proportion of positives.   Some personnel 
may not be directly involved with the high risk tasks and may return an 
indifferent response but most would be expected to agree with the statement. 
B.7 My Manager Statements 
This series of statements serves to determine respondents’ views on the 
performance and attitude of their line managers.   There is one statement in 
this section that can be regarded as providing a certain expected response. 
Statement 67 asserts “My line manager has clearly defined my safety roles 
and responsibilities.”   This statement should have a 100% positive response 
as all companies involved in the research have induction systems in place in 
which the basic and most important safety rules, responsibilities and 
expectations are made clear.   Anything other than a completely positive 
response would indicate that the respondents were either not answering the 
survey truthfully or that they believed that they had not been clearly advised.   
Whether correct or not, the perceived situation is what is most important as it 
is the employee’s perception that determines what their thoughts are on the 
subject.   On-going reinforcement of such measures must be in place in order 
to ensure that personnel are aware of their roles and responsibilities. 
Statement 68 asserts “My line manager regularly spends time in operational 
areas.”   A good safety culture is built on good team work and 
communications between management and shop floor.   An on-going 
presence of management on the shop floor for the right reasons is a good 
way of building trust and communication channels, especially if positive 
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reinforcement is given at the same time.   Such a presence indicates that the 
management have a genuine concern for what happens on the shop floor.   A 
high positive response is desirable for this statement. 
Statement 69 asserts “My line manager ensures that safety tours are 
regularly carried out.”   This statement serves to determine if a system of 
workplace safety tours / inspections is in place and whether they are carried 
out regularly.   The statement also implies that the line manager is 
responsible for ensuring that such tours are carried out but the most important 
factor is they are in place and not necessarily who organises them.   A high 
proportion of positive responses is desirable.   A high proportion of negative 
responses would suggest that, although a workplace may have many safety 
controls and procedures, without regular auditing and interaction between 
management and shop floor they will not achieve the desired outcome. 
Statement 70 asserts “My line manager is good at communicating safety 
information to my team.”   Clearly a high positive response is the desirable 
outcome and this would indicate that respondents are satisfied that line 
managers are looking after the safety aspects of the team to an acceptable 
level.   A high negative response must be investigated and corrected if this 
situation is to be prevented from getting worse. 
Statement 71 asserts “My line manager influences my safety behaviour by 
example and by providing support for issues raised.”   This statement is only 
true for a company with a good safety culture and where good behaviours are 
set by management and positively reinforced by their actions.   A high 
negative response would indicate that what the management say and do are 
two different things and that such a situation must be addressed to build a 
better safety culture. 
Statement 72 asserts “My line manager is genuinely concerned about the 
health and safety of people at this workplace.”   This statement serves to 
determine the respondents’ perception of their manager’s empathy with their 
own workplace situation.   A high proportion of positive responses can only be 
achieved if the line manager is a good communicator and is constantly in 
contact with the workforce.   Their handling of worker concerns will 
undoubtedly affect how this statement is answered. 
   Page 286 of 322 
Statement 73 asserts “The safety manager only appears when there is a 
problem.”   This is an all too familiar statement to be heard in many industrial 
situations.   A company with a good safety culture will have a safety manager 
who is known to the workforce and who is approachable.   A high proportion 
of negative responses would indicate that the safety manager is a good 
communicator and has built a culture in which people are not afraid to raise 
their concerns regarding safety issues.   A high proportion of positive 
responses would indicate that the safety manager is not devoting sufficient 
time to core functions.   Building a better safety culture will not be possible 
until this attitude is corrected. 
Statement 74 asserts “My line manager devotes sufficient effort to health and 
safety.”   This statement serves to determine what the respondents’ 
perception of their line manager’s attitude to safety is.   A high proportion of 
positive responses would indicate that the respondent is satisfied with the 
safety performance of the manager. 
Statement 75 asserts “There are sufficient opportunities to communicate with 
senior managers about safety.”   This statement serves to determine if the 
respondent feels that they can discuss safety issues with managers often 
enough.   A high proportion of positive responses would indicate that senior 
managers take safety seriously enough to make themselves available for 
such discussions. 
Statement 76 asserts “My line manager sometimes turns a blind eye when 
the rules are bent.”   This situation can never be acceptable in any company.   
A positive response to this statement shows that the manager has distanced 
themself from their responsibilities and is no longer managing the situation 
competently.   Unfortunately, it will be the shop floor worker who will inevitably 
suffer the physical consequences.   With such poor management it is also 
likely that the shop floor worker will be “blamed” for the accident when it 
occurs.   It is feasible that the line manager may trust the worker sufficiently to 
carry out tasks by knowingly breaking the rules but positive reinforcement of 
such rule breaking will lead to propagation of such behaviour if it were to go 
unchecked and may ultimately result in an accident.   Only a high proportion 
of negative responses would be an acceptable outcome for this statement. 
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B.8 Communications Statements 
This series of statements serves to determine the state of communications 
within the business.   All of the answers to the “Communications” section are 
entirely dependent on a respondent’s own experience of the workplace, its 
systems (physical and organisational), its hazards and its risk to them as they 
carry out their allotted tasks. 
Statement 77 asserts “Shift handover communications are formal, structured 
and specifically cover safety aspects.”   This statement serves to determine 
whether such formal communications systems are in place and whether they 
are used at shift changeovers for the purposes of ensuring all safety aspects 
are adequately addressed between different teams of personnel.   A high 
proportion of negative responses would indicate that personnel are not 
communicating clearly with each other which may lead to misunderstandings 
and the creation of a situation which may contribute to an accident occurring. 
Statement 78 asserts “The consequences of poor communications are 
understood.”   This statement serves to determine whether the respondent 
understands the potential effects of poor communications directly and through 
escalation mechanisms.   Poor communications between shifts and 
operations / maintenance teams was a significant contributing factor in the 
Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea and many other documented accidents.   
All safety-related information must be handed off correctly if people are to be 
kept safe.   This statement reinforces the answer to S77.   Any mismatch 
between the two responses would indicate the presence of a potential 
problem but with an unwillingness to do anything to rectify the issue.   This 
would clearly be a poor safety culture. 
Statement 79 asserts “Formal safety communication systems are regularly 
reviewed.”   This statement is not expected to return a high positive response 
as such reviews and audits may not actually involve all personnel.   A high 
proportion of positive responses may not actually be directly indicative of a 
good safety culture.   A high proportion of negative responses however would 
mean that there is a problem that requires to be addressed. 
Statement 80 asserts “My input to safety is encouraged through several 
different means of communication.”   This statement is seeking to determine 
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the answers to two aspects.   Firstly; is the input from employees encouraged 
and secondly are there actually different methods of communication in place 
such as suggestion schemes (anonymity included), verbal, safety 
committees, unions, etc?   A good safety culture will provide multiple means 
of communication.   As with the previous statement a high proportion of 
positive responses would indicate a good safety culture but anything other 
than this would indicate that the views of the employees were not adequately 
valued by the management.   The statement also serves to determine 
whether the respondent is willing to put forward their views by intervening in 
potentially unsafe behaviours. 
Statement 81 asserts “Timely and effective feedback is provided on positive 
and negative issues raised.”   This statement serves to reinforce the answers 
given to S10, S28, S55, S70, and S75.   A good safety culture will always 
have effective communications and will provide feedback to personnel in 
order to ensure that learning points are used for the improvement of safety.   
Feeding back decisions made on all such issues builds upon the trust present 
between managers and shop floor and ensures that continued dialogue 
occurs. 
Statement 82 asserts “A schedule is provided for regular site visits by line and 
senior management to communicate with employees.”   This statement 
serves to determine if the respondents are aware of a formal schedule for 
workplace site visits by management.   This is most often achieved by the 
implementation of periodic safety tours or similar.   A high proportion of 
negative responses indicates an infrequent presence of management on the 
shop floor and would suggest that there are insufficient opportunities for 
safety discussions with management. 
Statement 83 asserts “There is good communication here about safety issues 
which affect me.”   This statement serves to determine what the respondents’ 
perception of the quality of communication is within the workplace.   Only a 
high proportion of positive responses would be expected for a workplace with 
a good safety culture. 
Statement 84 asserts “There is poor communications between operator and 
contractor staff.”   Safety discussions with contractors are just as important as 
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those with employees; possibly more so as a result of them having less 
knowledge and experience of the site.   This statement serves to confirm that 
the communication systems in place are utilised for all personnel at risk and 
not just employees. 
Statement 85 asserts “The identification and communication of solutions to 
problems is encouraged.”   This statement serves to determine the perception 
of the respondents’ worth to the business and reinforces the answers to S18, 
S54 and S80.   A company with a good safety culture will always encourage 
employees to share their ideas for improvements to safety within the plant. 
Statement 86 asserts “Safety communications are provided in clear and 
concise language avoiding jargon and abbreviations.”   This is an essential 
requirement for high risk workplaces if accidents are to be avoided.   Any 
misunderstandings of the intention of procedures and safety rules could have 
serious consequences.   Only a high proportion of positive responses is 
desirable for this statement. 
B.9 The Organisation Statements 
This series of statements serves to determine the respondents’ views of how 
the company approaches safety control and management.   There is one 
statement (S87) in this section that can be regarded as providing a certain 
expected response. 
Statement 87 asserts “An induction process is in place which provides clear 
expectations for all employees and contractors.”   Of all the companies that 
the author has visited not one hasn’t had some form of safety induction for 
employees and visitors.   This is also true for the companies that took part in 
the research survey.   This statement should therefore return only a positive 
response.   Any negative responses in this statement would suggest that the 
respondent has not filled in the survey truthfully or read the statements with 
enough care to place a high level of reliance on the responses to the other 
statements in the survey. 
Statement 88 asserts “A policy promoting personnel intervention in the 
interest of safety is in place and supported at all levels.”   Most companies 
have such policies in place.   A good safety culture would result in a high 
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proportion of positive responses.   The response to this statement reinforces 
the responses to S62 and S63. 
Statement 89 asserts “Clear and simple safety rules and principles are 
communicated to all employees and contractors.”   The response to this 
statement also reinforces those from S83, S84 and S87.   Only a high 
proportion of positive responses would be expected for a company with a 
good safety culture. 
Statement 90 asserts “The same rules apply to all personnel and at all levels.”   
This statement serves to determine if there is any hint of a “them and us” 
culture within the business.   Negative responses to this statement should not 
be present in a company with a good safety culture. 
Statement 91 asserts “The company cares about the health and safety of the 
people who work here.”   This statement serves to determine directly whether 
the respondents believe that the company genuinely cares about its people.   
Negative responses would indicate that perhaps the company cared more 
about the accident figures than the well-being of its employees. 
Statement 92 asserts “Management acts decisively when a safety concern is 
raised.”   This statement determines the respondents’ perception of how well 
management respond to safety concerns that are identified.   Only a high 
proportion of positive responses would be expected in a company with a good 
safety culture. 
Statement 93 asserts “The company encourages suggestions on how to 
improve health and safety.”   This statement tells us if there is a good safety 
culture in place where the management are seen to listen effectively to the 
views of the employees.   The statement reinforces the answers given to S18, 
S80 and S85. 
Statement 94 asserts “Personnel are actively encouraged to participate in 
initiatives which can improve safety.”   This statement serves to discover if 
respondents know of the existence of any such initiatives and whether they 
are actually involved.   Participation can build trust and contribute to better 
teamwork.   A high proportion of positive responses is desired. 
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Statement 95 asserts “This is a safer place to work than previous employers.”   
This statement serves to provide a baseline estimation of the respondents’ 
perception of risk with reference to other workplaces.   A high proportion of 
positive responses would be desirable.   A positive response would indicate 
that the other statements relating to their perception of safety may tend to be 
scored highly while a negative response may indicate that they are less 
content with their present situation than in previous workplaces and may have 
scored other safety-related statements lower. 
Statement 96 asserts “Sufficient resources are available for health and safety 
here.”   This determines the respondents’ perception of the general 
importance that management place on safety.   This statement also reinforces 
the answers to S27 and S46. 
Statement 97 asserts “Some safety rules / procedures are impractical.”   This 
statement serves to determine the respondents’ view of the quality of the 
existing rules and procedures and whether they believe that they are capable 
of working safely without them, i.e. potentially by taking shortcuts.   The 
statement serves to indicate whether they are likely to take shortcuts and 
reinforces the answers given to S14, S15, S46, S50, S51, S53, S76,  
Statement 98 asserts “Management sometimes turn a blind eye to health and 
safety procedures/instructions/rules being broken.”   This final statement 
serves to determine the respondents’ perception of whether management 
knowingly allow safety rules and procedures to be broken, i.e. positive 
reinforcement of a poor safety culture.   A high proportion of negative 
responses is desirable for this statement. 
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C. APPENDIX – SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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D. APPENDIX – ASSESSMENT TOOL EXAMPLE OUTPUT 
Table D.1: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Quality Factors 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 4.29 3 Average Empowerment 2.97 13 
Average N° Quality 9.16 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 3.05 11 
Average Disagrees 1.26 23 
Average Management 
pressure 3.18 9 
Average Blame 2.71 14 Average Valued / worth 3.39 7 
Average Colleague Trust 3.13 10 Average Safety promotion 2.34 17 
Average Intervention 3.82 4 Average Resources 3.03 12 
Average Communications 2.29 19 Average Indifferent 3.45 6 
Average Incident Management 1.76 20 Average Motivation 1.37 22 
Average Competence 2.32 18 Average Training 1.61 21 
Average R&R 2.66 15 Average SD/SA 3.39 7 
Average Safety Culture 3.79 5 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 8.82 2 
Average Organisational 
measures 2.39 16 Average Quality 3.31  
 
Table D.2: Company A Baseline: Modal / Mean Values 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 1 4 6.73 2 
Organisational 
measures 4 3 6.04 8 
Incident Management 5 0 5.68 9 
Competence 
Management 2 1 6.12 7 
Influencing factors 4 0 6.12 6 
My role 1 3 6.64 4 
My Manager 1 1 6.70 3 
Communications 1 1 6.31 5 
The organisation 0 6 6.90 1 
Total Check Value  
Mode 
Incident 
management 
The 
organisation 
 
 
Table D.3: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Values 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 149.00 
Maximum Questions Total Value 75.43 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 97.00 
Mean Total 57.24 
Mean Quality 76.18 
Maximum Safety Culture 7.58 
Safety Culture Value 4.84 
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Table D.4: Company A Baseline: Management Safety Culture Quality Factors 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 7.33 4 Average Empowerment 4.67 11 
Average N° Quality 10.00 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 4.33 13 
Average Disagrees 3.33 18 
Average Management 
pressure 6.00 6 
Average Blame 4.67 11 Average Valued / worth 4.33 13 
Average Colleague Trust 5.00 10 Average Safety promotion 2.67 20 
Average Intervention 6.00 6 Average Resources 6.00 6 
Average Comms 2.67 20 Average Indifferent 6.33 5 
Average Incident Management 1.67 23 Average Motivation 3.00 19 
Average Competence 4.33 13 Average Training 2.67 20 
Average R&R 3.67 16 Average SD/SA 8.67 3 
Average Safety Culture 6.00 6 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 10.00 1 
Average Organisational 
measures 3.67 16 Average Quality 5.09  
 
Table D.5: Company A Baseline: Management Modal / Mean Values 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 1 7.92 2 
Organisational 
measures 0 0 6.75 9 
Incident Management 2 0 6.81 8 
Competence 
Management 0 1 7.33 5 
Influencing factors 0 0 7.65 4 
My role 0 0 7.69 3 
My Manager 1 0 7.02 6 
Communications 0 0 6.83 7 
The organisation 0 1 8.08 1 
Total Check Value 3 3  
Mode 
Incident 
management 
Safety 
culture  
 
Table D.6: Company A Baseline: Management Safety Culture Values 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 149.00 
Maximum Questions Total Value 75.43 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 3.00 
Mean Total 66.08 
Mean Quality 117.00 
Maximum Safety Culture 7.58 
Safety Culture Value 6.21 
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Table D.7: Company A Baseline: Non-Management Safety Culture Quality Factors 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 3.72 3 Average Empowerment 2.66 10 
Average N° Quality 9.00 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 2.81 8 
Average Disagrees 0.88 23 
Average Management 
pressure 2.66 10 
Average Blame 2.34 15 Average Valued / worth 3.22 6 
Average Colleague Trust 2.78 9 Average Safety promotion 2.28 16 
Average Intervention 3.41 4 Average Resources 2.47 12 
Average Comms 2.22 17 Average Indifferent 2.91 7 
Average Incident Management 1.78 20 Average Motivation 1.06 22 
Average Competence 1.94 19 Average Training 1.41 21 
Average R&R 2.47 12 Average SD/SA 2.41 14 
Average Safety Culture 3.38 5 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 8.59 2 
Average Organisational 
measures 2.16 18 Average Quality 2.98  
 
Table D.8: Company A Baseline: Non-Management Modal / Mean Values 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 1 3 6.51 3 
Organisational 
measures 4 3 5.90 6 
Incident Management 3 0 5.47 9 
Competence 
Management 2 0 5.89 7 
Influencing factors 4 0 5.84 8 
My role 1 3 6.45 4 
My Manager 0 1 6.64 2 
Communications 1 1 6.21 5 
The organisation 0 5 6.68 1 
Total Check Value 16 16  
Mode 
Organisational 
measures 
The 
organisation  
 
Table D.9: Company A Baseline: Non-Management Safety Culture Values 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 127.00 
Maximum Questions Total Value 71.86 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 97.00 
Mean Total 55.59 
Mean Quality 68.53 
Maximum Safety Culture 6.83 
Safety Culture Value 4.58 
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Table D.10: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Quality Factors: Poor Quality Responses Removed 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 4.68 3 Average Empowerment 3.21 13 
Average N° Quality 9.29 2 
Average Procedural 
awareness 3.24 12 
Average Disagrees 1.29 23 
Average Management 
pressure 3.44 9 
Average Blame 2.94 14 Average Valued / worth 3.68 8 
Average Colleague Trust 3.38 10 Average Safety promotion 2.50 17 
Average Intervention 4.15 4 Average Resources 3.26 11 
Average Communications 2.44 19 Average Indifferent 3.79 6 
Average Incident Management 1.88 20 Average Motivation 1.41 22 
Average Competence 2.47 18 Average Training 1.71 21 
Average R&R 2.85 15 Average SD/SA 3.74 7 
Average Safety Culture 4.15 4 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 9.76 1 
Average Organisational 
measures 2.56 16 Average Quality 3.56  
 
Table D.11: Company A Baseline: Modal / Mean Values: Poor Quality Responses Removed 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 3 6.95 2 
Organisational 
measures 4 2 6.10 8 
Incident Management 5 0 5.78 9 
Competence 
Management 1 1 6.28 6 
Influencing factors 4 0 6.24 7 
My role 1 3 6.84 4 
My Manager 1 1 6.89 3 
Communications 1 1 6.46 5 
The organisation 0 6 7.12 1 
Total Check Value 17 17  
Mode 
Incident 
management 
The 
organisation  
 
Table D.12: Company A Baseline: Safety Culture Values: Poor Quality Responses Removed 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 149.00 
Maximum Questions Total Value 75.43 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 14.00 
Mean Total 58.67 
Mean Quality 81.82 
Maximum Safety Culture 7.58 
Safety Culture Value 5.04 
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Table D.13: Company A Baseline: Non-Management: Safety Culture Quality Factors: Poor Quality 
Responses Removed 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 4.11 3 Average Empowerment 2.89 10 
Average N° Quality 9.14 2 
Average Procedural 
awareness 3.00 9 
Average Disagrees 0.86 23 
Average Management 
pressure 2.89 10 
Average Blame 2.57 15 Average Valued / worth 3.54 6 
Average Colleague Trust 3.04 8 Average Safety promotion 2.46 16 
Average Intervention 3.75 4 Average Resources 2.68 12 
Average Communications 2.39 17 Average Indifferent 3.25 7 
Average Incident Management 1.93 20 Average Motivation 1.07 22 
Average Competence 2.07 19 Average Training 1.50 21 
Average R&R 2.68 12 Average SD/SA 2.68 12 
Average Safety Culture 3.75 4 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 9.71 1 
Average Organisational 
measures 2.32 18 Average Quality 3.23  
 
Table D.14: Company A Baseline: Non-Management: Modal / Mean Values: Poor Quality Responses 
Removed 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 2 6.74 3 
Organisational 
measures 4 2 5.96 7 
Incident Management 3 0 5.57 9 
Competence 
Management 1 0 6.06 6 
Influencing factors 4 0 5.94 8 
My role 1 3 6.65 4 
My Manager 0 1 6.86 2 
Communications 1 1 6.38 5 
The organisation 0 5 6.92 1 
Total Check Value 14 14  
Mode 
Organisational 
measures 
The 
organisation  
 
Table D.15: Company A Baseline: Non-Management: Safety Culture Values: Poor Quality Responses 
Removed 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 127.00 
Maximum Questions Total Value 71.86 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 14.00 
Mean Total 57.08 
Mean Quality 74.29 
Maximum Safety Culture 6.83 
Safety Culture Value 4.79 
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Table D.16: Company A Final: Safety Culture Quality Factors 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 4.88 3 Average Empowerment 2.04 10 
Average N° Quality 9.33 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 2.21 9 
Average Disagrees 1.00 22 
Average Management 
pressure 1.75 13 
Average Blame 2.96 5 Average Valued / worth 1.38 20 
Average Colleague Trust 1.83 12 Average Safety promotion 1.42 18 
Average Intervention 2.58 8 Average Resources 1.96 11 
Average Communications 1.42 18 Average Indifferent 0.92 23 
Average Incident Management 1.58 14 Average Motivation 1.46 17 
Average Competence 2.71 7 Average Training 1.33 21 
Average R&R 3.04 4 Average SD/SA 2.88 6 
Average Safety Culture 1.58 14 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 8.88 2 
Average Organisational 
measures 1.54 16 Average Quality 2.64  
 
Table D.17: Company A Final: Modal / Mean Values 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 3 6.30 3 
Organisational 
measures 0 0 5.54 8 
Incident Management 1 0 5.73 6 
Competence 
Management 3 6 6.32 2 
Influencing factors 4 0 5.20 9 
My role 0 0 5.95 5 
My Manager 1 0 6.33 1 
Communications 3 0 5.70 7 
The organisation 0 3 6.23 4 
Total Check Value 12 12  
Mode 
Influencing 
factors 
Competence 
management  
 
Table D.18: Company A Final: Safety Culture Values 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 127.50 
Maximum Questions Total Value 70.12 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 75.00 
Mean Total 53.30 
Mean Quality 60.67 
Maximum Safety Culture 6.79 
Safety Culture Value 4.28 
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Table D.19: Company A Final: Management: Safety Culture Quality Factors 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 7.33 3 Average Empowerment 4.00 8 
Average N° Quality 10.00 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 3.33 10 
Average Disagrees 1.17 23 
Average Management 
pressure 2.67 18 
Average Blame 6.00 4 Average Valued / worth 3.00 12 
Average Colleague Trust 2.67 18 Average Safety promotion 3.00 12 
Average Intervention 5.00 5 Average Resources 4.67 6 
Average Communications 3.00 12 Average Indifferent 2.17 22 
Average Incident Management 2.67 18 Average Motivation 3.00 12 
Average Competence 3.00 12 Average Training 2.67 18 
Average R&R 4.67 6 Average SD/SA 3.67 9 
Average Safety Culture 3.00 12 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 10.00 1 
Average Organisational 
measures 3.33 10 Average Quality 4.09  
 
Table D.20: Company A Final: Management: Modal / Mean Values 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 1 7.58 1 
Organisational 
measures 0 0 6.42 8 
Incident Management 1 0 6.14 9 
Competence 
Management 1 2 7.25 4 
Influencing factors 0 0 6.97 5 
My role 0 0 6.86 6 
My Manager 0 0 7.58 1 
Communications 1 0 6.75 7 
The organisation 0 0 7.50 3 
Total Check Value 3 3  
Mode 
Incident 
management 
Competence 
management  
 
Table D.21: Company A Final: Management: Safety Culture Values 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 127.50 
Maximum Questions Total Value 70.12 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 5.00 
Mean Total 63.05 
Mean Quality 94.00 
Maximum Safety Culture 6.79 
Safety Culture Value 5.55 
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Table D.22: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Quality Factors 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 3.75 3 Average Empowerment 1.42 11 
Average N° Quality 9.33 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 2.17 7 
Average Disagrees 0.92 17 
Average Management 
pressure 1.50 10 
Average Blame 2.50 5 Average Valued / worth 0.83 19 
Average Colleague Trust 1.33 12 Average Safety promotion 1.00 15 
Average Intervention 1.92 9 Average Resources 1.08 14 
Average Communications 0.92 17 Average Indifferent 0.50 23 
Average Incident Management 1.00 15 Average Motivation 0.75 22 
Average Competence 2.25 6 Average Training 0.83 19 
Average R&R 2.08 8 Average SD/SA 3.67 4 
Average Safety Culture 1.25 13 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 7.75 2 
Average Organisational 
measures 0.83 19 Average Quality 2.16  
 
Table D.23: Company A Final: Non-Management: Modal / Mean Values 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 2 5.89 3 
Organisational 
measures 0 0 5.29 8 
Incident Management 0 0 5.47 7 
Competence 
Management 2 1 5.64 4 
Influencing factors 3 0 4.22 9 
My role 0 0 5.56 5 
My Manager 0 0 6.00 2 
Communications 1 0 5.48 6 
The organisation 0 3 6.04 1 
Total Check Value 6 6  
Mode 
Influencing 
factors 
The 
organisation  
 
Table D.24: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Values 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 63.50 
Maximum Questions Total Value 56.40 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 75.00 
Mean Total 49.58 
Mean Quality 49.58 
Maximum Safety Culture 4.52 
Safety Culture Value 3.83 
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Table D.25: Company A Final: Safety Culture Quality Factors: Poor Quality Responses Removed 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 5.23 3 Average Empowerment 2.14 9 
Average N° Quality 9.27 2 
Average Procedural 
awareness 2.14 9 
Average Disagrees 1.00 22 
Average Management 
pressure 1.82 13 
Average Blame 2.68 7 Average Valued / worth 1.45 18 
Average Colleague Trust 1.91 12 Average Safety promotion 1.45 18 
Average Intervention 2.55 8 Average Resources 2.05 11 
Average Communications 1.45 18 Average Indifferent 0.95 23 
Average Incident Management 1.64 14 Average Motivation 1.50 17 
Average Competence 2.86 6 Average Training 1.41 21 
Average R&R 3.23 4 Average SD/SA 3.09 5 
Average Safety Culture 1.64 14 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 9.64 1 
Average Organisational 
measures 1.59 16 Average Quality 2.73  
 
Table D.26: Company A Final: Modal / Mean Values: Poor Quality Responses Removed 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 2 6.28 4 
Organisational 
measures 0 0 5.57 8 
Incident Management 1 0 5.73 7 
Competence 
Management 2 6 6.44 2 
Influencing factors 4 0 5.21 9 
My role 0 0 6.04 5 
My Manager 1 0 6.45 1 
Communications 3 0 5.76 6 
The organisation 0 3 6.34 3 
Total Check Value 11 11  
Mode 
Influencing 
factors 
Competence 
management  
 
Table D.27: Company A Final: Safety Culture Values: Poor Quality Responses Removed 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 127.50 
Maximum Questions Total Value 70.12 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 17.00 
Mean Total 53.84 
Mean Quality 62.68 
Maximum Safety Culture 6.79 
Safety Culture Value 4.35 
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Table D.28: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Quality Factors: Poor Quality 
Responses Removed 
Quality Factor Value Rank Quality Factor Value Rank 
Average Test Quality 4.30 3 Average Empowerment 1.50 11 
Average N° Quality 9.20 1 
Average Procedural 
awareness 2.00 7 
Average Disagrees 0.90 17 
Average Management 
pressure 1.60 10 
Average Blame 1.80 8 Average Valued / worth 0.90 17 
Average Colleague Trust 1.40 12 Average Safety promotion 1.00 15 
Average Intervention 1.70 9 Average Resources 1.10 14 
Average Communications 0.90 17 Average Indifferent 0.50 23 
Average Incident Management 1.00 15 Average Motivation 0.70 22 
Average Competence 2.50 5 Average Training 0.90 17 
Average R&R 2.30 6 Average SD/SA 4.30 3 
Average Safety Culture 1.30 13 
Average Consecutive 
Indifferent 9.20 1 
Average Organisational 
measures 0.80 21 Average Quality 2.25  
 
Table D.29: Company A Final: Non-Management: Modal / Mean Values: Poor Quality Responses 
Removed 
 
LOWEST 
SCORE 
HIGHEST 
SCORE 
MEAN 
Value Rank 
Safety culture 0 1 5.77 3 
Organisational 
measures 0 0 5.30 8 
Incident Management 0 0 5.43 7 
Competence 
Management 1 1 5.77 3 
Influencing factors 3 0 4.06 9 
My role 0 0 5.67 5 
My Manager 0 0 6.20 2 
Communications 1 0 5.57 6 
The organisation 0 3 6.25 1 
Total Check Value 5 5  
Mode 
Influencing 
factors 
The 
organisation  
 
Table D.30: Company A Final: Non-Management: Safety Culture Values: Poor Quality Responses 
Removed 
Safety Culture Value 
Maximum Quality Value 63.50 
Maximum Questions Total Value 56.40 
Maximum N° of Consecutive Indifferent Responses 17.00 
Mean Total 50.03 
Mean Quality 51.80 
Maximum Safety Culture 4.52 
Safety Culture Value 3.91 
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Figure D.1: Company A – Safety Culture Statements 
 
 
Figure D.2: Company A – Organisational Measures Statements 
 
 
Figure D.3: Company A – Incident Management Statements 
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Figure D.4: Company A – Competence Management Statements 
 
 
Figure D.5: Company A – Influencing Factors Statements 
 
 
Figure D.6: Company A – My Role Statements 
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Figure D.7: Company A – My Manager Statements 
 
 
Figure D.8: Company A – Communications Statements 
 
 
Figure D.9: Company A – The Organisation Statements 
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E APPENDIX – AUTHOR EXPERIENCE 
The author of this thesis comes from an engineering background having 
completed a 4-year apprenticeship in the oil and gas industry followed by nine 
years as a technician responsible for the inspection and maintenance of 
instrument and electrical equipment including safety-critical systems. 
This was followed by several professionally graded roles (also within the oil 
and gas industry) in project engineering, planning and instrument/electrical 
engineering. 
The author completed a bachelor of engineering honours degree in electronic 
and electrical engineering in 2002 and achieved Chartered Engineer status in 
2003. 
For the past eight years the author has operated his own engineering 
consultancy business specialising in health and safety within high-risk 
businesses, particularly with those businesses with flammable / explosive 
materials within their storage and processing systems.   The vast majority of 
the clients served are small to medium sized enterprises that do not employ 
personnel with the level of expertise necessary to ensure compliance with the 
relevant industrial laws or to satisfy the regulators that appropriate safety 
measures are in place to minimise risk to a tolerable level.   The type of work 
carried out includes performing HAZOP and SIL analysis, hazardous area 
classification and the provision of hazardous area risk assessments. 
The author’s experience in working within the multi-national oil and gas 
industry provided the baseline knowledge and experience essential for 
development of a business involved in working with SMEs. 
The author has carried out and is actively engaged in carrying out work for 
clients in a wide range of industry sectors including food and beverage, 
plastics manufacture, defence research & design, oil & gas, chemical, power 
generation (nuclear, coal, bio-fuels, gas), water treatment, semi-conductor, 
pharmaceutical, printing, civil aviation, powder coating and mining. 
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F APPENDIX – EXAMPLE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (COMPANY A) 
The tables below show an example of the reliability analysis carried out for 
each survey.   Only Company A baseline survey data is included. 
F.1 Company A – Safety Culture Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.852 .856 10 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S1 19.8125 19.629 .619 .541 .834 
  
S2 20.0625 20.996 .410 .806 .850 
  
S3 19.8750 17.050 .811 .810 .812 
  
S4 19.0625 20.729 .463 .594 .846 
  
S5 19.5625 20.529 .337 .472 .858 
  
S6 19.2500 19.000 .424 .725 .856 
  
S7 19.8750 20.250 .565 .600 .839 
  
S8 19.4375 17.463 .799 .883 .814 
  
S9 19.9375 18.329 .756 .838 .821 
  
S10 19.4375 19.463 .476 .370 .846 
 
F.2 Company A – Organisational Measures Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.509 .632 10 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S11 23.4375 6.796 .649 .907 .366 
  
S12 23.3125 7.163 .421 .905 .420 
  
S13 22.3750 8.383 .084 .774 .517 
  
S14 22.5625 6.663 .273 .751 .463 
  
S15 23.0625 7.929 .148 .850 .502 
  
S16 23.2500 7.533 .543 .702 .421 
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S17 23.1875 7.229 .625 .855 .396 
  
S18 23.1875 8.163 .101 .638 .516 
  
S19 22.8125 6.829 .473 .859 .397 
  
S20 22.3125 10.763 -.423 .782 .698 
 
F.3 Company A – Incident Management Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.710 .740 12 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S21 29.2667 13.638 .665 .967 .634 
  
S22 29.0667 13.924 .838 .914 .618 
  
S23 29.0000 16.429 .418 .970 .684 
  
S24 28.4667 16.410 .297 .912 .699 
  
S25 28.9333 14.924 .736 .996 .642 
  
S26 28.3333 19.238 -.119 .847 .742 
  
S27 28.8667 15.552 .774 .949 .651 
  
S28 28.6667 18.238 .014 .925 .739 
  
S29 28.5333 17.124 .272 .857 .701 
  
S30 28.6667 16.952 .170 .987 .721 
  
S31 28.8667 17.552 .053 .946 .747 
  
S32 28.7333 16.352 .448 .989 .680 
 
F.4 Company A – Competence Management Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.890 .897 10 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S33 23.0000 34.875 .520 .734 .886 
  
S34 23.0588 32.684 .757 .807 .870 
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S35 22.8235 32.654 .715 .850 .872 
  
S36 22.5294 33.390 .766 .858 .871 
  
S37 22.9412 40.684 -.053 .491 .927 
  
S38 23.5294 35.015 .657 .655 .878 
  
S39 22.7059 30.471 .792 .806 .866 
  
S40 23.0000 30.000 .844 .903 .861 
  
S41 22.8235 32.904 .689 .764 .874 
  
S42 23.3529 33.618 .814 .823 .869 
 
F.5 Company A – Influencing Factors Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.917 .914 11 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S43 24.8125 45.629 .632 .797 .912 
  
S44 24.8125 46.696 .667 .935 .910 
  
S45 25.0000 46.533 .691 .833 .909 
  
S46 24.6250 42.383 .813 .914 .902 
  
S47 25.1875 41.629 .834 .921 .901 
  
S48 25.1875 44.429 .869 .967 .901 
  
S49 25.3125 47.296 .751 .914 .908 
  
S50 24.8750 41.583 .911 .985 .896 
  
S51 25.1250 43.317 .737 .942 .907 
  
S52 24.7500 50.067 .413 .655 .920 
  
S53 24.0625 52.596 .135 .708 .932 
 
F.6 Company A – My Role Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.931 .940 13 
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Item-Total Statistics 
  Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S54 28.4211 53.480 .804 .931 .922 
  
S55 28.1579 52.807 .737 .910 .924 
  
S56 28.0000 51.111 .799 .881 .921 
  
S57 28.0526 52.719 .802 .894 .922 
  
S58 28.3684 51.246 .818 .883 .921 
  
S59 27.5263 61.152 .011 .880 .951 
  
S60 28.0000 54.333 .725 .912 .925 
  
S61 27.7368 53.427 .506 .788 .934 
  
S62 28.3158 50.673 .843 .935 .920 
  
S63 28.3158 50.117 .891 .942 .918 
  
S64 28.3158 55.339 .732 .949 .925 
  
S65 28.1579 53.918 .801 .960 .923 
  
S66 28.3158 53.339 .841 .972 .921 
 
F.7 Company A – My Manager Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.818 .858 10 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S67 21.3333 22.235 .692 .808 .790 
  
S68 21.6667 20.588 .791 .808 .774 
  
S69 21.1111 19.163 .805 .889 .765 
  
S70 21.0556 19.938 .841 .953 .766 
  
S71 21.0556 20.291 .701 .942 .779 
  
S72 21.3889 20.016 .797 .976 .770 
  
S73 19.8333 34.971 -.788 .796 .936 
  
S74 21.3333 20.353 .797 .955 .772 
  
S75 21.0556 20.997 .670 .763 .784 
  
S76 21.1667 19.441 .658 .774 .782 
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F.8 Company A – Communications Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.918 .921 10 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S77 22.0000 29.875 .646 .942 .913 
  
S78 22.2353 27.816 .852 .866 .900 
  
S79 22.2941 31.596 .468 .811 .923 
  
S80 22.3529 29.743 .699 .908 .910 
  
S81 22.3529 30.743 .775 .947 .908 
  
S82 22.0588 28.434 .730 .847 .908 
  
S83 22.5294 29.390 .795 .937 .905 
  
S84 22.1765 29.279 .680 .878 .911 
  
S85 22.5882 29.632 .793 .941 .905 
  
S86 22.2941 31.346 .570 .866 .917 
 
F.9 Company A – The Organisation Section 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items N of Items 
.872 .890 12 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
  
S87 24.9474 33.275 .724 .759 .852 
  
S88 24.6316 33.579 .775 .798 .851 
  
S89 24.8421 33.807 .760 .951 .852 
  
S90 24.8947 34.877 .653 .938 .858 
  
S91 24.8947 31.322 .844 .899 .843 
  
S92 24.9474 31.053 .916 .928 .839 
  
S93 24.7895 32.398 .733 .890 .850 
  
S94 24.7368 31.760 .785 .923 .847 
  
S95 24.5263 32.041 .651 .737 .855 
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S96 24.8421 31.696 .845 .920 .843 
  
S97 23.7895 43.398 -.351 .742 .916 
  
S98 24.5789 39.368 -.027 .746 .904 
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G APPENDIX – EXAMPLE FACTOR ANALYSIS (COMPANY A) 
The tables below show an example of the factor analysis carried out for each 
survey.   Only Company A baseline survey data is included. 
G.1 Company A – Factor Analysis – Safety Culture Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 
  
S1 .492 .365 .341 
  
S2 .934 -.169 .099 
  
S3 .702 .445 .351 
  
S4 -.004 .792 .159 
  
S5 .017 -.009 .864 
  
S6 .100 .897 -.075 
  
S7 .365 .100 .732 
  
S8 .387 .833 .245 
  
S9 .861 .333 .194 
  
S10 .205 .182 .676 
 
G.2 Company A – Factor Analysis – Organisational Measures Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 
  
S11 .938 .162 .077 .129 
  
S12 .858 .179 -.192 .211 
  
S13 -.338 -.178 .665 .495 
  
S14 .087 -.083 .919 -.182 
  
S15 .315 .214 -.100 .895 
  
S16 .800 .102 .062 .016 
  
S17 .643 .393 .479 -.334 
  
S18 .194 .718 -.135 -.057 
  
S19 .262 .713 .554 .074 
  
S20 -.082 -.906 .087 -.229 
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G.3 Company A – Factor Analysis – Incident Management Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 
  
S21 .882 .132 -.242 .051 
  
S22 .854 .229 .028 .233 
  
S23 .205 .578 -.114 .687 
  
S24 .261 .030 -.053 .892 
  
S25 .886 -.048 .355 -.036 
  
S26 -.006 .216 -.826 -.184 
  
S27 .797 .193 .116 .231 
  
S28 .109 .015 .807 -.325 
  
S29 .080 .883 -.048 .041 
  
S30 .015 .893 -.183 .140 
  
S31 .476 -.360 .536 -.423 
  
S32 .733 -.326 .124 .090 
 
G.4 Company A – Factor Analysis – Competence Management Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 
  
S33 .759 .113 
  
S34 .368 .786 
  
S35 .814 .278 
  
S36 .800 .356 
  
S37 -.582 .654 
  
S38 .234 .808 
  
S39 .539 .676 
  
S40 .815 .439 
  
S41 .781 .296 
  
S42 .442 .782 
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G.5Company A – Factor Analysis – Influencing Factors Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 
  
S43 .731 -.172 
  
S44 .715 .150 
  
S45 .768 -.086 
  
S46 .861 .037 
  
S47 .885 .052 
  
S48 .858 .431 
  
S49 .744 .508 
  
S50 .920 .139 
  
S51 .782 .150 
  
S52 .388 .743 
  
S53 .327 -.857 
 
G.6 Company A – Factor Analysis – My Role Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 
  
S54 .881 .151 
  
S55 .912 -.057 
  
S56 .767 .310 
  
S57 .693 .444 
  
S58 .681 .542 
  
S59 .525 -.775 
  
S60 .444 .820 
  
S61 .259 .736 
  
S62 .715 .538 
  
S63 .761 .527 
  
S64 .550 .669 
  
S65 .823 .241 
  
S66 .752 .450 
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G.7 Company A – Factor Analysis – My Manager Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 
  
S67 .419 .682 
  
S68 .546 .653 
  
S69 .850 .372 
  
S70 .786 .501 
  
S71 .873 .229 
  
S72 .301 .918 
  
S73 -.770 -.398 
  
S74 .305 .917 
  
S75 .199 .801 
  
S76 .863 .199 
 
G.8 Company A – Factor Analysis – Communications Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 
  
S77 .188 .879 
  
S78 .597 .665 
  
S79 -.003 .833 
  
S80 .599 .508 
  
S81 .661 .509 
  
S82 .467 .664 
  
S83 .895 .271 
  
S84 .860 .136 
  
S85 .709 .482 
  
S86 .825 .011 
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G.9 Company A – Factor Analysis – The Organisation Section 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 
  
S87 .541 .394 .562 
  
S88 .726 .403 -.023 
  
S89 .313 .910 .130 
  
S90 .194 .939 .085 
  
S91 .668 .489 .169 
  
S92 .616 .704 .206 
  
S93 .889 .165 .132 
  
S94 .883 .299 -.051 
  
S95 .848 .184 -.148 
  
S96 .564 .714 .236 
  
S97 -.026 -.206 -.824 
  
S98 -.100 -.006 .922 
 
 
/End 
